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Nations reel and stagger on their way; they make hideous mistakes; they commit frightful 
wrongs; they do great and beautiful things. And shall we not best guide humanity by 
telling the truth about all this, so far as the truth is ascertainable? 
 
…If the record of human action is going to be set down with that accuracy and 
faithfulness of detail which will allow its use as a measuring rod and guidepost for the 
future of nations, there must be some set of standards of ethics in research and 
interpretation. 
  
-W.E.B. Du Bois, “Social Science and Civil Rights”, Black Reconstruction in America 
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ABSTRACT 
States regularly use fear of terrorist threats to gain support for domestic 
political agendas and promote geostrategic interests. Consecutive U.S. presidents 
have cited the theory of the just war to defend these policies and particular 
violations of national sovereignty. Those doubtful of whether existing threats 
justify violations of privacy and territorial integrity also use fear — of corruption, 
mission creep, and unintended consequences — claiming that such interventions 
are a cure worse than the disease, yet one about which domestic audiences are 
easily misled.  
To combat abuse of moral arguments for the use of force, some in peace 
and conflict studies advocate military force be restricted to self-defense, per strict 
interpretation of the United Nations Charter (as in international legal 
positivism), or restricted completely (as in pacifism). Because the goal of 
reducing violent conflict is nearly universally acceptable, these varieties of 
noninterventionism are rarely scrutinized. In social psychological peace research 
(SPPR) on public opinion, however, positivism and prescriptive pacifism mask 
	  	   x 
the diversity of opinion on whether and when intervention is necessary to curb 
aggression, prevent atrocity, and/or restore stability in failed states. 
This project critically examines SPPR’s positivistic premises and the 
political implications of moral skepticism generally. In an intellectual history of 
the discipline, I contrast scientific emphasis on certainty in the formulation of 
threat and risk-avoidance with the humanities’ appreciation of the ethical 
implications of uncertainty, also at the heart of just war theory. Taking Albert 
Bandura’s social cognitive theory (SCT) of moral dis/engagement as a case 
study, I argue that SPPR skepticism of individual citizens’ moral judgment 
implicitly endorses elite or consensus-driven models of social and political 
change. The determinism, consequentialism, and institutional gradualism of 
SPPR approaches, I argue, contradict stated progressive aims and the egalitarian 
individualism behind liberal conceptions of the rule of law and international 
human rights regime. 
Using just war’s ethical framework and a non-consequentialist Kantian 
theory of moral judgment, I construct a reasoning model and coding manual for 
use in public opinion research on international conflict. These instruments 
operationalize moral dis/engagement in a manner consistent with political 
liberalism and humanitarian law, including the Responsibility to Protect. 
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PREFACE 
There is a commonplace: history is the history of war. Its recitation 
conveys a sort of stolid resignation in the face of past and future suffering that 
often passes for wisdom. The point of departure for this project is a meditation 
on history that suggests wisdom requires something else entirely: to resist the 
attempt to make either history or human nature into a science governed by 
immutable laws, while maintaining an understanding of behavior in each context 
as nonetheless rule-governed. It grew from a related question: What would it 
mean for history’s operative principle to be freedom, and its corollary, 
responsibility?  
This meditation, its question and corollary were irrigated not just by 
reading history, but the classics of Western literature, each of which represents 
its own reflection on the subject of the past’s bearing on the eternal present, and 
the relationship of the fiction to nonfiction. Such language makes the subject 
seem philosophic, personal — even spiritual; my conviction is that in addition to 
these, the question of the interplay of freedom and responsibility is essentially 
political. Rather than separate realms of inquiry, the political and moral 
interpenetrate, building the drama of the mentioned works, literary and 
historical.  
The importance of the inquiry, however, is hardly limited to the dramatic 
artist, author, or historian; these reflections on freedom and responsibility, rights 
and duties, are questions for the living. Nowhere is the tension of competing 
rights and obligations more pronounced than in international politics, 
	  	   xii 
particularly questions of responsibility and blame in preventing war and 
promoting peace.  
In one of the oldest and richest descriptions of war in Western literature, 
Homer’s Zeus wonders not at the destruction of Troy, but at why in its aftermath 
humans blame the gods. Mortals know that by being born, each owes a death, 
which should make the little peace in these short lives precious. Just as precious 
to mortals, however, is the glory to be won from fighting (or writing) which is 
seen as a proxy for immortality. Still, fame could be pursued honorably and 
according to the rules, as by Achilles, or with the poison-tipped cunning of 
Odysseus. The choice is ever ours. 
The research and writing for this project have reinforced in me the idea 
that the possibility of a future more peaceful than what preceded rests on the 
fungibility of what it is that humans praise and prize — what is sacred and what 
remains open to doubt. Humans have proven they will fight and die for either, 
faith and the right to doubt, though the arational seems to have a stronger pull 
than the rational. Rather than a liability of human nature, what if this were a 
failure of contemporary storytellers, historians, and intellectuals to adequately 
praise the fight for peace above the din of daily revelations of crisis, hypocrisy, 
and deceit? 
Because how and when groups fight says as much about the justness of 
their cause as any formal statement, a theory of what justifies the use of force has 
been around as long as political dissent itself. Because power cannot be its own 
justification any more than could an orderly peace disallowing dissent, 
	  	   xiii 
successive experiments in political organization have been undertaken to pry 
open the space in between. Though it is easy to think of this process as social or 
political evolution, the metaphor is misleading; the enlarged freedom provided 
by education — versus chance, wealth, or brute force — is the main mechanism 
by which the species changes not only itself but the selecting environment for the 
better.  
The difficulty is that this process of popular improvement is decentralized 
and willful, and, as educators know and politicians often forget, cannot be 
achieved through any ‘top-down’ reformation of thinking. The challenge of 
finding the best for the most is in this way not unlike finding the price of 
commodities in the marketplace: autonomous but rule governed; dependent on 
taste, but not fixed. In this analogy, the tenets of just war theory are the 
minimum regulation necessary to keep all good faith players in the game, and 
deter those with a demonstrated wish to cheat the system.  
Plato would ask in Republic whether it was not wiser to ban poets who 
glorified warriors, or wealth, if not war itself. Though no democrat, Plato 
ultimately undermines the Socratic suggestion to censor Homer by linking it to 
increasingly outrageous attempts to control what people value. The lesson is 
prescient: given the inhumanity invited by the political manipulation of opinion, 
the best hope for politics is to prompt reflection and discussion among citizens 
and leaders on commonly held opinions, such as those on the permanence of war 
or the propriety of the use of force in securing peace. It is my hope that the 
present work will contribute to this conversation in its own modest way.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Two pillars of Western civilization, Athens and Jerusalem, stand as a 
shorthand for the secular–religious tension underlying liberal pluralism. The 
cultures for which they are metonyms gave birth to the political, artistic, 
linguistic, and ethical paradigms under which Europe and the United States 
came to maturity and eventually, dominance. Expressive domains like art, 
custom, and language have evolved, like cuisine, according to taste. The areas of 
science, religion, ethics are more universal in their pronouncements as they each 
address beliefs and values that relate to human need, not just particular 
preference. Depending on one’s worldview, politics is either the arena in which 
these domains vie for supremacy, or in which they achieve mutual 
accommodation. Arriving at this accommodation by vote or informal consensus 
might be fitting for matters preference, but the named tension persists on matters 
of need, which require a less arbitrary foundation than the shifting (if not 
shiftless) majority opinion.  
Procedural aspects of politics are therefore inseparable from its substance 
insofar as they define which parties have the authority to define the politically 
“necessary” — shaping society’s goals, their stakes, and what constitutes 
acceptable risk in their pursuit. For this reason, ‘anarchical’ international politics 
is often framed as fundamentally eristic, as if conduct and procedure are 
determined solely by the nation or group of nations enjoying supremacy. This is 
one way among many of explaining continuity and change in international 
relations (Crawford 2002), but, as Robert Jackson and other advocates of the 
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classical humanist approach have pointed out, it is one that has difficulty 
accounting for the normative dimension of politics (2000: 44–55).  
Though demonstrative of the competitive side of politics, the state system 
that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century seems to be less about 
dominance or the balance of power as respect — the pluralism of member states, 
writ large. Both science and religion are of only ancillary utility in this effort to 
reconcile the values of universality and respect for difference. The state system 
relies principally on norms of trust and communication that permit the 
elaboration of international law (Wright 2001) and together constitute 
international ethics. International ethics are less like the de jure guide of a 
professional association as the de facto shared normative framework that a world 
of difference dictates: recognition, particularly the formal recognition of 
diplomacy (Jackson 2000: 10). 
Even if representative government or the separability of political life into 
private and public realms made their debut in the West, they are not peculiarly 
Western but based on common values of recognition and reciprocity. This is also 
true of the very idea that aspects of politics and ethics might be universal, 
continuous across cultures. While these ideas and the institutions like the nation-
state, the university, and popular houses of parliament that represent them all 
had their birth in the West, they presumably enjoy near universal assent not 
because they were propagated by force but because the egalitarian principles 
underlying each. Just as the astrolabe and compass, paper and writing were too 
attractive to such imaginative, adventurous creatures to remain the property of 
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the Far or Middle East, the named “Western” institutions and ideas are 
inherently choiceworthy to rationally autonomous creatures. 
For the success of these principles and institutions to represent, on 
aggregate, something other than duress, cultural imperialism, or evolutionary 
adaptation, we should like to know that, a) this assent is freely given over and 
against a range of other options, b) due to the merits (effectiveness, adaptivity, 
stability) of each rather than c) material, geographic, or other accidental factors in 
the selecting environment (Diamond 1999; 2004). Despite being a Wilsonian 
neologism, “self-determination” is emblematic of this class of universally 
appealing normative principles or institutions that happen to have made their 
debut in a Western context. To take root and flower, these innovations seem to 
require a general climate of cosmopolitan openness — accommodating the kind 
of diversity present not just in Athens and Jerusalem, but in capitols and 
crossroads the world over (Popper 1971; Wright 2001). 
This dissertation project is concerned with one member of this class of 
normative principles and institutions at the meeting of the two traditions: that 
substratum of international ethics known as just war theory. Addressing the 
criteria above, the argument I wish to defend is that the just war tradition 
remains the dominant paradigm in international law and ethics governing the 
use of force for reasons independent of its antiquity or affiliation. As such, it 
ought to be studied in international relations, social science, and peace and 
conflict studies as practical normative theory — a constraint on power rather 
than power’s tool of constraint as it is portrayed more often than not. In my 
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presentation of its development and contemporary significance, I argue that just 
war is better understood as expressive than formative of public opinion, and 
more restrictive than permissive of political and military officials. Like law, its 
breach is not indicative of its failure, but ours. 
In defending this thesis, I look at just war’s particular moral justifications 
for the use of force and their criteria: actions of self-defense, other-defense, and 
humanitarian intervention declared by a legitimate authority with right intention 
and a good chance of success. I engage criticism from Albert Bandura and others 
involved in social psychological peace research that the idea of a justified 
violation of national sovereignty is too prone to abuse to be useful in the postwar 
international order, nor in the post-9/11 era of asymmetrical warfare. In meeting 
these objections, I employ both classical humanist and Kantian constructivist 
understandings of the moral basis for just war, particularly the grounding of 
national sovereignty and good governance in the protection of individual 
autonomy (and its enlargement, barring intentional harm). These criteria are, I 
argue, more substantively and procedurally democratic than competing 
prescriptive paradigms such as pacifism, legalism, or foreign policy realism, and 
necessary to the proper functioning of democracy in a world of states. 
In the first chapter, I situate debate over the persistence of war and the 
possibility of peace in the interpretive context of Western literature and 
philosophy. In so doing, I argue, one can reduce this artificial binary to the more 
basic tension between competing understandings of freedom and necessity, or 
natural versus social or ‘constructed’ order. To recognize this tension as itself 
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irreducible is to open the question of the proper relationship of morality to 
politics, and the problem of necessary, if not moral, violence in protection of 
freedom. I use this distillation to introduce three possible metaethical, or ‘onto-
epistemic’ positions, each defining the ‘natural’ (how the world is/humans are), 
the ‘knowable’ (how much certainty can humans have and about what), and the 
ethical implications of these limits. The mediate, plural, and normative character 
of politics I described in the opening pages indicates that whichever of these 
understandings of the politically possible predominates at a given time will be 
due to considerations apart from sheer power or the power of persuasion. 
The proposition is that contrary to contemporary folk wisdom, politics is 
not value free (per positivism) and that values are not merely expressive of the 
preference of the powerful (per critical theory), nor of some ‘enlightened’ elite 
(per postmodernism), nor, importantly, a shifting and arbitrary consensus (per 
social constructivism). This negative thesis undercuts the explicit descriptive and 
prescriptive claims of the major schools of international relations (IR): realism, 
pacifism, liberalism, and IR constructivism, posing a sustained challenge to 
positivist and post-positivist social scientific and IR methodologies. Thus, the 
first chapter’s distillation and critique creates the space for the subsequent 
chapters’ exploration of a common sense middle ground that exists between 
liberal and realist poles and the often-polarizing discussions of war, justification, 
and the possibility of moral violence. In later chapters I stake out this middle 
ground with the Kantian constructivist and classical humanist theses that the 
structure of rational agency and state sovereignty, respectively, underpin norms 
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of respect and reciprocity. These in turn influence perceptions of political 
possibility (peace) and political reality (force). 
This opening chapter also launches a corollary argument against the social 
constructivist ‘legitimacy framework’ approach to international ethics of the 
Welsh/Aberystwyth School, represented by theorists such as Alex Bellamy and 
Ian Clark. Bellamy argues that just war is a pastiche of “sub-traditions”: 
legalism/positive law, realism, and natural law — forerunner to Kantian 
reformism and liberal humanitarianism (Bellamy 2006: 8, 127). I argue this last 
grouping ignores the crucial metaethical difference between the simplistic moral 
realism of natural law, and the objective ethics provided by a cognitivist 
interpretation of Kantian constructivism (Bagnoli 2013). As importantly, this sub-
tradition is truest to the deontological jus in bello core of just war tradition, and 
gives the strongest defense of the contemporary consensus around the 
Responsibility to Protect. After presenting the three major parts of just war 
theory, I devote the remainder of the chapter to a dialogic history of the 
tradition’s development up to the modern era. I pay special attention to its chief 
expositor, Thomas Aquinas, focusing on the precocious connection he draws 
between legitimate authority and the space for independently directed 
individual development — a good which is the end of sovereignty for secular 
and ecclesiastical visions alike. 
 The second chapter continues the dialogic history of just war, examining 
the competition between realism, legalism, and reformism that emerged with the 
dissolution of its traditional natural law basis. It culminates in the thought of 
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Immanuel Kant, who I champion as an underappreciated expositor of just war 
principle and practice. Chapter Three paints a picture of the post-Kantian eclipse 
of jus ad bellum by realism, romantic nationalism, and legal positivism. 
Interspersed is an impressionistic intellectual history of the nineteenth and first 
half of the twentieth century — a period which saw the birth of psychology and 
the social sciences, their positivist and behavioralist revolutions, and the 
consolidation of the modern university system whose journals of experimental 
research, publishing houses, and faculty connections with government and 
industry all helped popularize these developments. 
The purpose of this third, linking chapter is to draw parallels from the 
development and historical conditions of the three named schools of 
international relations to those of late-Enlightenment scientific materialism 
(ontology), industrial revolution utilitarianism and turn-of-the-century 
pragmatism (ethics), and interwar period logical positivism (epistemology). This 
history is necessary prologue to understanding how the intellectual pedigree of 
the relatively new fields of social psychology and international relations bears on 
their particular understanding of mass democracy, normative theory, and the 
role of public opinion in the use of force. These differ markedly from the onto-
epistemic premises of political theory and just war theory, which are enjoying a 
modest resurgence amid renewed post-positivist interest in normative 
philosophy. 
 Chapter Four narrows the focus of this intellectual history still further to 
the life and work of one of the most influential social psychologists of this 
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century and last, Albert Bandura. From his early work in social learning theory, 
to his development of social cognitive theory and its widely used moral 
dis/engagement paradigm, I interpret Bandura’s prolific fifty-year career as 
illustrative of the split in social psychology between behaviorists/evolutionary 
psychologists and positivists. The remainder of the chapter is a critique of 
Bandura’s principally positivist or ‘sociogenic’ account of moral standards and 
moral judgment. It flags some of the ethical inconsistencies and cross-
disciplinary misunderstandings that contribute to the misconstrual of just war 
theory. 
 The final chapter attempts to set aright some of these misrepresentations 
of just war theory and public opinion in social psychological peace research 
(SPPR) by presenting two original coding frameworks, the Moral Reasoning 
Model (MRM) and Just War Coding Manual (JWM). Originally developed for 
use in coding and ranking qualitative responses to survey questions on issues in 
war, peace, and intervention, the two instruments are also illustrative of 
deontological alternatives to the consequentialist and/or legalist frameworks 
dominant in SPPR. Rather than rating responses on a scale ranging from more to 
less militaristic, with poles of engaged pacifism and disengaged militarism, the 
MRM and JWM incorporate legitimate rationales for the use of force in 
international law and convention, such as the Responsibility to Protect. They are 
therefore better equipped to deal with the exceptions and qualifications that 
many respondents offer when given the opportunity to elaborate on Likert scale 
agreement or disagreement with such contested questions in international ethics 
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as the violation of national sovereignty. These instruments have the added 
advantage of enabling coders to discriminate between instrumental nationalistic 
and ideological or religious justifications for intervention or nonintervention. 
This enhanced sensitivity to styles of justification has obvious implications for 
both the competency and authority that citizens in a democracy might justifiably 
claim on matters of foreign policy, on policies of governmental transparency and 
accountability, and on the formal and informal educational material contributing 
to opinion formation on the use of force and diplomacy in international relations.  
As stated in the Preface, my hope is that this project helps facilitate 
interdisciplinary dialogue on just war and the role of normative theory generally 
in moral psychology and international relations. If it does not directly provide 
the requisite competency for more enlightened public debate, at least it might 
highlight the underestimated importance of such in democracies. Where it fails, 
the authors who appear throughout and in the bibliography I trust will succeed.
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Chapter One: 
Why Just War? 
 
 
[R]ecognition of sovereignty is the only way 
we have of establishing an arena within 
which freedom can be fought for and 
(sometimes) won. 
 
-Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 
 
What men call sovereignty is a worldly 
strife and constant war 
 
-Muhibbi, For the Throne 
 
 
These epigrams capture an ancient contest between fatalism of the 
worldly wise, the opposing faith that through work and wit, the human lot can 
be gradually improved. From one age to the next, humans alternate between 
stories bearing morals of the first and second kind, one for children and optimists 
in times of peace and plenty, the other by and for those who have seen darker 
days and claim a finer appreciation for human drama, including that brought by 
war and scarcity. Occasionally, the oscillations between the two types become so 
tight that they mingle and blur, leaving the audience at that cultural or historical 
juncture to determine the moral, and to create new stories about what is and 
what can be. 
In the Iron Age, a tradition of oral poetry cataloguing Bronze Age exploits 
and a semi-mythic past was committed to writing in the Greek Epic Cycle. The 
minor tone of the sung verse carries over into the loss of the Iliad and the longing 
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that characterizes the Odyssey. These themes are captured in the epigram from 
“Muhibbi”, penname of Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent: freedom, 
though hard fought, is a mirage and even the powerful are laid low with time. 
Homer’s Zeus, the son of Time, admits at the outset of the Odyssey that this 
elemental rule determines human experience in ways that petitions to the 
Pantheon or lesser gods cannot alter. Greeks living in Athens’ Golden Age 
incorporated this tragic wisdom into purgative dramatic art that managed to be 
as celebratory of human excellence (arete) as it was cautionary of human 
shortcoming (hamartia). 
In the roughly contemporaneous origin story of a nomadic Semitic people, 
more West Asian or Middle Eastern than Westerners, the Genesis author 
illustrates the relationship between striving and overreach as originating in 
choice, not nature. Some combination of inattention to the supernaturally fixed 
limits of human nature, and the aspiration to unfix them make man and woman 
more than clay or rib. Though there remained for some a promised land, the 
ejection from Eden inaugurated conflict between man and nature, and man and 
man — privation punctuated by spurts of abundance, won and lost through war. 
While the Torah strikes a similarly cautionary tone to the early Greeks, its 
significance for modern interpreters is closer to that of those later Athenians’. 
Conflict becomes constitutive of human nature only after a fateful choice in favor 
of complete knowledge, or certainty. The unwillingness to recognize limits itself 
imposes a limit, but, crucially, human agency — the capacity to recognize and act 
on limits — precedes and follows this curse. Destiny governs the fate of those 
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first humans, warriors and pastoralists, but the ‘technologies’ of didactic and 
dramatic art, written and spoken, are epoch-making. Beyond articulating rules or 
commandments, these uses of language liberate and compel; they spark the 
imagination, create awareness of snares — of archetypal passion and pride and 
poisonous envy. They arm reflective persons with the knowledge to predict 
consequence, sidestep traps, and ultimately, to enhance and enjoy freedom — to 
re-create. 
Though accretive and heritable, art and storytelling are more organic or 
‘memetic’ than technological, meaning that part of their liberating potential 
comes from the fact that they belong to no one and cannot be controlled. That 
stories seem to take on a life of their own speaks not to their infinite malleability 
but rather, to their unique ability to draw out the values of host populations. This 
power to reflect value, to channel desire, to defer gratification, and even to 
inspire sacrifice is something more than evolutionary; it is progressive and 
humanistic. It is the lightning that education attempts to bottle. 
The present work is a reflection on a particular set of values drawn out in 
the millennia-long global conversation that is classical humanism, which have 
jointly become known as the ‘just war’ tradition. Rather than a ‘theory’ as it is 
often called, it is better conceived as a political self-understanding which entails a 
set of rights and responsibilities relating to the perennial human activities of war 
and peacemaking.  
Though rarely acknowledged as such, just war is premised on the 
constancy of uncertainty coupled with the necessity of decision and action. The 
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first feature, our ‘invincible ignorance’, is the main reason for morality, and the 
wellspring of the virtues of humility and prudence (Bagnoli 2013: 20, O’Neill 
1989: 70–71). The second feature is the essence of politics: the same quality of 
limitation or scarcity demands intelligent tradeoffs that do the best for the most 
without violating the rights of any. The joint pursuit of knowledge of these two 
areas — of origins and outcomes — animate political life, but also the intellectual 
life of the arts and the sciences. 
Myth and mystery seem to end with science, or scientific certainty of 
origins and sure probabilities of outcomes, which also augurs the end of politics, 
or end of history, as it has been called more recently. The successful negotiation 
of preferences (and their convergence in the “universal homogenous state” it 
presumes) would mark the end of armed conflict, and obviate the need for a 
theory of the just war (Hegel 1991, Kojève 1980, Fukuyama 1992). This is also the 
conclusion of positivist scientific and legal approaches to international politics. 
The same classical Greeks who marked firsts in history, philosophy, and 
drama also sparked scientific inquiry, but acknowledged the possibility that 
there is no knowledge to be had of first things, which are always the subject of 
reasonable belief. If this is true, politics looks more like poetry (a cognate of 
‘power’; literally, a ‘making’), than philosophy or science. Whether in pursuit 
(philosophy), possession (science), or production (poetry), knowledge is power, 
as the maxim goes. Each epistemological proposition foreshadows the 
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metaethical1 positions under investigation in this work, as well as their distinct 
implications for morality, agency, and justification. 
 
Three worldviews 
The competing claims about history and politics outlined above mark the 
respective poles of international relations, separating the cyclical ‘realist’ 
worldview from the ‘idealist’ progressive. The latter has been popularized as 
‘liberalism’ through related theories of economic cosmopolitism, convergence, 
and democratic peace (Kant 1991, Fukuyama 1992). Between realism, on the one 
hand, and liberal idealism, on the other — between the constant threat of war 
and the immanence of peace — is a world of possibility that raises equally 
fundamental questions: What if history were interminable but directional? What 
if ‘history’ — the human species’ uncoordinated but collaborative evolutionary 
project — admits of greater directedness through homo sapiens’ conscious 
engineering of the selecting environment? 
Though ‘engineering’ and notions of social control strike dystopian notes 
in the liberal sensibility, the unease is perhaps lessened in acknowledging that 
the reflexive processes shaping social reality are, like ‘genetic engineering’ of 
food through selection, already well underway. Technology catalyzes these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Metaethics refers to the area of moral philosophy concerned with axiomatic or 
first principles of onto-epistemic systems. An example would be moral realism, 
which postulates that moral truths preexist as objects (versus constructs) of 
reason. 
2 “Constructivism” names the third major school of international relations. 
Although gaining that position in the aftermath of the Cold war, according to 
international relations scholar Robert Jackson is traceable to eighteenth century 
jurist and political philosopher Giambattista Vico (2000: 53). 
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processes but in a less conscious and only partially coordinated way, including 
through warfare. However, when technology begins to represent the 
diminishment of human possibility through its unprecedented and 
indiscriminate destructive capacity, moral progress demands a more 
comprehensive vision. 
This dialectical possibility of altering material factors to maximize human 
potential, first opened in Marx’ cooption of Hegelianism, implies minimizing the 
causes of war — including class war and civil war — through species-level 
thinking. The means to this end are improbable, but have already been conceived 
in the idea that conflict, rather than being endemic to history and human nature, 
is, like them, a social product. As such, it is subject to more conscious collective 
fashioning. This worldview pairing the ‘soft’ determinism of structure (‘history’) 
with the revolutionary potential of concerted human agency has its contemporary 
analogue in constructivism (Onuf 2013).2 
Commentators on international relations misspeak when calling these 
schools — realism, liberalism/idealism, and constructivism — ‘theories’ or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Constructivism” names the third major school of international relations. 
Although gaining that position in the aftermath of the Cold war, according to 
international relations scholar Robert Jackson is traceable to eighteenth century 
jurist and political philosopher Giambattista Vico (2000: 53). 
Constructivism also names an approach to ethics, epistemology, and, some 
argue, metaethics, tracing its origin to Kantian theory, which I turn to next 
chapter. The latter differs from ‘post-modern’ IR constructivism in its moral 
realism (cognitivism), meaning its normative pronouncements are nonrelative 
and do not rely on consensus for their authority. This is because its principles are 
‘constructed’ from the perspective of the hypothetical rational autonomous 
individual to which any sentient has access but requires an additional empathic 
component to initiate such reasoning (Rawls 1989). On this point, see Carla 
Bagnoli’s introduction and contribution to her recent edited volume, 
Constructivism in Ethics. 
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‘models’. The schools’ prescriptive claims about best practice, grand strategy, or 
right action rely on descriptive ontological premises (claims about the way the 
world fundamentally is) that are mutually exclusive. Any false humility on this 
count lends itself to the pervasive contemporary prejudice that as ‘theory’ these 
worldviews must be disconnected from the actual practice of international 
relations — a conceit which lends itself to broadly realist presuppositions about 
power.3  
Neither laypeople nor statespersons regularly self-identify as an ‘idealist’ 
or ‘constructivist’ but as I hope to demonstrate in what follows, when pressed on 
their beliefs about humans (agents), nations, and world organization (structures), 
each can sensibly be categorized in one of the three worldviews I have identified. 
And though there are a greater number who more readily claim being a ‘realist’ 
because of its connotation of clear-eyed, hard-nosed, unsentimental view of 
reality, few of these when pressed hold the line that international relations or 
conflict is or ought to be a value-free area.  
Neorealist and neoliberal variations of these schools focus on material 
more than ‘natural’ factors as the ‘higher’ structural level of analysis over agency. 
Neoconservatism shares with religious ideologies belief in the right of certain 
communities to reconstruct or reconstrue international norms and act 
unilaterally. However, every sub-school is susceptible to this more basic 
tripartite descriptive classification of ontological claims about ‘history’ broadly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The connection between belief and practice, for groups as for individuals has 
been corroborated in the work of social psychologist Albert Bandura. This 
phenomena he calls ‘self and collective efficacy’ is discussed in Chapter Four. 
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construed (linear, cyclical, or constructed) and human nature (improvable, 
lapsed, intersubjective). 
This claim about a mutually exclusive triumvirate of 
schools/orientations/worldviews in international relations might be of only 
taxonomic interest were each of these descriptive categories not also prescriptive, 
recommending certain courses of action to agents based on its ontological 
presuppositions (Suganami 2005: 40). Through their writing, speech, and other 
actions, scholars, statesmen, and citizens of these varying dispositions add to the 
theoretical and institutional latticework of international ethics and praxis. This 
includes the main body of normative thought on the use of force, just war theory, 
with which this project is primarily concerned.  
Comprehending elements of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, just 
war theory occupies a paradoxical position in relation to the three schools. It is 
rejected by each as partaking too much in one or more of the others — too 
pragmatic or compromising for the dove and too idealistic or procedural for the 
hawk. Those involved in social psychological peace research (SPPR) level the 
same accusations at just war theory: too permissive or weak (an artifact of 
realism); too foundationalist or ethnocentric (an artifact of natural law, 
liberalism, or Catholicism); and especially salient for the social psychologist, too 
manipulable (an ‘artifact’ proper — a construct privileging whoever happens to 
be able to persuade the majority or create a consensus). 
 ‘Constructs’ like the just war framework do manage to constrain actors 
and present new possibilities in international affairs but the last of these critiques 
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would prove devastating to just war’s moral authority if it is shown to be reliant 
on perspectivist or functionalist/ instrumentalist criteria. Perspectivism claims 
that acting well amounts to being thought to act well by the ‘right’ parties or by a 
majority of observers. Functionalism brackets the ontological status of norms in 
favor of the consequences of agreement such that ethics have the form, “we 
would all be better if we did ‘x’ or acted as if ‘y’” versus claims about the 
rightness or wrongness of x or y. These arguments rely on an ancillary claim 
about how individuals and groups are convinced and arrive at moral judgment 
and the process of agreement. The suspicion in each case is that people can be 
persuaded by other-than-rational means, making normative authority more a 
matter of knowing which way the wind is blowing: what to say, and who to 
please. If agreement can be purchased with power or influence, its object is 
shown to be arbitrary and without justification, especially in periods of crisis 
when it is needed most. 
To break this hermeneutic circle, the ‘right’ parties must themselves be 
shown to have a right or legitimate claim on right or legitimacy, beyond 
considerations of power. The divine right of kings was one way to pull this 
rabbit of legitimacy out of the hat of authority. But even in ages dominated by 
warriors, foreign policy realism’s premise that power is its own justification was 
rarely deemed sufficient. What would a reasonable belief for authority look like 
in the age of democracy besides the new measure of power, majoritarianism? 
The most obvious route to justification is an appeal to moral realism, the 
belief that truth about ethics is somehow preexistent or ‘out there’ to be known. 
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As I describe next chapter however, consensus over this onto-epistemic position 
broke down with the decline of natural law and rise of empiricist ‘is–ought’ 
distinctions. Liberals and other progressives have since mounted the argument in 
the form: (P1) social and political progress requires ethical action, the 
coordinated assertion of rights, and/or legislation that sacrifices some degree of 
self-interest for those in power, and (P2) such progress seems evident, that (C) 
altruism or the rights beings recognized in these actions must exist. Skeptics like 
Hume, Rousseau, and Montesquieu anticipated the objection of English School 
thinker Martin Wight to this argument that while progress in the domestic 
context can be conceded, “In progressivist international theories, the conviction 
usually precedes the evidence” (Wight 1960: 42). Kant, by contrast, thought the 
burden of proof against dutiful action in the service of right was with skeptics, 
who had to show that a better world was not possible. Montesquieu anticipated 
Nietzsche’s opposing view that “arguments from despair” like Kant’s against 
history’s cyclical nature lacked the courage to see the hard world as it is — a 
contest of wills (Montesquieu 1989: 112). The constructivist might not disagree 
with this latter diagnosis but retains an optimism, like Kant’s, that these wills 
converged toward improvability — fundamental similarity, rather than absolute 
difference. 
In sum, constructivism’s bracketing of ontology — how the world ‘really 
is’ — for how it might be given the mutability of belief requires supplementary 
support of the progressive proposition that better or truer beliefs are the ones 
that more often obtain and prove durable. The epistemological ambiguity of 
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whether and how human communities know or invent normative practices 
reiterates the original debate between realists and idealists about history and its 
possibilities. Is normativity a matter of convenience that is more cursory than 
words like ‘right’ or ‘law’ suggest? What accounts for changes in the menu of 
rights deemed human rights, or in the character and limits of international law? 
Does persuasion proceed through reasoned argument, strategic coordination, the 
will of the strongest, or what? If legitimacy is grounded in judgment, in what is 
judgment grounded: Education? Socialization? Intuition? Cognition? These 
questions surrounding why people believe what they believe, about the world, 
themselves, and others, are also questions central to social psychology, which I 
turn to in the third chapter. 
In the international sphere as in the domestic, legitimacy has evolved from 
a de facto product of accepted authority (divine right, heredity, tradition, et cetera) 
to a de jure concern with consultative process that takes into account the consent 
of the governed (Rawls 2001). As I shall seek to demonstrate, this contractarian 
understanding of legitimate authority (a just war tenant) adds to IR’s Hobbesean 
world of geopolitical jockeying a procedural criterion for international ethics that 
mitigates the influence of power relations in their substance (Clark, I. 2007). 
Though neither the transnational stewards of international law, nor every 
member nation can be called democratic, the dialogic process between “judges 
and juries” that just war facilitates captures the soft power of accountability ‘built 
into’ the concept of international society (Franck 2002: 185). 
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At the national or ‘constitutional’ level of this legitimacy framework, 
duties are more narrowly construed, and more subject to manipulation. Through 
a network of political, intellectual, and media elites, a small minority of 
statespersons, military bureaucrats, and businesspeople can exert 
disproportionately powerful influence on public opinion. Public ignorance of 
geopolitics and national intelligence is thought to justify political expediency, 
including deception regarding the relationship of means to ends — what is 
necessary and therefore permissible — in foreign policy.  
Though average citizens haven’t the time for Homer or Hegel, they do 
have more nuanced opinions on political morality than either this cynical realist 
account, or the pacifist alternative usually attributes them. This is because more 
goes into opinion formation than breaking news, visceral images, or 
manipulation of emotion (Curtis 2002, Lakoff 1995, 2004). Individuals’ 
worldviews develop through complex socialization processes that are only 
obliquely influenced by elite opinion. The assimilation of new information is 
conditioned by the more basic historical orientation under discussion, which 
arbitrates the philosophical tug-of-war between freedom and necessity, or ethical 
consideration of ends to means.  
The difference between moral skeptics on the realist side, who favor 
material/structural explanations, and liberals enamored of the power that ideas 
provide to free agents comes down to this: 
 
a) one believes opinions of the power elite are absorbed and 
conveyed relatively passively by (a majority of) the citizenry or 
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b) there is sufficient agreement on facts, words, and concepts to 
prevent the meaning of the former from being bent to the point of 
breaking though deceit or defection. 
 
 
Many in SPPR or the peace studies community, rightly critical of governmental 
abuses of power, extend their skepticism to public opinion and, implicitly or 
explicitly, adopt the first position without intending it as an indictment of 
democracy or democratic authority. Examining public opinion around the world 
— that is, ‘controlling’ for varying conditions of governmental or media 
openness — reveals the same commonsense approach to law and war around 
which the just war tradition has been assiduously constructed. This consensus is 
not arbitrary but rather what Charles Beitz calls in Political Theory and 
International Relations, “basic ideas about the nature and requirements of reality”, 
and Walzer reiterates as “practical morality” (Beitz 1999: 17, Walzer 2006: xxiii). 
In these and other writings, both lend strong support to proposition ‘b’. 
On the other side of the ledger, the past century of democratization has 
also been the world’s bloodiest. The persistence of machtpolitik, plus the 
resurgence of ideological warfare, plus the proliferation of increasingly lethal 
weapons technologies available to state and nonstate actors alike were reported 
to have reversed the ratio of soldier/civilian casualty rates from 9 or 8:1 to 1:8 or 
9 by century’s end (Kaldor 1999: 8). Interventions and occupations of 
questionable legitimacy have continued past the end of the Cold War, with just 
war cited explicitly by perceived aggressors. From the revolutions of the late 
eighteenth century to the interventions of the twenty-first, the relative bellicosity 
of democracies has revitalized realist skepticism of the U.S.-led post-war 
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international order (Zinn 2002, Burke 2005, Doyle 1986, 2011). Critics suspect the 
contemporary human rights regime and even liberal democracy itself act as 
convenient cover for the power politics that ultimately underlie the law, United 
Nations not excepted (Foley 2009, Kinzer 2010). 
This skepticism about justifications for war is hardly surprising as the 
phrase ‘just war theory’ is a marketing fail, and doubly inaccurate. The aim of 
this influential body of scholarship, jurisprudence, and treaty law has never been 
to justify war, nor eliminate it, but to reduce the frequency, intensity, and 
duration of armed conflict by identifying the commonly agreed-upon features of 
valid uses of force. Second, contrary to the connotation of ‘merely’ theoretical, 
the norms of just war have always been eminently practical, existing as long as 
have empires and organized militaries to distinguish professional soldiers from 
civilians and protect each from the excesses of war (Bellamy 2006). From Greek 
and Roman scholars to early church fathers, its accreted principles became the 
province of natural lawyers, jurists, and international lawyers in the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, and the substance of humanitarian and 
human rights law established by the Geneva conventions and Nuremburg trials 
in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth.   
Recognizing the perils of militant nationalism in the wake of World War 
II, the world community accomplished in the United Nations Charter what the 
League of Nations could not: an actionable ban on aggressive war through a 
model of collective security (Thakur 2006). The institutionalization of just war 
principles and its implementation through transnational organizations like the 
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International Red Cross, the United Nations ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine, 
and the International Criminal Court have imposed limits on national militaries, 
violations of which are invariably met with the opprobrium of the international 
community and, in an increasing number of cases, prosecution. The concept of 
the just war is also behind the ban on unacceptably destructive weapons and 
serves to preempt or curtail the kinds of mass atrocity that perpetuate 
resentment and animosity.  
Perhaps the best argument for the efficacy of the kind of decentralized 
authority that a just war legitimacy framework represents, however, is that for 
centuries international law conditioned the use of force despite lacking these 
bodies to enforce its proclamations. As philosopher of language and World War 
One veteran Ludwig Wittgenstein argued in the context of religion, the facticity 
of an ‘international community’, like a ‘final judgment’, is demonstrated in the 
degree to which it structures agents’ behavior, not the immanence of the judge 
(1966: 53). Even in eras when strategic thinking predominated, ostracism from 
international society has proven to be a powerful disincentive for violation of the 
norms that define membership — arbitrary violations of national sovereignty as 
well as wanton affronts to decency at home.  
The barbarism in the World Wars and the scale of their destructiveness 
were, however, Copernican in their effect on the state system. States acted badly 
in these cases and with catastrophic costs, but rather than shifting the gravity 
away from state sovereignty, the UN reinforced this principle, placing it at the 
center of its charter, and placing human rights at the center of these respective 
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sovereign orbits. Though states retain prerogative in determining much of their 
national interests, the ‘solar’ significance of individual rights acts as a moral 
‘trump’ on these interests whose claim on state actors makes their relationship 
more Venn than concentric, and mandate more multilateral than unilateral 
(Dworkin 1984: 153). In the next section outlining the structure and history of just 
war theory, I will be arguing that the centrality of individual rights in 
sovereignty and the international system was more a replacing than a ‘placing’. 
Next chapter’s continuation of this dialogical history culminates in a 
constructivist explanation of how the ‘gravitational force’ of just war norms 
continues to keep appearance tied to reality, and authority to legitimacy even 
after their natural law and ecclesiastical clout had passed (Nye 2005; Clark, I. 
2007). 
 
Structure and History 
 
The Just War tradition has been called “a two-thousand-year-old 
conversation about the legitimacy of war” (Bellamy 2006: 2). Like any good 
conversation, it has input from at least two sides, which I described earlier as 
“judges and juries”. Known collectively as “the war convention” (Walzer 2006), 
just war principles play both a legitimizing and evaluative role. Soldiers and 
statespersons use just war principles to defend particular uses of force, while 
citizens, scholars, and international observers (the “juries”) weigh in on the 
permissibility of those actions. Its history can be summarized as the movement 
from substantive concerns in the constitution of legitimacy — what is posited or 
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constructed and by whom — to procedural concerns: that principles are agreed 
upon and how.  
Just as language is a rule-governed activity that is in every instance 
unique, just war shares with constructivism the acknowledgement that 
preexisting consensus is necessary even to disagree about war, and that this prior 
agreement has normative significance. If nothing else, it is an acknowledgement 
that it is better to talk than to fight, which is a recognition of one’s interlocutors, 
that they are rational and therefore persuadable. Thus, just war’s language, 
concepts, and history provide a normative backdrop for official, public (media), 
and private conversation, even when there is substantive disagreement about 
implementation, judgment, and consequence.  
Yet, just as critics of constructivism focus on the arbitrariness of consensus 
(Rosen, S. 1987), critics of just war fixate on the malleability of public opinion as 
the dependent variable behind militant nationalism (Clark, A. 2010). In reality, 
gaining the consent of all affected parties — representatives in the ‘target’ nation, 
the domestic legislative body, regional security organizations, and the UN 
Security Council — is far more salient as a measure of legitimate authority, and 
far less tractable than public opinion. ‘Judges and juries’ in the court of world 
and historical opinion use these moral, legal, and constitutional criteria — not a 
formal poll — to determine just cause and just conduct. 
For this conversation to be properly normative, however, it needs to be 
maximally inclusive, or ‘consultative’ (Rawls 2001). There are groups that are 
willfully not party to the conversation, and therefore not party to the war 
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convention. Their members usually deny procedural legitimacy because they 
doubt the legitimacy of the state system itself as a Western invention that has 
spread because of the Northern hemisphere’s continued dominance, not 
goodness-of-fit. On the left, these skeptics include anarchists and hardcore 
pacifists who believe that violence can never be rationalized and because all war 
is barbarism, state and military institutions are morally culpable. Since the 
jurisdiction of international law is incomplete, subject to the same power 
considerations, and guilt is so widespread, legal prosecution is suboptimal as a 
remedy to something more revolutionary.  
On the opposite side of the ideological spectrum are those who deny state 
legitimacy because of a higher authority — commonly religious but militant 
environmental fit here as well who share the realist view that there are no moral 
limits on violence when in conflict. They differ markedly in viewing conflict as 
ongoing and outside the ethical bounds of formally declared war (chiefly, 
combatant versus noncombatant and military versus civilian targets). When used 
to overthrow immoral states, punish apostates, or disrupt the functions of a 
corrupt international order, violence is, in their view, morally justified.  
We will return to these two species of moralism, pacifistic and terroristic, 
in Chapters Four and Five where I suggest some criteria for drawing sharper 
lines distinguishing the poles of the three schools and these extremes in SPPR. 
Until then, the focus is on charting the topography of the vast area of consensus 
that exists in between — consensus that there are such things as legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of force, if not just and unjust wars. The dissensus, I hope to 
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show, is over what exactly makes them so, more than the red herring of who 
decides. 
There are eight commonly acknowledged just war principles used to 
identify morally permissible uses of force. These are divided into six jus ad bellum 
principles that govern entry into war, and two jus in bello principles that govern 
conduct in war. In both cases, the first principle entails the remaining ones 
(McMahan 2005). Jus ad bellum dictates that to be entered justly, a war must have 
the following: 
 
i. a just cause, evident in a 
ii. declaration by legitimate authority 
iii. undertaken with right intention (viz. a just peace), 
iv. reasonable hope of success, 
v. as a last resort, and 
vi. with force proportional to these ends. 
 
 
Once entered, jus in bello dictates that to fight justly, combatants must 
demonstrate, 
 
 
i. discrimination in targeting, respecting noncombatant immunity  
ii. and that damage inflicted is proportional in achieving war aims. 
 
 
Recently, theorists concerned with justice in post-conflict situations have 
proposed the addition of a jus post bellum category (Bass 2004; Orend 2000) with 
principles mirroring the first two categories, namely: 
i. just termination (concludes as soon as just cause is amended) 
ii. right intention (no revenge) 
iii. working with a legitimate domestic authority 
iv. discrimination (no collective punishment) 
v. proportionality (e.g. occupation would only be permitted to 
reconstitute a society that has been tainted by a genocidal regime, 
for example) 
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Taken together, the theory of just war describe an ‘ideal type’ with few or no 
historical precedents, described as “casuistic”, or context-dependent, by both 
proponents and detractors. Though this word has acquired the same connotation 
as “moralizing” or “rationalizing”, casuistry in its original meaning refers to the 
proper relationship of theory to practice — the way in which humans use 
principles and precedent to apply, and sometimes modify, rules or laws to a 
specific case. The misconception is that because this fitting process is variable, it 
is subjective and arbitrary — rhetorical exercise for lawyers or sophists. It is 
rather than the proper vocation for judges and scholars, as well as a more 
formalized way of describing the process every human goes about resolving 
moral dilemmas (in which rules or laws collide and contradict).  
Just war “theory” is therefore better conceived as a toolkit than a checklist. 
Taking account of human uncertainty and consequent political disagreement, 
internally and externally, just war principles formulate the relevant questions for 
domestic disputants to ask when faced with the dilemma of possible threat to 
themselves or others. Notwithstanding the unfortunate nomenclature, these are 
not theoretical (‘onto-epistemic’ or metaethical) questions but practical ethical 
ones: Whether there is a yet-untried diplomatic solution to impending conflict; 
How the immanence of threat compares with the chance of success in stopping it 
and the likely costs to both sides.  
While past conflicts conspicuously fail to meet all of these criteria, this is a 
demonstration of the success of the theory of the just war in identifying 
	  	  
30 
shortcomings, not its failure. The centuries-long, dialogic, critical process of 
delineating the just use of force provided the contours for not only the law of 
war, but the current international legal order based on state sovereignty. Jus ad 
bellum lacks the clean ‘thou shalt not’ formula of law prohibiting the violation of 
national sovereignty, but arguably provides something more valuable and 
lasting to anarchic international relations by enunciating the principles behind 
international norms. This is representative of a hard-fought consensus, which is 
expressed in the establishment and maintenance of the inclusive and leaderless 
diplomatic system that facilitates trust and communication between nations — 
an element often left out of just war history and contemporary critique. Just war 
concepts provide not only the lingua franca of this system but the vocabulary 
that enables wider discussions of legitimacy and permissibility that make for 
meaningful ‘normative dialogue’ (Jackson 2000: 1–25; Walzer 2006: xvii–xx). 
As it became the de facto normative framework constraining the action and 
lawmaking of national subsidiaries, the practical function of just war has gone 
from providing the basis for justification of sovereign uses of force, to providing 
the basis for criticism thereof. Jus in bello, for example, has become a sort of de jure 
bill of rights for combatants and noncombatants alike through the Geneva 
Conventions, violations of which are potentially prosecutable as war crimes. The 
weighting and relationship of the three areas of just war theory and their 
principles makes the framework as a whole more like the British constitution.  
As is the case with founding documents, there are layers of ambivalence: 
the phrasing of principles can be seen as either too confining or too flexible, 
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depending on interpretation. The susceptibility to interpretation is itself seen as 
either a strength or weakness, depending on perspective. Perspective, I argued in 
the preceding section, is primarily dependent on implicit or explicit ontological 
and epistemic assumptions at the core of the three schools of international 
relations, better conceived as distinct philosophies of history. These three 
interpretative traditions are: 1) the realist onto-epistemic position which dictates 
that the permanence of deception and ill-intention elevate concern with 
protection over concern with progress, dictating a principle of ‘self-help’, 2) 
liberal internationalism, which shares the cosmopolitan ethos of its ‘natural law’ 
predecessor, and 3) constructivism, which can refer to either the ‘positive law’ 
approach of IR constructivism, or the ‘discourse ethical’ constructivism to be 
elaborated in the dialogical history of just war and philosophy of Immanuel Kant 
to follow. 
None of these schools actively advocates or seeks to justify war generally, 
as the name ‘just war’ is often misinterpreted to imply. Rather, there is basic 
agreement between the three traditions that hellish as war is, as long as the resort 
to arms remains a possibility, it must for the good of all its initiation and conduct 
remain a rule-governed activity. Realists press the latter claim by reserving the 
right to ignore or abandon these rules when their observance is perceived to 
compromise war aims and potentially, national survival. Liberalism, by contrast, 
emphasizes the first part of the syllogism — that a world of rational actors 
obviates the resort to arms — but until such a world is achieved, its promotion 
includes the resort to arms.  
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Between these two, constructivism’s role has been to problematize both 
realist fear and liberal faith by emphasizing that neither correspond to an 
objective reality of international politics, so much as an intersubjective reality 
upon which actors formally and informally agree. Most constructivists 
acknowledge that the reality of the existing agreement has been 
disproportionately, though not exclusively, shaped by power relations. This is 
not so much a ‘law’ of politics as a state of affairs, meaning the proportional 
influence of power could be lessened with the concerted use of positive law.  
If constructivism ‘leans’ one way or the other between the poles, it is likely 
away from the tendency to exaggerate power politics and threat level that 
characterize realism’s materialist ontology. Constructivists take issue with realist 
exclusion of beliefs of values, including those of power politicians, and the 
normative role of soft power. Constructivism shares with liberalism (broadly 
construed) the belief that ideas, agreements, esteem, sentiments all matter, 
perhaps not so much in the fog of war as in averting such “atrocity-producing 
situations” and the accompanying cynicism, which entrenches belief in the 
corrupt nature of humans and states alike. 
Just war’s plural origin and casuistic application should not be construed 
as implying that the moral ‘universe of discourse’ is pliable enough to render its 
principles, categories, or conclusions relative or subjective. ‘Threat’ and ‘intent’ 
are contested concepts subject to perspectivist/relativist critique, but historical 
and contemporary political context, troop movements, and incendiary rhetoric 
are the kinds of signs that together permit their positive identification. The cases 
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of Iraq and Syria have each proven in their own way that the existence and 
deployment of weapons of mass destruction and mass civilian casualty are 
susceptible to evidence-based judgment (from multiple internal communications, 
for journalistic purposes, and external verification by impartial third parties, for 
political) that deception cannot long obscure. As Bellamy notes, though the Just 
War tradition “cannot determine political outcomes or judgments in every 
case…[it] creates the possibility for meaningful discussion about the legitimacy 
of war and can inhibit actions that cannot be justified in reference to it” (2006: 3). 
Just war principles might be better called “just war obligations” since they 
balance the ‘theoretical’ right of nations to wage war against basic moral and 
legal responsibilities that together constitute permissibility. Rather than treating 
questions like, “Can nation ‘A’ assassinate a terrorist, disrupt a weapons 
program, or destroy a resistance movement of rival ‘P’?” as one of puissance — 
that is, technological capacity and/or the tacit permission from the powers that 
be — determining permissibility demands a properly consultative, well-informed, 
and well-led republic that considers additional, non-material costs such as to 
international reputation and trustworthiness (which are also of strategic 
importance). In this sense, just war is not just a procedural guide but is 
prescriptive of substantive domestic democratic reform for countries wishing to 
be full members of international society, enjoying the rights and taking on the 
responsibilities of enforcement. This is gauged in no small part by the way a 
nation — a people — balances the risks it is willing to take against those to which 
it subjects weaker peoples. Restraint, not right, is the underlying principle of just 
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war theory, and, I would submit, a greater indicator of national prowess and 
longevity than sheer military power. 
As with any decentralized, self-governing system, this freedom opens up 
problems of collective action, though this feature of international society is not 
captured with the hackneyed phrase ‘anarchic international relations.’ A 
transnational enforcing agency has never been among the aspirations of the just 
war tradition, which operates on the premise of equality, reciprocity, and 
collective security represented in treaty law and preserved in the United Nations’ 
Charter. This premise does not imply that every legitimate use of force must be 
multilateral, but it does imply that there is a higher standard for the unilateral 
use of force, especially those uses outside of self-defense (alluded to in the 
preceding paragraph). Defectors from this tacit agreement of membership in 
international society who exaggerate threat in order to use self-defense as an 
excuse for national aggrandizement are liable to be branded ‘aggressors’ and 
viewed as possible threats themselves. Thus, while the violation of just war 
standards may not be met in kind, the increasingly steep sanctions able to be 
imposed on bad actors yield economic consequences that are arguably more 
effective than this last resort, reserved for a diminishing number of pariah states. 
A survey of past empires indicates that even without the kinds of disincentives 
possible in an extremely interdependent global economic system, superpowers 
that fail to ask the question by what right they rule and with what obligations do 
not retain this role indefinitely. 
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Classical origins 
  Though it might seem anachronistic to speak of a truly inter-national law 
before the Treaty of Westphalia, there are several examples from classical 
antiquity of spirit and letter limiting war between foreign powers. Hanging on 
the wall of the United Nations headquarters is a replica of the Treaty of Kadesh 
— the first recorded peace treaty, concluded in 1258 BC between the Egyptian 
and Hittite empires. These neighboring peoples had battled intermittently for 
control of slim corridor of land on the far side of Lebanon’s Cedar Valley in 
modern-day Syria for the prior 200 years. However, the treaty’s significance is 
not seen as lying in its ending of hostilities, establishing mutually agreeable 
boundaries, boosting sea commerce to the North Mediterranean, or even the 
agreements of extradition and mutual defense, which would have been common 
in the late Bronze Age. Rather, it was the inclusion of language pledging 
indefinite peace, cooperation, and brotherhood between former enemies — a 
promise underwritten by oaths to entirely different pantheons — that is notable. 
Admittedly, encroachment at the opposite extremes of their respective empires 
would have made closing this contested front attractive to both sides. But 
archeological evidence shows that the treaty was an accomplishment in which 
the two allies took great pride, keeping copies of the original silver tablet on 
which the peace was engraved in their respective capitals and in the case of 
Ramses II, even incorporating the treaty’s text into the glyphs of his burial crypt. 
An example of a brotherly ethos that did not come directly out of war 
settlement is Greek Panhellenism, which included customs such as settlement of 
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grievances through a proxy contest of champions (anticipating the chivalric 
practice) and the just war criterion of formal declaration, meant to avoid the kind 
of marauding behaviors that fostered animosity. Hostilities were suspended in 
ritual periods such as the Olympic games, to ameliorative effect. It was perhaps 
this budding respect for human excellence and victory with honor that led 
Greeks to observe something like jus in bello for noncombatants, choosing to 
ransom or release Greek prisoners of war, and to assimilate certain non-Greeks 
as slaves or mercenaries.  
Evolution from honor culture to democratic empire, however, brought 
sobering counterexamples to these practices among Athenians and allies. Some 
of the more infamous examples of imperial hubris are catalogued in Thucydides’ 
History of the Peloponnesian War, chief among which is the massacre at Melos. In 
the preceding dialogue between Athenian occupiers and Melian resistance, 
Thucydides recreates the Athenians’ justification of their aggression as the right 
of the stronger. Countless commentators since have interpreted this as a rare 
moment of honesty, laying bare the first principle underlying international 
politics: power.  
However, Thucydides’ juxtaposition of this episode with Athenian 
plague, defeat, and decline suggests the imprudence of this philosophy. Despite 
being most often read as an endorsement of realism, his History provides an 
equally powerful illustration of the opposite ethos: considerations of justice are 
appropriate, if not necessary, in times war to avoid hubris. Moreover, the History 
contains an ‘esoteric’ or metacommunicative teaching that political 
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argumentation, democratic deliberation, and historical self-awareness are not the 
enemies of expediency, but virtues thereof. In the aftermath of a rebellion and 
costly siege at Mytilene, the Athenian assembly decreed the death penalty for all 
male rebels and dispatched ships to carry out the deed. The orator Cleon argued 
forcefully in the assembly that justice and the national interest demanded such 
punitive measures, and that any second-guessing in public must be motivated by 
sophistry, softness, or the desire for status or wealth. 
Thucydides recounts a citizen-observer in the assembly, Diodotus, rising 
to rebut Cleon, but not before conceding that skepticism about speakers’ motives 
is natural in a free society. Presaging de Tocqueville’s keen observation about 
democratic political culture, Diodotus notes that the double-edged sword of 
democratic equality: individuals often think they know better than their fellows 
but are nonetheless subject to demagoguery like Cleon’s if they connect political 
necessity to the freedom they prize. This combination of skepticism and faith 
compels even the genuinely noble to inflate the truth or flatter the demos to 
inspire public support. This seems to be Diodotus’ tack when he praises “the 
propriety of frequent deliberation about the city’s affairs as ‘the greatest [of] 
things’” (Bolotin quoted in Strauss & Cropsey 1987: 29). 
In what author David Bolotin calls “an unparalleled example, at least 
during war, of an entire people showing mildness of character” (22), the citizen 
Diodotus convinces those assembled to reconsider their rash decision and send a 
second, faster ship to intercept the first. Thucydides’ purpose in relating this 
story seems less to praise the Athenian political system or national character, as 
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to highlight the strategic dimension to political speech that exists even in an 
‘open’ society. Athenian greatness arose not through the dogged concern with 
justice or security — these were Spartan virtues — but by freeing the majority of 
citizens from these concerns to pursue individual goods, in trade or in the arts, 
and knowledge of the good through philosophy. The quality of the polis, in other 
words, was a function of provisioning and maintaining the requisite space and 
inspiration for personal development.  
In Diodotus’ case, this freedom permitted sufficient attention to domestic 
politics, foreign policy, knowledge of rhetoric, and courage for him to be able to 
use the opportunity in the assembly give his fellow citizens a chance to redeem 
themselves. However, this esoteric teaching about the virtue of temperance, the 
value of liberal cosmopolitanism, and the place of civic education needs to be 
communicated to a proud, if not yet entirely autonomous audience of merchants 
and slaveholders. Individuals like Diodotus (and Thucydides himself) therefore 
eschew praising anything as abstract as truth, beauty, justice, or progress, any of 
which might appear suspect or soft to fearful temperaments. Instead, they use 
strategic juxtapositions to connect amour propre to national greatness and these to 
greatness of character (literally, “magnanimity”). 
Thus, while Thucydides’ account can be seen as justifying suspicion of 
power, it is more difficult to read him as vindicating the kind of moral and 
political skepticism customarily ascribed to realism. What is true of polities — 
that it is more desirable to live in a temperate society of equals ruled by laws, 
than a feverish expansionist state populated by rivals — is also true of 
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international politics. Even in Thucydides’ day, part of the meaning of 
international justice is that ‘the strongest’ realize and maintain their strength 
through its justification — in word as in deed and to subjects and selves. Part of 
this is concern is economic, since well-being of rulers depends on the well-being 
of the ruled. For tax or tribute to be something more than extortion, it must at 
least buy protection, but peace is more than satiety or the absence of hostilities; it 
is the condition of willing reciprocity and mutual benefit. Rather than stasis, it is 
the precondition of a certain kind of change or growth. This is in stark contrast to 
the high-risk, zero-sum portrait of politics that realism and versions of liberalism 
accept as normative. 
When actions proceed not from equanimity, but from a place of fear or 
greed, as Thucydides illustrated in the case in Melos, others are justifiably fearful 
and power begs to be balanced. The terrible logic of extermination, assimilation, 
and expansion follows, but the technology of storytelling makes memory 
difficult to extinguish. In the Mytilenean case, returning the rebel ringleaders for 
trial presents itself as the more humane alternative to the totalizing mission of 
colonization, which would require some Athenians to leave their city to found 
new polis in the shadow of resentment. This early understanding of international 
ethics and the danger of imperial dissolution adds to prudential realism’s 
utilitarian appreciation of the importance of appearance something of 
liberalism’s substantive emphasis on well-informed and spirited public 
deliberation (Crawford 2002). 
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 When public knowledge is lacking, on the other hand, Thucydides’ rough 
contemporary Plato argued that democratic opinion has no special claim in 
determining what is just. In fact, democracy was in his opinion the worst 
political arrangement because it was the least temperate, guilty of consenting to 
the colonial expansionism that led to overreach and defeat. The second book of 
his dialogue on the virtue of justice, Republic, illustrates how people’s desire for 
luxury stirs envy and contention among neighbors, conflict in international 
relations, and leads to the necessity of a warrior class — a standing army. 
Aristotle elaborates on this portion of Republic in a passage from his Politics: 
 
’Socrates’ gives no part to the defense force until the growth of the 
city’s territory, and contact with that of its neighbours, gets them 
involved in war. Moreover, even among the four original parts — 
or whatever may be the number of the elements forming the 
association — there needs to be someone to dispense justice, and to 
determine what is just. If the mind is to be reckoned as more 
essentially a part of a living being than the body, parts of a similar 
order must equally be reckoned as more essentially parts of the city 
than those which serve its basic needs. By this we mean the military 
part, the part concerned in the legal organization of justice, and the 
part engaged in deliberation, which is a function that needs the gift 
of political understanding. Whether the people these functions 
belong to are separate groups or the same makes no difference to 
the argument. It often falls to the same people both to serve in the army 
and to till the fields (1985: 142; 1291a19; emphasis added). 
 
Given Socrates’ fate, both Plato and Aristotle are justifiably wary of urging 
domestic reforms. Each tried and failed to educate the aristocracy of their day to 
adopt a more philosophical, law-governed regime with a better chance of 
cultivating these qualities than more strictly mercantile or militaristic orders. 
Even if their take on domestic politics is less democratic than the moderns, 
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however, Plato and Aristotle’s thought on war and peace have some resonance 
with the later just war framework. Plato insinuates that the only just cause for 
initiating war is to secure peace, and Aristotle in Politics expressly invokes the 
concept of the just war to describe five possible just causes (1255a21). Among 
these, he counts the three familiar criteria: self-defense, aiding allies (observing 
treaties/other-defense), and avenging injury (punishment or preemption), as 
well as two additional criteria that would be classified as unjust: gaining 
advantage over enemies (‘preventive war’) and establishing authority over 
‘ungoverned’ areas (colonization or wars of conquest).4  
 Though Greek dominance was already in decline in their lifetime, Plato 
and Aristotle’s writings cast a long shadow in world civilization when 
rediscovered by Roman, Muslim, Medieval thinkers. Roman statesman and 
political theorist, Marcus Tullius Cicero, was responsible for transmitting Greek 
philosophy to the Romans, but also, as Pierre Manent points out, for its 
“profound transformation” by “most intelligently gather[ing] together the usable 
elements of the ancient political tradition” (2013: 2). Manent notes that Cicero 
introduced three remarkable ‘pre-modern’ elements, each relevant to the 
ascendency of the just war principle of ‘legitimate authority’. Cicero was the first 
to speak of magistrates as “bearer of the public person” in a way that abstracted 
from the individuals comprising the republic, anticipating the ‘personhood’ of 
the sovereign state through the ‘domestic analogy’ (2013: 2). If that innovative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In a poetic twist, the Spanish Schoolmen of the sixteenth century used 
Aristotle’s own reasoning about the natural law, via Aquinas, to discard these 
last two justifications. 
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conceptualization presaged Hobbes, Cicero’s second innovation protecting 
property anticipates Locke’s basis of the state.  
Third, and perhaps most important was Cicero’s ethical teaching 
regarding the ability of law to express not only the universal dictates of reason, 
but the individual concerns of conscience. Where Aristotle had laid the 
intellectual groundwork for a ‘natural law’, Cicero found corresponding 
universal rights constituting a ius gentium or ‘law of peoples’ that followed 
individuals wherever they traveled within the empire’s vast expanse. Presaging 
the modern idea of a transnational political order, Manent writes that after 
Cicero “the political realm loses the real, substantial character that it had when 
the city [Rome] was visible as a whole that could be seen all at once; now the city 
is so extensive, it is the magistrate who shines forth in the public light” (2013: 2). 
Cicero was, like the empire at large, both preservationist and innovator. 
The first to discuss the major just war categories of right intention and legitimate 
authority, his treatise On Duties made the bold claim that even wars for glory 
had to be justified by the improvement they might bring to world through 
greater peace, justice, and order. To ensure this aim, he argued, war should be 
properly declared, fought by military regulars, cease at surrender, and respect 
the rights of the vanquished (1991: 72–79). Rome was well known for leaving 
intact local custom and authority after conquest. To remain an ‘unum’ over so 
vast and diverse an expanse, however, and ensure freedom of movement within 
the empire required that some aspects of law and right attach to person, not 
place. This inchoate concept of individual rights in the ius gentium was at this 
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point predicated not on the societas of equal city-states or republics but the 
universitas of an imperium that could enforce it. 
Any cosmopolitan tolerance the Roman Empire possessed gave way to 
repression in the face of insurgency, its vicious reprisals only stoking the viral 
proliferation of Jewish, then Christian sectarianism. In this cycle of violence, 
neither the Roman occupiers nor their subject peoples observed the named 
aspects of Cicero’s proto war convention. (Cicero, like Socrates, was killed as an 
enemy of the state.) With no precedent of coexistence, marauding hordes from 
the empire’s fringes were even more merciless in their raids, seeming to confirm 
Cicero’s observation that “laws are silent in times of war” (1980: 54). Lucretius 
observed of this bloody century “tragic discord gave birth to one invention after 
another to spread terror in battle among the tribes of men, and added daily 
increments to the horrors of war” (Lucretius 240). 
On the opposite side of the Common Era from Cicero, the Roman jurist 
Gaius wrote in his Institutes of Roman Law: 
 
Every people that is governed by statutes and customs observes 
partly its own peculiar law and partly the law common to all 
mankind. That law which a people establishes for itself is peculiar 
to it, and is called ius civile as being the special law of that state, 
while the law that natural reason establishes among all mankind is 
followed by all peoples alike, and is called ius gentium as being the 
law observed by all mankind (Gaius & Greenidge: 2012: 1). 
 
 
The 1904 introduction to Gaius’ Institutes identifies the most significant moment 
in Roman legal development: when ‘Law’ gained universal status, “yield[ing] to 
no other in importance — the stage at which it passes from the religious to the 
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secular sphere, from Fas to Jus” (2012: xi), anticipating what we now call ‘The 
Rule of Law’. 
I juxtapose this elevated praise of the Law with the elegiac summary of 
Rome’s first decline to offer three observations that connect the present inquiry 
into the historical development of just war to the three historical orientations 
with which the chapter began. First, Fas, referring to what is done or posited, 
only gains the status of law when and where it is enforced. It is particularistic, 
and if not the product of power, it is ultimately dependent upon it (again, the 
basic insight of realism). The same is not true of Jus, or natural law, whose 
universality owes to its own power, which includes, but is not limited to, the 
power to persuade. The pronouncements of natural law, paradoxically, possess 
authority even when they lack the power of enforcement.  
This leads to the second observation: in neither the international nor 
domestic sphere does the existence of wrongdoing — the violation of (laws based 
on) Jus — imply a failure of the law. The status of the rights and duties to which 
Jus refers are, if anything, strengthened by such a recognition, as is the relevant 
community’s resolve to respect those rights, carry out those duties, and enforce 
the law’s rule. Grave or repeated offenses, however, can provide impetus for 
attempting to expand the rule of law from the law of peoples to a world order, 
diminishing pluralism and hastening the elimination of difference (see ‘liberal 
internationalism’ above). 
When lawlessness/anomalies accrue or the agents responsible for 
upholding the law themselves become guilty of injustice, the authority of the law 
	  	  
45 
is conflated with that of the agents, resulting in epistemic crisis. This is the third 
observation: though the authority of justice and the ontological status of rights 
are independent of power considerations, they are nonetheless contested during 
the paradigmatic shifts and structural changes of these crisis periods (Lakatos & 
Musgrave 1970). 
The Patristic period of the church fathers, around the time of 
Constantine’s conversion, represents one such shift. The transformation of a 
‘secular’ Roman empire (albeit one ruled by a semi-divine emperor) to a Holy 
one ruled through Caesarean-papism required a theory of the just war to 
reconcile the ends of earthly and heavenly authority. At the southern frontier of 
that empire, on the ashes of a civilization Rome had exterminated as revenge for 
Hannibal’s famous Alpine incursion, Augustine, Bishop of Hippo wrestled with 
the relationship of the City of God and City of Man — of what claims the 
moral/spiritual realm has on that of politics. Defying the region’s history, he 
followed his contemporary Ambrose’s interpretation of the biblical injunction to 
“turn the other cheek” with a strong preference for persuasion over force in 
addressing interpersonal and internecine conflicts. For these saints, neither 
individual self-defense, nor preemptive self-defense for states was just, as both 
were demonstrative of pride, fear, and this-worldly attachment.  
However, wars in defense of others, to promote order, and redress 
previous injury/recover property were deemed just casus belli, as they shared, in 
Augustine’s estimation, the right intention of a just peace. Augustine justified 
this departure from Christian pacifism by arguing that both ‘humanitarian wars’, 
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as we would call them, and punitive wars that responded to aggression 
conformed to another biblical injunction to “seek out wickedness.” He was a 
witness to the privations war caused, including the societal improvement 
necessary to individual advancement. Though this ethos opens the door to abuse 
by including among the ‘wicked’ those who do not observe orthodoxy, 
Augustine’s oft-quoted passage “it is the wrongdoing of an opposing party 
which compels the wise man to wage just wars” (2004: 311) conveys prudential 
policing more than crusading vigilantism. 
Like Cicero, Augustine emphasized the centrality of not only right 
intention, but legitimate authority as a safeguard. By his time, ‘Rome’ 
represented ecclesiastical more than political power, which had moved to 
Constantinople. His ‘doctrine of the two swords’, based on a loose interpretation 
of Luke 22:38, justified the church’s use of coercive power, including the 
cooption of secular authority (the second sword). While soldiers were obliged to 
fight, even in unjust wars, this doctrine implied that Christian citizens were not 
obliged to obey an unjust law. Ecclesiastical authority ordered bodies, in other 
words, but temporal powers had no claim on the movements of the soul. Though 
the particular standards of legitimate authority would be contested for a 
millennium, the task of judging whether a law was unjust, and whether wars 
issuing from monarchs were well-intended rested with citizens and ‘neutral 
observers’ in the church. 
As in the Greeks’ Dark Age, when Roman central authority gave way to 
regional fiefdoms, a warrior culture came to dominate the European continent 
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and its fringes. Rarely, interests of earthly and heavenly seats of power in 
Christendom aligned, as in the Crusades; more often, they clashed. The ease with 
which good intention gave cover to the interests of the powerful is disquietingly 
familiar: defense of others, contra Augustine, masked more cynical ideological 
and strategic aims, such as inflicting punishment or securing resources. The 
facility of kings and princes, popes and bishops in finding righteous uses for 
military force proved antithetical to progress, lending credence to the old saw 
quoted in the Preface, that history is the history of war. 
In addition to the ideological irreproachability of fighting for God, faith, 
or country, there was simultaneously a defensive ‘arms race’ of fortification 
technology that increased the duration and financial cost of war. Each 
development incentivized the use of weapons and tactics that earlier warrior 
cultures would have thought dishonorable. “Despite a deep-seated aversion to 
unfair, cruel tactics and toxic weaponry in many ancient cultures” and “evidence 
of disapproval in Greek, Roman, Indian, and Muslim traditions”, historian of 
war Adrienne Mayor finds that “such weapons were used and that the ancient 
attitudes towards them were complex and ambivalent” (Fleming 2004: 44-45). In 
several early instances of biological warfare, armies used diseased corpses to 
poison wells and catapulted bodies, snakes, scorpions, or incendiary bombs to 
and from besieged cities (i.e. in defense). This is despite written prohibitions of 
these tactics as old as the sixth century BC. Hideous punishments for resistance 
instilled terror, and the burning, looting, scorching and salting of the earth aimed 
at extermination or displacement rather than surrender. Writes Mayor, “Not only 
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in sieges but in civil wars and in conflicts with exotic ‘uncivilized’ cultures, 
whole populations are demonized, and traditional constraints on vicious 
weapons and total war are set aside” (Fleming 2004: 46). 
Religious communities were not spared as their relative wealth made 
them an especially attractive target. The plague of war led to a series of synods, 
the organization of militias, and the development of a chivalric code to secure jus 
in bello exemption for weary non-combatants, including clerics, women, farmers, 
merchants, pilgrims, and Jews. Pacifist movements with names such as the 
‘Peace of God’ and ‘Truce of God’ called upon militias to defend the peace and to 
curb new lethal technologies, respectively, but were coopted, then crushed, 
ultimately doing little to halt the despoilation and protracted misery that came to 
characterize medieval warfare. 
Twelfth-century jurist Gratian succeeded where these piecemeal attempts 
failed by working to reconcile them in a more univocal and authoritative law of 
war, knowledge of which was the first step to wider adoption. The longevity of 
his Concord of the Discordant Canons, known as the Decretum, was testament to its 
comprehensiveness, persuasiveness, and lucidity, but also to the emergence of a 
third mediating authority bridging church and state: the university.  
The legal tradition at the time permitted the use of force as a means of 
redressing grievances in contexts that lacked competent executive or judicial 
authority (Johnson 1975: 37; Bellamy 2006: 33). The Gratian legal school at 
Bologna worked to reconcile Biblical teaching; secular law, Roman and 
provincial; and common practice relating to the use of force. The scholarly, 
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systematic, interrogative style imitated Aristotle and anticipated Aquinas. 
Refereeing between folk opinion, intuition, experience, and logic to arrive at 
“right opinion”, which had the epistemological status of knowledge, the nascent 
school of law at the university at Bologna continued this work after his death.  
The biggest service rendered by the development of the Decretum was to 
separate holy wars, which could be initiated in defense of faith, from just wars 
which Gratian agreed with Augustine were exclusively remedial or reactive in 
character (righting previous wrongs or defending self or others). War could be 
declared by clerical or princely authority, but importantly, only the latter could 
mount armies and participate. This de jure prohibition of mercenary armies had 
the aim of halting or reversing the escalatory tendencies characteristic of the 
security dilemma between bishoprics and vassal states.5 
As importantly, the ideal soldier was a layman whose motivations 
mirrored those of just cause: to prevent theft and defend the homeland. Drawing 
soldiers from the public also reinforced the norm of non-combatant immunity. 
Inspired by examples from the Old Testament, the Decretum wisely made 
provisions for soldiers who had “shed human blood” to rehabilitate before 
reintegrating into society. Though the Decretum did not go as far as to prohibit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The centralization of military authority was gradual and in many cases 
managed to replace church and state competition with inter and intra-state 
competition. However, like as many mergers and acquisitions, ‘inward-looking’ 
competition and reorganization facilitated a more outward-looking Europe in the 
late Middle Ages, marked by growth in trade and naval power, regional rule by 
non-royal banking families, and the cultural Renaissance their profits 
underwrote. See Paul Kennedy (1989), The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and 
Charles Tilly (1992) Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1990 on “The 
European Miracle”. 
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what contemporary observers would call ‘aggression’ by more strictly defining 
legitimate authority, it did replace Augustine’s dangerously malleable category 
of ‘right intention’ with more objective standards of just cause and identified the 
licit entities and conditions to enforce them. 
 Gratian and the Bolognese school are instructive but frequently 
overlooked elements in the development of just war. First, their method 
exemplifies the dialogical, casuistic character of the just war tradition, arbitrating 
between seemingly contradictory statutory opinions and practices to reach a 
non-arbitrary result. Reconciling norms is an inescapably interpretive enterprise, 
but not a subjective one. These jurists and schoolmen had to make a persuasive 
case for the ‘spirit’ or purpose of the law, but this is a more rigorous exercise than 
it sounds, or than “constructivism” usually connotes. 
The possibility of reconciling disparate normative practice is the meaning 
or essence of moral principle. It is also the function of political theory. As 
important as the theory–practice divide is the difference between morality and 
laws, norms, or ethics. Theory illuminates moral principle, which is the 
instrument that tells us how to use the law and where its exceptions might lie 
(Scanlon 2008: 22–36). Like constitutional scholarship, this is partly a question of 
origins and intent, highlighting similarity to predecessors and the continuity of 
norms, and partly a question of current needs, doing justice to the difference of 
the challenges confronting those living in the present moment. This ‘dual 
movement’ of respecting difference while recognizing universality is emblematic 
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of both cosmopolitanism, and what I have dubbed ‘discourse ethical’ 
constructivism. 
As the work of these first university-men and pioneering theorists 
illustrates, the principle animating the law of war is peace. Jus ad bellum limits 
valid calls to arms to those that aim at peace. In a flawed age and system, this is 
simultaneously a statement that there ought not be any war, and a recognition 
that free republics, like the free humans that comprise them, will in their 
judgment nonetheless find it necessary to their security. Some will be wrong, and 
those whom they threaten when lines are crossed will therefore be within their 
rights to use proportional force to defend themselves. Peace refers to more than 
the absence of hostilities, but is a longer-term project in which jus in bello also 
plays a role. Disavowing punitive tactics and indiscriminate weapons, and 
prohibiting entirely intentional harm to civilian populations reduces unnecessary 
destruction and makes jus post bellum and the project of peace achievable even 
between longtime enemies. The principle underwriting international law as a 
whole, from The Peace of Kadesh, through these medievals, to the present, is 
fidelity. Good faith or trust gives truces and declarations their force, and 
facilitates the communication, cooperation, and respect for difference that has the 
power to heal historical antagonisms. 
 
The Thomistic Turn 
If Gratian is the least recognized contributor to the development of the just 
war tradition, Thomas Aquinas is perhaps the most, though his contributions did 
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not come to the fore until the late Renaissance. It is no surprise Aquinas’ 
definitions of authority and legitimacy in matters of war and peace resonated 
with later Renaissance humanists suggesting as they did that sovereign right is 
predicated on the common good of the people. Proposing a popular basis for 
legitimate authority, however indirect, was as revolutionary in the just war 
tradition as it would be in the classical liberal political theory of John Locke four 
hundred years on.  
Whereas Aquinas and Locke’s intellectual predecessors— Augustine and 
Hobbes, respectively — viewed man as irrevocably Fallen, Aquinas revived the 
countervailing Aristotelian idea that human nature inclined towards the good 
and was improvable under a well-ordered polity. Human sociability and the 
capacity to reason, judge, and legislate, they argued, bring cities and states 
together for ends higher than survival. And, as the allegorical frescoes of 
Aquinas’ rough contemporary Ambrogio Lorenzetti portray, good government 
was as instrumental in securing the conditions for human improvability and the 
virtuous life as war was detrimental to these same goals. 
The centrality of language and of collaboration in Aquinas’ first principles 
has several important implications for just war, some of which mirror the 
method, style, and content of the Decretum which I identified as constructivist. 
First, they make normative the state of peace, cooperation, and communication, 
rather than the state of war, competition, and conflict of interest. Even if earthly 
peace is not our shared beginning or current reality, Aristotle and Aquinas’ 
accounts imply that it is our shared human end. Belief in a natural law of peace 
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shifted the center of gravity in just war from the proactive Augustinian principle 
of having to promote these goods, to Aquinas’ negative principle of avoiding evil 
as the best way of promoting human flourishing. The normative state peace gives 
special status to domestic political projects as means to that end, intervention 
into which requires an especially strong justification. 
Second, Aquinas’ strengthened the protections of jus in bello immunity, 
defining them not in terms of relative weakness (surrender), or religious 
affiliation (which was ambiguous), or social or economic function (which was 
arbitrary), or even age or gender, but by a moral–legal status: innocence. As long 
as civilians were not actively taking up arms or themselves harming innocents, 
the inviolability of sovereignty accrued to them. The upshot of this doctrine is 
that intentional killing of a civilian is never just, even if the violation of national 
sovereignty might have been deemed to be; just cause and general jus ad bellum 
conformity does not confer or connote blanket immunity for jus in bello 
infractions. For Aquinas, “The only legitimate intent that an individual may have 
[in killing] is self-preservation. Even then it is incumbent upon the killer to 
demonstrate through his actions that he intended to defend himself and not kill 
his assailant” (Bellamy 2006: 39). 
Though this definition of defense as legitimate intent holds true in 
domestic criminal law, international conflicts present special difficulties that 
Aquinas sought to resolve. The deontological (philosophic/theoretical) 
inviolability of individual rights, and the utilitarian (political/practical) dilemma 
of serving the greatest good under conditions of duress remains the primary 
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source of tension between the two halves of just war theory. Aquinas’ attempt to 
reconcile these two ethical imperatives has come to be known as the doctrine of 
the double effect (DDE) (Finnis 1998: 277, 285). The DDE limitedly extends the 
category of ‘necessary violence’ to cases in which a government violates 
conditions of internal or external peace by killing, or credibly threatening to kill, 
civilians.  
With such high stakes, justness of cause and right intention were not 
enough; Aquinas added to jus ad bellum legitimacy that war be a ‘last resort’ and 
that peace be the subject of ongoing negotiation. If the offending power leaves no 
channels for amelioration or avoidance, it is liable and subject to the force 
necessary to end said violations/threats and restore the peace of the status quo 
ante. Under these conditions, the ‘right intention’ is the greater good of 
proportionally restored peace as much as self-defense. In Aquinas’ terms, acts 
necessary to achieve this narrower aim of restoring peace that result in the 
unintentional, if foreseeable, death of innocents, are justifiable, even if the acts 
themselves cannot be called just. 
Wary of ideologically-driven holy war, Aquinas followed Gratian in 
defining ‘legitimate authority’ as those princely powers with no judge above 
them capable of mobilizing an army. But with no judge, how to tell if princes’ 
justifications of necessity were genuine? What explains Aquinas’ sanguinity 
given this history of warranted skepticism? Aquinas saw this system of 
sovereignty as self-enforcing for several reasons, the first of which is presaged in 
the Greek Polybius’ maxim that “providing pretexts for war propitiates 
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humanity as well as the gods.” By formalizing as part of jus ad bellum the 
convention that wars were to be declared by the mobilizing authority, a potential 
belligerent had to make his case to those who would be fighting and dying, to 
their relatives, and to others who stood to be affected. This insured the 
righteousness of intention and justness of cause would be on display not only for 
judgment by contemporaries, but by posterity as well — for “humanity and the 
gods.”  
If a sovereign were to have sufficient strength or disdain as to feel 
insulated from public opinion, there is still a second level of accountability that 
might prove more compelling. Flippant uses of force not only open violators to 
domestic discontent, but the resentment and reprisals of those harmed and their 
allies. Even in the nascent international community of the thirteenth century, 
legitimacy entailed conforming to the chivalric code and the legal conventions of 
the jus gentium. Aquinas’ framework revived Aristotle, Cicero, and Gaius’ 
arguments that the universal duties implied by the jus gentium were deducible by 
reason as part of the jus natural, as distinct from the positive law of the jus civile. 
‘Common customs of mankind’, such as recognizing surrender or giving quarter, 
became part of the early war convention precisely because they were regularly 
recognized across jurisdictions as natural rights, even in the absence of formally 
promulgated law (Boyle in Nardin & Mapel 1993). The obsolescence of holy war 
required that those who systematically ignored these basic prohibitions, however 
unholy their crimes, not be subject to the same barbarity. 
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Even if killing and deception have their place in war, killing those who do 
not present a threat is as universally despised as the use of deceit to initiate 
hostilities (explaining the convention of declaration). Ambush is an acceptable 
tactic once war is begun, but piracy or knavery if introduced in context of peace 
or trade is the equivalent of a sucker-punch and just cause for retaliation. The 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, which reinforced the inviolability of compacts and 
treaties, is an example of this ‘common sense’ of justness finding its way into 
law, and a reminder of the ‘troth’ behind all law and treaty — that all parties 
gain more from an environment of trust (and trade) than from any temporary 
advantage won by infidelity or subterfuge.  
This promise of mutual benefit was the impetus behind the formation of 
the defensive commercial confederacy of Northern European guildsmen, or 
hansa, into the Hanseatic League in the high Middle Ages following Aquinas.6 
The convention of contract-making became part of positive law but took its 
power from a more basic understanding that its value relied on the good faith of 
two parties — a sort of mutual duty, rather than enforcement (Zimmerman 1996: 
568). This principle was pivotal in the expanding role of diplomacy in the Italian 
city-states, which underpins the ‘last resort’ and ‘ongoing negotiation’ portions 
of Aquinas’ jus ad bellum. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The prohibition of surprise attacks by army and navy regulars did not stop the 
use of the ‘asymmetrical’ tactic of encouraging brigandry and piracy by non-state 
actors, any more than contemporary international law has eliminated espionage 
and covert operations. For more on the incorporation of bandits and other 
criminal elements into early European statebuilding see Charles Tilly, 
“Warmaking and Statemaking as Organized Crime” in Evans, Rueschemeyer, 
and Skocpol (Eds.) Bringing the State Back In, or his expanded argument in 
Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992. 
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Clarifying the key concepts of legitimacy, authority, and jus in bello, the 
cumulative effect of Aquinas’ negative, reactive, or defensive reformulation of 
the theory of the just war was to raise the bar for all its major categories: just 
cause, right intention, and legitimate authority, as well as jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello proportionality. These represent the peacekeeping function of the doctrine 
of the just war as I have previously characterized it: to reduce the frequency (last 
resort/legitimate authority), intensity (right intention/proportionality), and 
duration (declaration/accountability of legitimate authority/ongoing 
negotiation) of armed conflict. These canvas all of the most recognized just war 
principles save just cause, whose gatekeeping function gives it special 
importance (McMahan 2005).  
Aquinas’ tightening of just war and premium on peace formally amount 
to a narrowing of jus ad bellum to three just causes consistent with international 
right: self-defense, other-defense, and what we now recognize as humanitarian 
intervention. However, because these principles antedated the hard-fought 
formation of the modern nation state, they were ignored as often as they were 
invoked (Kennedy 1989; Tilly 1992). By the time the sovereign state had taken 
shape, the principled, natural law conception of international ethics had given 
way to a realist understanding of international right as states’ rights, exemplified 
in the raison d’etat of Niccolò Machiavelli. 
The relationship of means to ends in the nascent discipline of political 
science reversed in early modernity, so that the might of the state came to define 
‘right’. This new conception of state authority took the legitimacy of the 
	  	  
58 
magistrate or ruler for granted, whittling reason and citizen to strategic 
instruments in the pursuit of glory and the national interest. Machiavelli boldly 
stated a preference for the appearance of justice over right intention and just cause 
(Strauss 1999: 178–180). But as Manent writes in his essay Birth of the Nation,  
 
Machiavelli did not clearly outline the new order that action [based 
on these pretenses] was supposed to produce. He did define a 
number of conditions of that action, famously dismissing all moral 
or religious precepts, all prudential maxims, and all forms of 
respect transmitted with our mothers milk that might forbid, fetter, 
or discourage action (Manent 2013: 3-4). 
 
 
Underlying conversations throughout the late middle ages, the Renaissance, and 
Reformation periods, however, are Aristotle, Cicero, and Aquinas’ arguments to 
the contrary: that without the humane appreciation of ends — the essential 
goodness of peace and law — any victory won by such assertiveness would 
ultimately be meaningless. 
Withstanding the shift toward statecraft after Aquinas, it was Schoolmen 
more than statesmen, jurists, or men of affairs like Machiavelli that made lasting 
contributions to international ethics in the Renaissance period, through to the age 
of exploration, and up to the present day. This is owed in no small part to the rise 
of that second-most successful Western institution, the European university, in 
those same Italian city-states that had been beneficiaries of diplomatic exchange 
(Rüegg 1992: 19, 31, 463). There is more than superficial similarity between the 
universitas — a decentralized community of equals united in conversation — and 
the birth of international societas in the bourgeoning study of international law 
(Jackson 2000: 165). 
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Exemplary of this community of scholars were Thomists Francisco Suàrez 
and Francisco de Vitoria of the famed Salamanca School. In their thinking, 
speaking, and writing, they drove the transition from a jus gentium based in 
natural and divine law, to one based on consent and common practice. In this 
spirit of voluntarism, they substituted for feudal hierarchy individual liberties 
like those articulated in the Magna Carta, including the right to overthrow a 
despot. As with the war convention, the development of a law inter omnes gentes 
was significant not in its novelty but in its antiquity — the fact it had developed 
organically, “by practice itself and by tradition… 
 
without any special meeting or consent of all peoples at a particular 
time…and so suited to all nations and the fellowship between them 
that it would have been almost naturally propagated along with the 
human race itself, and thus it was not written, because it was laid 
down by no lawgiver, but prevailed by usage” (Suàrez 1995: 470; 
emphasis added). 
 
 
This passage beautifully captures what I referred to in the context of 
constructivism as the ‘double movement’ of international law: universal and 
progressive activity, plural in origin and membership. For Suàrez, consent is 
what gave the law of nations its authority over positive law, subjecting the will of 
individuals and individual republics to that of an overarching res publica — a 
human unum from the pluribus of what was at that time an increasingly 
interdependent cosmopolitan world, in matters of taste if not in matters of state. 
While the Salamancans’ conception of jus in bello preserved Aquinas’ 
notion of proportionality as governing the DDE, they were responsible for 
pioneering now-familiar concepts in international humanitarian law such as 
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equal dignity and freedom of movement. It was members of this school who first 
suggested the area of post-conflict justice as a third aspect of just war analysis in 
addition to just entry and just conduct, later supported by Balthazar Ayala. In his 
“Lectures on the American Indian”, Vitoria used these principles to critique 
Charles V’s conquests in the New World, demonstrating the tradition’s dual use: 
to curtail governmental excess and prick the conscience of the citizenry. The 
Lectures were longsighted in their constructivist interpretation that a system of 
law, rule, and custom was enough to give Native American populations legal 
standing in a pre-Westphalian world against imperial or clerical claims of 
‘universal jurisdiction’, even if such claims are premised on humanitarian 
grounds. 
This modesty of national purpose speaks to Vitoria’s greatest 
methodological and epistemological contribution to debates on the morality of 
the use of force: the twofold notion of a society of equal states, and what he 
called their “invincible ignorance.” Anticipating the doctrine of sovereign self-
determination established at Augsburg, the conjunction of these two principles 
implied that no nation, institution, or group thereof could be so certain of 
another nation’s flaws in governance to claim the moral or legal right to impose 
upon it an alternative political or religious system. Invincible ignorance, or 
“probabilism” as Vitoria’s successor Luis de Molina called it, laid bare the 
supposed positive right to wage wars of punishment or preference as matters of 
‘subjective justice’, not international right. 
On issues that were matters of international right (and therefore duties) — 
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such as self-defense, upholding treaties, or protecting innocents — Molina’s 
doctrine of probabilism still dictated a sort of normative skepticism over their 
objective justice. introduced the procedural norm of consultation to help 
ascertain the justice of such actions. Sovereigns championing ostensibly just 
causes were to have them vetted by advisors, including those of pacifist opinion, 
before being acted upon. As Rawls would argue in his Law of Peoples, the 
concepts of legitimate authority and recognition that have been taken for granted 
with sovereignty are predicated on some minimum standard of consultation and 
accountability (Rawls 2001). However, for Vitoria (and, controversially, for Kant) 
this procedural just war criterion neither necessitates popular (majority) consent, 
nor voids civil or military obligation for dissenters. 
While their tighter normative standards were not immediately 
incorporated into international relations, the Scholastics’ emphasis on 
epistemological limitations progressed conceptions of legitimate authority. 
According to just war scholar James Turner Johnson, 
 
because sovereigns needed to make difficult decisions in cases 
where the truth was veiled by ignorance, it became important to 
pay more attention to the process by which decisions to wage war 
were taken. Second, if it is conceded that the enemy might have 
justice on its side [as well], it becomes imperative to conduct the 
war with maximum restraint (1975: 20–21; emphasis added). 
 
 
The humility of such a position seems salutary from the pacifist’s perspective, 
but this uncertainty in judgments relating to the use of force had considerable 
unintended consequences. As Bellamy has it, “It was precisely this type of 
argument that contributed to the shift away from jus ad bellum to jus in bello in the 
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nineteenth century” and that “unwittingly paved the way for later realists and 
legalists to argue that as objective knowledge of just causes was impossible, it 
should be assumed that war waged by sovereigns was just, placing the normative 
emphasis on conduct” (2006: 54–55; emphasis added). In the next chapter, I will 
be discussing how this early modern trend toward realism and legalism 
contributed to the normatively minimalist positivism of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, and in the following chapter, positivism’s deleterious effects 
in both the theory and practice of social science and international relations.
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Chapter Two: 
 
The Kantian Moment 
 
 
Those who would treat politics and morality apart will never understand the one 
or the other. 
-Viscount John Morley, Rousseau 
 
The alternative to tradition is bad habit. 
 
-Jaroslav Pelikan, “Speaking of Faith” 
 
 
The preceding chapter characterized the overall development of classical 
just war theory as the refinement and clarification of the jus ad bellum — the 
criteria delimiting legitimate resorts to force in international relations. It began 
with a paradox: Augustine denounces concern with self-defense, but breaks with 
Christian pacifism by praising the salvific role strength in arms can play in 
defending others and punishing wrongdoers. I recounted the development of 
specific jus ad bellum principles beyond right intention and imperial-ecclesiastical 
authority, bookended by formal and informal agreements on more general jus in 
bello protections for civilians and soldiers in Greek convention, Roman law, and 
chivalric codes. 
As we saw, the key refinement in both halves of the just war tradition 
came with Gratian and Aquinas’ subordination of ‘intention’ to the more 
objective rubric of ‘just cause’, foregrounding the now common conception of 
just wars as wars of defense, discretion, and restraint. Aquinas’ limitation of 
legitimate authority in the declaration of war to secular principalities marked the 
beginning of a reorientation in international law from righting wrongs to 
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protecting rights. Aquinas also claims the distinction of having introduced the 
remaining just war categories of ‘last resort’ and ‘proportionality’, both of which 
remain central in the legitimation of military force. 
This chapter picks up the modern shift from clerical to juristic and 
academic authority on matters of just war. The counterpoint these latter camps 
presented to princely or state authority was already evident in the relationship of 
the School of Salamanca of the sixteenth century to the Spanish crown. The 
‘Salmanticenses’ — Vitoria, Molina, Suàrez — perfected and arguably 
secularized the casuistic character of the just war tradition, returning to the idea 
of Roman jus gentium that individuals are the bearers of rights which have 
corresponding ‘national’ duties. The Schoolmen argued that the law of peoples’ 
plus Aquinas’ natural right considerations of life, property, and prosperity 
underwrote freedom of conscience and the equal dignity of human persons even 
in the ‘unincorporated’ areas of the Americas. 
As intimated, Vitoria’s introduction of radical moral skepticism into 
international relations with the concept of “invincible ignorance” shifted the 
burden of proof to those arguing for just cause (jus ad bellum) and raised the bar 
of proportionality (jus in bello) but was of mixed effect in the longer run. Its intent 
was to foreclose claims of ‘objective’ or absolute justice of the kind that had been 
used to defend holy war. Gradual acceptance of this doctrine had the positive 
effect of introducing the procedural norm of consultation, allowing sovereign 
and imperial authority to be held to public account by the home populace. 
However, as will become clear in what follows, probabilism or fallibilism’s war 
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on certainty was less-than-discriminate in its destruction, eventually taking all of 
natural law and much of jus ad bellum as collateral damage, making the members 
of international society equals in right before equals in respect. 
 
Early modern realism and the return of holy war 
 
The next movement in just war theory from natural law and the law of 
nations to positive law can be traced to a former monk and academic turned 
jurist and magistrate, Jean Bodin. It was Bodin who introduced to international 
jurisprudence the key legal concepts of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘state’. These 
innovations were captured in the 1555 Peace of Augsburg’s doctrine of cuis regio, 
eius religio that sought to give rulers freedom of conscience in determining their 
region’s religious affiliation. Though the right of self-determination established 
at Augsburg was revoked, reinstated, and altered several times during the 
bloody French Wars of Religion that followed, the introduction of a rationale for 
national autonomy marked the beginning of the end of ecclesiastical and 
imperial aspirations to dominate the Old World and the New. Bodin was 
involved in negotiating the 1598 Edict of Nantes to stanch the decades-long series 
of massacres, assassinations, forced conversions, displacements, and reprisals 
between Catholics and Huguenots, but his efforts were not enough to end a new 
era of holy war, the aftershocks of which lasted into the eighteenth century. 
The profound disruption caused by the post-Reformation growth of 
Protestantism in Europe also prepared the ground for democracy. As Pierre 
Manent writes, “the rupture of ecclesiastical mediation gave power, including 
spiritual power, to the temporal prince, since it stripped spiritual princes — the 
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church and its prelates — of their legitimacy. The repository of religious 
authority was henceforth the community of citizens” (Manent 2013: 4).7 When the 
community of citizens is plural, however, leaders that might otherwise be 
inclined to act pragmatically can be spurred to factionalism instead. In civil war 
as international, inflamed passions present a stronger argument for republican 
leadership than democratic control (Lijphart 1968).  
It was this sentiment and the convulsive violence in Europe and at home 
that animated Englishman Thomas Hobbes’ pathbreaking political philosophy. 
More than any other thinker, it was Hobbes who was responsible for supplanting 
natural law with natural right (Strauss 1999). Both were ‘natural’ in the sense of 
knowable by reason but what was ratiocinated by Hobbes was not the equal 
personhood and liberty of others, but the claims one’s interests had against 
theirs. For Hobbes, this implied a constant collision of interest, or in his phrase, 
“a war of all against all.” As Hobbes’ own life seem to prove, only under strong 
national positive law, where right was legally enforceable, could war tentatively 
cease. 
Such an anarchical international sphere should make the rational ruler aim 
for enough prosperity to keep he and allies comfortable and citizens content, but 
not so much as to be made the envy of his neighbors. As in democratic society, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7Manent’s anti-historicist reading of modernity does not address the ‘materialist’ 
‘middle term’ between prince or priest and peasant: the emergent urban 
bourgeoisie. Before the nation existed, the aristocracy and merchant ‘middle 
class’ in the Italian city states and Dutch financial centers eyed the potential of 
(secular) nationalism as a way to wrest divine right the way of the people 
(though not yet for democracy) to be wielded as a weapon against capricious 
monarchs. 
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however, members of an international society of equals tend to overestimate 
themselves and underestimate their peers, leading to distortions in the 
formulations of risk and irrational behavior. Hobbes saw security-obsessed 
stockpiling as vain in the context of individual citizens, but nonetheless 
necessary for the head of state. Like his predecessors Machiavelli and Bodin, 
Hobbes thought the best way to achieve peace was imbuing an absolute monarch 
with what a later commentator called “the heroic unity of the sovereign Will” 
(Stromberg 1956). The flimsiness of peace meant constant preparation for war, 
and no holds barred when at war. According to Harold Laski, “The work of 
Bodin and Hobbes was to separate ethics from politics, and to complete by 
theoretical means the division which Machiavelli had effected on practical 
grounds” (1963: 45). 
Observing firsthand monarchs’ murderous machinations and the perfidy 
of the Catholic League, diplomat, reformer, and scholar Giovanni Botero argued 
expressly against Bodin, Machiavelli, and Hobbes’ conception of sovereignty and 
the emergent Protestant notion of divine right. Influenced by Aquinas and 
Salmanticenses Suárez and de Molina, Botero’s Reason of State promulgated a 
progressive doctrine of popular sovereignty that anticipated Rousseau’s, as well 
as a controversial right to revolution affirmed by Juan de Mariana and Robert 
Bellarmine. Behind these radical views are Gratian and Aquinas’ faith in the 
durability of reason, and magistrates’ ability to navigate any temporary insanity 
of cardinal, king, or public. As the Edict of Nantes’ partly proved, there are 
limitations on war’s imposition into public life even in the most tumultuous of 
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times. As with taxes, the distinction between ‘necessary’ and ‘unnecessary’ wars 
shines through.  
Machiavelli and Hobbes also recognized that sovereigns of most religious 
stripe were sufficiently invested in their own self-preservation to be ‘rational’ in 
this realist sense of the word. In practice, however, entrusting states to define 
their own interest meant stripping jus ad bellum down to one, procedural 
principle: ‘right authority’. In an anarchical state system, this reduces 
international right, or ethics, to a tautology: ‘justice’ is whatever authoritative 
entities do or posit. In this positivist epistemology, the lack of a competent judge 
of just cause, right intention, proportionality, last resort, or jus in bello means that 
‘norms’ are mere suggestions, ignored by the powerful. For Machiavelli and 
Hobbes, the only limits to power and violence were prudential, a truism of 
politics domestically as well as internationally. 
The moral skepticism of Machiavelli and Hobbes enjoyed great longevity 
in political philosophy, in political realism and classical international law’s 
privileging of sovereignty. The contributions of Alberico Gentili and Hugo 
Grotius and of lesser-known ‘legalist’ scholars and jurists were pivotal in 
maintaining in international law something of the Spanish School’s conception of 
natural law and international society through the tumult of seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries when it could germinate contemporary international 
humanitarian law in the person of Immanuel Kant, to whom we turn in the next 
section. 
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Natural law’s last gasp and the ‘Miracle of Holland’ 
The legalist tradition can be traced to Italian émigré, Oxford professor, 
and international lawyer, Alberico Gentili. Like Hobbes and Grotius, Gentili was 
a Protestant, political advisor, and sometime political–religious exile who 
resented outside impingement on matters of state and conscience. Unlike his 
English inheritor Hobbes, his conception of international justice did not defer to 
state sovereignty but aligned with Suàrez’ view that state right and positive law 
were limited by international law, operative by consent upon entry into de facto 
community with other sovereigns.  
Gentili acknowledged that war was a legal remedy where wrongs were 
not adjudicatable but reiterated Aquinas’ and Vitoria’s requirement of 
demonstrated necessity. This involved a legal–consultative process vetting the 
aims and intentions of war to ensure that: a) its cause was just, b) sovereign 
authority remained open to negotiation and/or arbitration, and c) arms were 
taken up only as a last resort. The crucial difference between Gentili and his 
natural law predecessors is that ‘legitimate authority’ for him referred not to the 
status of a sovereign, some informal process of consultation, or the perfunctory 
act of declaration, but to a freestanding legal process rooted in established norms 
of diplomacy and international jurisprudence. 
In addition to wars of self- and ‘other-defense’ (to preserve a political 
community imperiled by territorial incursions), Gentili upheld the legality of 
wars in defense of honor. By ‘honor’, he meant not the chivalric code, but a 
proto-interventionist duty to foreign subjects suffering abuse under a tyrannical 
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ruler — what today might be billed as humanitarian intervention. Anticipating 
the contemporary doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, Gentili went as far as to 
suggest that observers failing to intervene accrued the guilt of the offending 
sovereign. As permissive as this understanding of intervention seems, religious 
intolerance did not alone constitute the kind of harm that made government 
liable to intervention.  
A just war remained a necessary war but Gentili agreed with Ayala that 
justice was not a zero sum proposition in international conflict. His departure 
from natural law predecessors on the issue of comparative justice left open the 
perplexing possibility that both sides in a conflict could legitimately claim not 
only simultaneous ostensible justice (legality), but objective justice (moral right). 
Amidst the sectarianism and nationalism of Counter-Reformation Europe, this 
skepticism of state monopolies on international right might have had some 
salutary effects in its revival Christian pacifist and humanist preference of an 
unjust peace to a questionably just war (Bellamy 2006: 65). In the intellectual 
hothouse of seventeenth century European Enlightenment, bourgeoning 
university, art, and literary cultures increasingly took up press and type versus 
muskets and pikes to register dissent against perceived injustice. 
Where Hobbes’ enthusiasm for the new scientific method made him an 
outspoken critic of the ‘Schoolmen’, Hugo Grotius defended the idea of a 
‘republic of letters’ not dissimilar to Aristotelian nous — the ‘world mind’ of 
philosophers, historians, poets, and orators of all ages and climes whose 
cogitations collectively informed the opinion of mankind. Of this imagined 
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community he wrote, “I quote them as witnesses whose conspiring testimony, 
proceeding from innumerable different times and places, must be referred to 
some universal cause” (2009: 40). Even if knowledge of this “universal cause” 
remained incomplete and conflict persisted, one could still reasonably believe in 
moral–historical progress since natural law prohibitions such as those on the 
intentional harming of innocents, and permissions such as freedom of 
movement, continued to be in force.8 
In his legal studies at Leiden, Orélans, and the Hague, Grotius’ method 
was, like Machiavelli’s, critical historical, but drew an entirely different lesson 
regarding the disjuncture between law and war. Unlike his contemporary 
Hobbes, violence for Grotius was not natural to humans but an aberration from 
the natural desire for peace. Like Aristotle and Aquinas before him, and Locke 
and Rousseau after, Grotius saw the state as “a complete association of free men, 
joined together for the enjoyment of rights and for their common interest” (1925: 
44). Protecting and developing the sociability of our rational nature was the 
raison d’être of states. Anticipating liberal internationalism, Grotius believed that 
in the hands of a legitimate sovereign, war could not only be used lawfully, but 
to the same effect as law. Both natural law reflective of individual reason, and 
volitional law reflective of individual consent were derivable from basic 
principles of right and custom, respectively. These principles — such as keeping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 At its core, the theory of the just war embodies the same zetetic or Pyrrhonic 
paradox of practical wisdom: lessons of history, philosophy, and political theory 
speak to the necessity of certain forms of coercion, though always with the aim of 
reducing violence asymptotically toward zero. 
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one’s promises, or paying restitution if one causes harm — also placed 
constraints on the use of force.  
As with Grotius’ intellectual inheritor John Locke, it was recognition of a 
fundamental equality as much as sociability or self-interest, that impelled 
individuals and the magna personae of nation states to freely contract and form 
themselves into a society. War was an instrument states reserved in “fulfilling 
the natural purposes of men” to enjoy the blessings of tranquility and live free 
from fear, but in doing so they could not lawfully violate the equal right of others 
in international society to the same. For Grotius, the state had inestimable value 
as protector of faith and culture — the arts, sciences, and ways of life but their 
“heroic unity” was born not of the willful particularity of national or religious 
identity, but from precisely the representative structures that gave them 
legitimate authority, making sensible the analogy of states as free, rational, 
‘unitary’ actors. 
Grotius discussed in depth the relationship of natural law to legitimate 
authority in his masterwork, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, “The Law of War and Peace”. 
In it, he disputed Hobbes’ claim that individuals, in agreeing to the social 
contract, yielded their right to self-preservation to the state, arguing that the very 
reason they are thought to have consented is to avoid the arbitrary violence of 
the state of nature. Similarly, “states are not engaged in a simple struggle, like 
gladiators in an arena,” as Hedley Bull had it, “but are limited in their conflicts 
with one another by common rules and institutions” (2002: 25). Where the 
interests of states conflicted, contractual (legal) and natural (moral) obligations 
	  	  
73 
constrained sovereign authority in waging war (and jeopardizing peace) in 
pursuit of those interests. While the state reserved the right to self-preservation, 
and was bound to honor treaties to preserve others, these did not entail 
unnecessarily placing citizens and soldiers in harm’s way to right wrongs or 
defend honor.  
In this ‘rationalist’ conception of natural right, Grotius introduced the 
final jus ad bellum category, ‘chance of success’. This principle forbade entering 
‘Pyrrhic’ conflicts that risked the independence of the home population, even if 
well-intentioned and ostensibly just. ‘Necessary’ and proportional uses of force 
and the formulation of ‘acceptable risk’ were, under this conception, not purely 
matters of state or military prerogative. For Grotius, the moral force of the 
concept of necessity was conditioned by international law through a combination 
contracts (human law) and convention (natural law) corresponding to jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello, respectively. 
Per De Jure Belli ac Pacis, the justness of force was primarily a function of 
the two most familiar elements of the jus ad bellum: just cause and legitimate 
authority. Grotius pruned Gentili’s six just causes to just four:  
 
1) self-defense, including from immanent threats (preemption) 
2) punishment of wrongdoing corrosive to international 
society/natural law (‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’) 
3) the enforcement of legal rights (the extradition of international 
criminals or maintenance of freedom of the seas) 
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4) reparation of injury, to which the preceding restrictions applied 
(last resort, proportionality, chance of success). 
 
Grotius’ distinction between universally binding natural law, and volitional 
human law was more than taxonomic; it was a deliberative tool for citizens, 
scholars, and statesmen that helped differentiate potential actions in 
international relations as just (moral), legal (permissible), obligatory (dutiful) or 
their obverse. It was this practical applicability as much as Grotius’ encyclopedic 
knowledge of international law and his experience in its application that lent De 
Jure Belli ac Pacis singular durability among treatises on the subject. 
The prominence of ‘volitional’ law in Grotian rationalism seems to leave 
open the possibility of ‘opting out’ and entering war unjustly when it seems to 
the benefit of the potential belligerent. To address this possibility, Grotius’ 
wrested back the category of legitimate authority from the realists and placed it 
at the center of jus ad bellum. Like Gentili, Grotius claimed that legitimate 
sovereign authority already implied last resort, for war was properly declared 
only after consultation had exhausted diplomacy, arbitrage, and other options 
short of military force. Grotius’ went further, however, in claiming the 
consultative, procedural aspects of proper declaration by a legitimate authority 
was by definition evaluative of each jus ad bellum principle (McMahan 2005) 
leaving only in bello proportionality and discrimination to be determined (Hurka 
2005). 
Both jurists, Gentili and Grotius, analogized war to litigation, or, to 
paraphrase Clausewitz’ later description, ‘arbitration by other means’. This seems 
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strange since the ethical undergirding of international law defines the morally 
‘permissible’, rather than the strictly prosecutable. After all, as Freud would 
write to Einstein in the correspondence Why War, the international system lacks 
competent transnational military-executive, judicial, or legislative authority, 
making international norms more like guidelines than ‘law’ in the traditional 
sense. This common critique ignores the basic Grotian insight that Bull called 
“the third position”: 
that states and the rulers of states in their dealings with one another 
were bound by rules and together formed a society…Even without 
central institutions, rules and peoples might constitute a society 
among themselves, an anarchical society or society without 
government (Bull, Kingsbury, & Roberts 1992: 72; emphasis added). 
 
In Grotian legalism, as in liberal constitutional law and communitarian 
philosophy, the original, hypothetical, unanimous ‘contract’ both supports and is 
supported by self-evident moral claims of signatories’ rights, equality, and 
reciprocal duties that are legally enforceable (Etzioni 2010). To abrogate either 
contract through criminal behavior is to enter back into a state of war, and in 
presenting such a threat to the normative state of peace, one becomes liable to 
counterattack. 
To continue the analogy, in the legalist–constructivist legitimacy 
framework, sovereigns are ‘deputized’ as sheriffs — public prosecutors of 
aggressors in an anarchical society of states, and public defenders to victims of 
aggression. This means that states are not only responsible for ensuring peace for 
their subjects, but in rare circumstances are obliged (through original consent) to 
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uphold the law by pursuing justice for others. Sovereigns that did not fulfill the 
first responsibility of securing domestic peace, or were guilty of what Grotius 
called “unambiguously destructive wrongs” (see the second just cause, above) 
under an unjust peace, were liable to the (proportional) costs of restoring just 
peace by force. The ‘looser’ the international social contract, however, the greater 
the obstacles to collective enforcement. Acknowledging the barriers to 
international cooperation even in Grotius’ day, ostracization of defectors is a 
more likely outcome than invasion. Then as now, collective security is a last 
resort. Thus, the deterrent effect of international law remains a ‘soft power’, only 
as strong as the perceived value of good standing in the international community 
(Nye 2003). 
 
Moral skepticism in legalism versus legal positivism 
If Grotius’ tighter definition of just cause and his and Gentili’s higher bar 
for legitimate authority represent progress toward a more objective standard of 
just war, these gains are balanced by Grotius’ return to Vitorian ‘invincible 
ignorance’ from Gentili’s ‘simultaneous objective justice’. In either case, part of 
the meaning of the analogy of war as arbitration is that even nations ostensibly in 
violation of the law retain the legal right to defend themselves. It may not be 
quite true that they are “innocent until ‘proven’ guilty”, though as evidence 
mounts in that direction, they are more likely to plead ‘no contest’ and sue for 
peace (hence the importance of ongoing negotiation). 
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For just war theory, the combination of agnosticism regarding moral right 
and the pursuit of truth is of central significance9, though the ethical implications 
of this paradoxical feature are hotly contested. It signifies, on the one hand, the 
steadfast refusal to provide war of any kind the dignity of the designation 
‘moral’, particularly to kinds of ideological, punitive, or ‘holy’ wars that claim it. 
We will be discussing the moral psychological dimension of certainty and the 
self-righteous sense of impunity that comes with sureness of cause in the 
following chapter. 
On the other hand, to be concerned with normative international theory 
while refusing to allow international law the authority to recognize moral right 
in determining the just use of force seems contradictory. It implies a sort of faith 
that good men, contrary to Edmund Burke’s later warning, will not do nothing 
when confronted with ostensible evil, such as wars of extermination, crimes 
against humanity, or other massive jus in bello violations. It implies, in other 
words, that law follows this impulse, rather than the other way round. Violators 
might retain the right to defend themselves per invincible ignorance, but when 
word of despicable, dehumanizing acts reach a wide enough audience, the posse 
comitatus that righteous indignation builds is bound to be stronger than the 
bonds between the perpetrators. Far from a proof, the acknowledged difficulty of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See the previous footnote on this point. 
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maintaining justice among thieves nonetheless gives the ‘good guys’ in any 
protracted conflict with the advantage.10  
Put in terms of the domestic analogy, this picture of voluntarism in 
Grotian international society represents a tentative solution to the problem of 
political obligation (Miller 2003). The recognized peace and goodness of which 
society is capable, which is the object of unanimity in the hypothesized original 
contract, ensures that at any given time there are more nations willing to enforce 
international law than there are defectors. Jus ad bellum right intention aside, self-
interested motivations for maintaining international society or enforcing 
international law do not undermine their legitimacy, any more than individuals’ 
personal, parochial, or familial reasons for paying taxes, obeying the law, or 
joining the armed forces diminishes these acts. The fact that order appeals to the 
courageous, conventional, and callow increases the likelihood that those 
supporting the state system will outnumber those who deem their unlimited 
right to fight more valuable. 
Notwithstanding consensus in international society on the injustice of the 
crime of aggression, Grotian invincible ignorance means that majority opinion or 
an accusation from an upstanding member alone does not indict a perceived 
aggressor. As in the domestic case, the possibility of just cause gives the plaintiff 
ground to defend themselves against this accusation, first through speech and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This is Plato’s point in the argument he mounts through Socrates in the first 
book of Republic against Thrasymachus’ claim that the idea of justice works to the 
advantage of the stronger. 
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diplomacy, and only then through force of arms. This is simply to reiterate 
Grotius’ analogy of war as ultimate arbiter. 
There are, however, two perverse incentives in this assurance: first, a 
sovereign already guilty of aggression, disproportionality, or jus in bello 
violations has less reason to begin to observe any of when defending itself from 
international policing. These already bad scenarios have greater potential to 
devolve into a worse one — that of total war (war without the possibility of 
surrender).11 Second, if the violator is a superpower, Grotius’ jus ad bellum 
category ‘chance of success’ disincentivizes intervention, since the stronger, more 
reckless, or better allied a sovereign is, the greater risk confrontation brings (as 
illustrated by recent examples of Syria and Ukraine).  
If the aggressor crosses this higher threshold prompting policing nations 
to intervene, the latter would need to use weapons or tactics commensurate with 
the enemy’s, subjecting each to higher casualties and, importantly, higher risk of 
compromising or forfeiting their moral standing.12 Moral considerations are 
therefore crucial in motivating early and decisive action on the part of 
international society, while indecisiveness or ambivalence raise stakes and risk, 
thereby aiding an already strong enemy, as Burke feared. The caveat of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In addition to providing support for Neiman’s (2008; op cit) argument for moral 
clarity and early intervention, this dangerous possibility explains, in part, the 
logic behind the post-war transition from collective enforcement to 
peacekeeping, and the eventual addition of an international criminal court. On 
this point, see Ramesh Thakur’s excellent book, The United Nations, Peace and 
Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect. 
12 At a minimum, this seems to be an argument for multilateral enforcement and 
risk sharing, not least because the most willing coalition partners in multilateral 
enforcement are also likely to possess the most humane home populations, 
which might also be the most risk-averse. 
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invincible ignorance regarding objective (versus ostensible) justice is that it not 
blind the international community to objective injustice. 
Though the scientific fact and the nation state were both seventeenth 
century inventions, few have taken up the question of the connection between 
epistemology and ethics: whether and how the rubric of certainty in the 
experimental sciences might be related to changes in the approach to politics, 
including international relations (MacIntyre 1989).13 As noted at the end of last 
chapter, the net effect of agnosticism over international right in the historical 
development of just war theory was to stoke the moral skepticism characteristic 
of both realism and legalism. Presuming the indeterminacy of moral issues 
militates against consideration of not only intention, but just cause as well, 
reducing the matter to one of authority. The presumption against objective 
justice had the unintended consequence of elevating the prerogative of 
sovereignty above jus ad bellum, shifting normative attention to ‘refereeing’ the 
more manageable jus in bello, or just prosecution of war.14 Helping victims but not 
preventing victimization is akin to scolding a schoolboy for biting while fighting, 
rather than for fighting in the first place 
An alternative interpretation to that which has been presented is that 
Grotius and Gentili’s legalism actually countered and delayed the paradigmatic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Pierre Manent’s (2013) exploration of the relationship between moral irrealism 
and political realism is a notable exception. 
14 Rarely noted in analyses of this shift from jus ad bellum to jus in bello is the 
disappearance of the jus post bellum considerations that the Spanish School’s had 
introduced, depriving prosecutors of international injustice of still more ground 
that might be used to hold entrants into hostilities to account. 
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shift toward positivism, if only by keeping open the possibility of objective (if 
unknowable) justice and its corollaries, dialogue and discrimination. That we 
cannot know intention or justice with certainty is ethically and epistemologically 
distinct from claiming that they do not exist or are in any case insignificant. 
Grotius’ theological writing is significant in this constructivist context, since he 
was among the first to propose that hermeneutics are constitutive of truth rather 
than the converse. As editor of the Cambridge companion to Grotius’ Law of 
War and Peace writes,  
 
his theological work was, in many respects, more modern in 
outlook than his legal and political writings. He was a major 
pioneer of modern biblical scholarship, in which the Bible is treated 
in its historical context. His purpose in taking this controversial 
approach was to help promote the reunion of the Christian 
churches, on the basis of an agreed interpretation of the Bible 
arrived at through historical and critical study, rather than through 
the lens of pre-existing dogmata (Neff 2012: xx). 
 
Agnosticism in regard to justice, in other words, in no way obviates intent; the 
shared project of intent — to understand the truth of a text in the preceding 
analogy — is in some ways the substitute for certainty.  
On this interpretation, as long as nations are not guilty of manifest 
injustice in their shared pursuit of national and international right, their good 
faith insures them against the same. This general jus ad bellum formulation is 
perhaps less contentious than its jus in bello form familiar from the debate 
regarding foreseeable but unintentional harm in the Doctrine of Double Effect. 
Those disposed against the activity of justification for war, realist and pacifists 
alike, see deference to intention as giving states an unearned carte blanche for 
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carnage. Just warriors respond that this exemption serves a vital purpose in 
international society by preventing carnage, especially evident in the case of 
humanitarian intervention.15 
As demonstrated in the dramatization of Denmark’s most famous prince, 
foregoing actions to right obvious criminality and injustice when a judge is 
unavailable can lead to greater tragedy. ‘Volitional’ international law imparts to 
statespersons a unique obligation to act in situations of extreme emergency, 
including those that lie outside the narrow national interest (Dallaire 2005; 
Walzer 2006). Confronted by a range of poor options in scenarios most civilians 
(with the notable exception of moral philosophers) are never troubled to 
consider, statespersons are required to execute the least harmful action that is 
compatible with the demands of natural right (Scanlon 2008). 
It should be noted, finally, notwithstanding their theoretical approach to 
legalism, neither Grotius, Gentili, nor Botero’s roots in academe signal a lack of 
appreciation for the bare-knuckled world of statecraft. Each found acclaim in life 
and letters, which is perhaps why their legal pronouncements and 
interpretations were assimilated into the actual practice of international law 
(Falk, Kratchowil & Mendovitz 1985). In life, Gentili served in the High Court of 
the Admiralty and as advocate for the Spanish embassy, and was a member of 
the prestigious Inns of Court in London. Grotius was advocate at the Hague at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 While uncertainty regarding outcomes prescribes prudent inaction to 
individual nations, especially middle or remote powers, a great power willing to 
absorb the bulk of the cost can bring these marginal stakeholders into a risk-
sharing coalition, as demonstrated by the funding structure and membership of 
NATO, for example. 
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the age of 18, Dutch East India Company counsel at 21, Chief Administrator of 
Rotterdam at 30, negotiating trade disputes with the British crown, and served as 
Sweden’s ambassador to France. Though he helped establish the concept of 
freedom of the sea, Grotius forfeited his own freedom by weighing in on the 
most divisive religious issues of his day (Bull, Kingsbury, & Roberts 1992; Van 
Vollenhoven 1919). Botero also found diplomatic work in France after angering 
the religious establishment. And just as King Gustavus Adolphus was said to 
have carried a copy of Grotius’ Law of War and Peace throughout his military 
campaigns in Germany during the Thirty Years’ War, Duke Maximilian of 
Bavaria on the opposite side consulted Botero’s Reason of State for advice (Neff 
2012: xix). (They eventually entered peace negotiations culminating in the Treaty 
of Westphalia.) The example of these poets–cum–reformers–cum–lawyers 
controverts the late modern prejudices of morality as divorced from law, and 
(legal) theory as divorced from practice. 
 
Modernity’s Great Schism 
Just war theorizing after Grotius attempted to resolve the tension between 
its natural and positive elements, first by shoring up the former in the person of 
Samuel Pufendorf, then pivoting to the influential proponent of positive law, 
Emerich Vattel. Many of Vattel’s legal opinions held into the twentieth century, 
but the intervening centuries saw the jus ad bellum half of the tradition remain 
largely dormant with one notable exception. The exception is that Copernicus of 
the moral universe, Immanuel Kant, who reoriented philosophy away from the 
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metaphysical claims of natural law, and towards the critical and constructive 
dimension of reason. The next section explores how Kant’s understanding of the 
reflexive relationship between mind and world differs from his legalist 
predecessors and positivist inheritors, and the implications for practical 
philosophy, political theory, and international ethics. 
The immediate inheritor of legalism’s legacy was Samuel Pufendorf. Like 
his predecessors, Pufendorf lived in a time of great social and political upheaval 
on the continent. Thus, like his predecessors, he was not only an academic, but 
put his knowledge of law to use as a statesman and was ultimately created a 
Baron for his service as royal historian by King Frederick III elector of 
Brandenburg (and grandfather to Kant’s royal patron) (Seidler 2013). As a legal 
and political theorist, the influence he exerted on Montesquieu, Locke, Rousseau, 
and the American founders is quite out of proportion with his own recognition. 
His direct contributions included primary responsibility for the period’s 
renaissance in natural law that served to justify, in part, the Glorious Revolution 
and, eventually, the American Declaration of Independence, as well as a record 
of bold publications that dragooned the despots of his time towards still further 
enlightenment. 
Pufendorf owed much to “the incomparable Hugo Grotius,” whom he 
saw as having resurrected what his translator Barbeyrac called, “the Science of 
Morality” (2005: 78). However, where Grotius was essentially a curatorial figure, 
preserving the best of Aristotle, Roman law, and natural law, Pufendorf had to 
respond to the revolutions in philosophy and science sparked by Grotius’ 
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contemporaries Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo. Even though none of the three 
named traditions informing Groitan international law were originally Christian, 
each had been absorbed into a medieval theology and Chirstian humanist lexicon 
of which Grotius was perhaps the last and greatest representative.  
Pufendorf’s modern natural law approach sought a less expressly 
theological basis for morality. Presaging Kant’s fixation on reason and individual 
autonomy as moral cornerstones, Pufendorf tethered the positive law of nations 
to a voluntarist and rationalist conception of international right. “State” (status) 
was for him a technical term — a condition under which willful bodies brought 
themselves under the dominion of a moral sphere which operated as the earthly 
sphere did for physical bodies. Such scientific analogies reflected Pufendorf’s 
aim in his Elements of Universal Jurisprudence to achieve what his esteemed 
predecessor Hobbes’ had attempted in Leviathan and De Cive: to bring logical 
rigor to the theory of politics and mathematical certainty to its practice. 
Much like just war tradition itself, Pufendorf’s method was eclectic but 
“acknowledge[ed] the contingency of both worldly subject matter and its 
intellectual construal.” Writes one biographer,  
 
The goal remained systematic understanding and demonstrative 
certitude, but one informed by wide and reflectively appropriated 
experience (derived from a careful study of history and 
contemporary events), and thus yielding a more empirically 
grounded and realistic sort of moral and political argument (Seidler 
2013). 
 
 
Both Pufendorf and Hobbes sought to distance themselves from the Scholastics’ 
essentialist conception of human nature with its teleology of human reason, 
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motivation, and history. Pufendorf did not altogether disavow Aristotle, 
appropriating via his teacher, the mathematician Erhard Weigel, Aristotle’s 
apodictic method and applying it to the sphere of human action. Rather than the 
Hobbesean anarchy implied by limitless human desire, Pufendorf’s treatise On 
the Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature describes an internal and 
external world characterized by the lawful operation of the will in conjunction 
with human sociality. 
Sociality was also the animating principle in The Law of Nature and Nations 
— the Archimedean point around which Pufendorf set about reconciling Grotius’ 
and Hobbes’ natural law teaching (Seidler 2013). (Ironically, Pufendorf 
composed the work while imprisoned abroad for the imperial missteps of his 
nation of origin.) Pufendorf’s On the Duty of Man and Citizen had a similarly 
telling title that intimated its own conclusion: just as nations acquired duties by 
acknowledging their membership in a society of states, humans’ recognition of 
their and others’ freedom is ‘naturally’ normative. ‘Sociability’ is both a 
description and a prescription, natural and aspirational. The distance between 
‘perfect’ rational freedom and our own experience spurs the moral being to 
cultivate natural capacity for empathy and structure their choices accordingly. 
Contra Hobbes, predicating human association on choice, will, or consent did not 
necessarily imply a zero sum choice between ‘natural’ self-preservation and the 
duty to preserve others, to which Locke referred in his Second Treatise on 
Government. 
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For Pufendorf as for Aristotle, sociality was based on experience, but has, 
as one shcolar observed, 
 
methodological status as ‘principle’ [principium], for while it 
corresponds to the hypotheses that the natural sciences gain from 
experience, once established it serves as the deductive basis for 
scientific theorems. Accordingly, experience that already played a 
major role in the Elements’ observations as foundation for that 
work’s anthropology now gained preeminent importance. This is 
shown in the vast number of citations from manifold sources 
(ancient and contemporary philosophy, historiography and 
literature, legal texts, contemporary books of travel) that 
supplement the systematic approach to natural law by giving 
examples of concrete moral, legal, and social relations from 
different times and cultures (Behme in Pufendorf 2009: xvii). 
 
In this description we see the very definition of ‘apodictic’: connecting readers’ 
experience to that of different authorities and peoples through time and space in 
a way that cements certain conventions’ status as law.  
Whether by nature or by choice, humanity’s manifest interdependence 
and continued willful subjection to law pointed Pufendorf towards Aquinas’ 
conclusion that peace is the normative baseline behind all law. This is the mirror 
image of Hobbes’ state of war, self-interested social contract, and unrepentantly 
competitive society. Pufendorf’s conception of societas is undergirded not by the 
legal contract, but by the more ancient pactum, or pact — a cognate of ‘peace’ 
whose essence is to promote cooperation, trust, and compromise for mutual 
benefit (Zimmerman 1996: 568). The authority of divine command, cultural 
norm, and individual consent are all predicated on this basic reciprocal: to 
promise and to trust.  
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As much as the ability to question, it is this feature — the ability to respect 
— that is foundational to all human society and synonymous with legitimacy 
(Wright 2001, Bagnoli 2013). Trust made behavior predictable and lent to the 
social world something like the law-governed character of the physical world. 
This standard permits ‘naturalistic’ judgments of political health and 
development — a science of society, or ‘social science’. As we shall see, this 
conception of social science contrasts sharply with the more familiar meaning 
gleaned in the nineteenth century, the principal difference being the role of 
morality in that pursuit. Could, should ‘external’ standards be used to judge the 
validity of individual action, let alone a nation’s? 
Anticipating MacIntyre’s conclusion in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 
the neo-Aristotelian coherence of Pufendorf’s natural law breaks down at the 
level of international society. His position was in some ways closer to Hobbes’ 
than Grotius’ in its permissiveness, deferring to national autonomy in 
determining military necessity. Anticipating Rousseau, however, the national 
will was not identical to that of the sovereign but the aggregate of its citizens’, 
meaning the Leviathan was ideally governed by more than its head, or raison 
d’etat, but by the ‘law of humanity’ (1994: 258).  
While this ‘law’ of humanity lacked particular protections for civilians, it 
did reintroduce the older jus ad bellum category of right intention. This addition 
was particularly important in humanizing the legalist formulation of just cause, 
which even after Grotius’ pruning included the troublingly moralistic category, 
‘punishment of wrongdoing’. Instead of this Augustinian artifact, Pufendorf 
	  	  
89 
added to Grotius’ first and second categories of reprisal for wrong received (self-
defense) and pursuit of reparations the third category of satisfaction of legal 
rights (“revanche”), and fourth: that war can and should be fought to guarantee 
future peace. 
While legislating an intention might seem dangerously vague, the 
evidence of adherence to this category is demonstrated in a belligerent’s 
adherence to jus ad bellum proportionality. In Pufendorf’s words, “tak[ing] 
care…that the evils which will be inflicted on an enemy be adjusted to the 
measure customarily followed by a civil court in assessing crimes” meant not 
leaping at every just cause, limiting uses of force to objects of military necessity 
not achievable by diplomatic means (Pufendorf 1994: 258; emphasis added). The 
challenge is not one of proving intentional losses, of blockades or projectile 
weapons, for example (including jus in bello proportionality) but the failure to 
incorporate such foreknowledge into political–military considerations of chance 
of success, last resort, or jus ad bellum proportionality. Gross negligence, rather 
than premeditation, is the relevant analogue from criminal law (Scanlon 2008). 
 The concern with legal, versus moral, distinctions in international ethics is 
indicative of the gravitational shift in international law from the natural law side 
of legalism to more the positivistic interpretations that represent its second stage 
(Van Vollenhoven 1919). By this point in the late eighteenth century, volitional 
law and the right of states were seen to trump any natural law obligations 
citizens or sovereigns might have as individuals. The idea of states as magna 
personae or bodies politic with similar collective obligations to members of 
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international society was reduced back down to a legal fiction or figure of 
speech. The legalist complement to natural law premised on the absolute 
equality of states that began with Vitorian agnosticism was transmitted through 
Grotius via Pufendorf to Christian Wolff. But it is Emerich Vattel who best 
represents the empirically-driven, reductionist form of legal positivism.  
Both Wolff and Vattel grouped voluntary, treaty, and customary law into 
a positive law of nations, derived from a ‘science of rights’ not unlike 
Pufendorf’s. Rather than a Grotian society of states, Wolff and Vattel followed 
the mathematically-minded Pufendorf in beginning with the atomistic domestic 
analogy of states as free, equal, and independent entities. These, in turn, got their 
equal status (though not necessarily legitimacy) from the delegation of authority 
by citizens. In positivism, however, authority and duty do not ultimately derive 
from the free, equal, and independent status of individuals, as is the case for 
Locke. Nor is duty derivable from the conscience of sovereigns, but from the 
legal status of contracts as enforceable agreements for services rendered (in this 
case, security). Sovereigns could claim the right to use force against other states 
without admitting corollary duties to them beyond those to which they had 
expressly consented (treaties, accords, and conventions, for example).  
This alternative genealogy of duty hearkens back to Hobbes and is one of 
several instances in which Vattel borrowed his immediate predecessors’ 
categories but with differences in meaning that shave down their normative 
edges. For example, Grotius and Pufendorf’s hierarchical categories of law and 
their three just causes relating to injury threatened or received are preserved but 
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right intention and end of just peace are replaced with realist exhortations to 
prudence and expediency. Vattel thus completed Hobbes’ decisive break with 
natural law by recognizing legitimacy as something to be bargained for through 
strategic agreement — a matter of de facto power rather than de jure authority. 
The fragmentation of the natural law basis for international society and just war 
theory from anarchical international relations was so complete that the will and 
opinion of individual citizens became virtually irrelevant to foreign policy.  
The fragmentation did not entail the complete loss of accountability, 
however, since representative legislative bodies increasingly had a say in the 
signing of treaties. Bellamy also notes the persistence of a thin version of “the 
parliament of man” in Vattelian positivism,  
 
Certainly, one of Vattel’s primary contributions was his rejection of 
a universal world community predicated upon either Christianity 
or rationality and advocacy of the idea of an international society of 
sovereign equals bound by voluntary rules. Equally significant was 
the idea that sovereigns owed each other legal explanations for their 
actions and had a right to judge the actions of others and enforce the 
law…the waging of unjust (but legal) wars could give another 
sovereign a right to wage justifiable war in order to punish the 
wrongdoing (2006: 80–81; emphasis added). 
 
Because jus ad bellum provides the principles for judgment but not the laws, 
“unjust wars” were for Vattel limited to those that could be demonstrated to 
have violated agreements, including jus in bello proscriptions on scorched earth 
tactics, intentional targeting of civilians, ignoring surrender, killing prisoners, et 
cetera. 
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As salutary as this development was for controlling the conduct of war, 
Vattel’s rubric did little to address the prior, preventative questions regarding 
military necessity in the jus ad bellum.  For a last, and lasting, attempt to preserve 
moral considerations as an essential part of international relations, we turn to 
Immanuel Kant. 
 
The Kantinental Divide 
The “schism” in international law introduced in the preceding section 
refers to the branching of legalism into modern natural law and legal positivism. 
It also refers to the concomitant eclipse of Grotian classical humanism and 
rationalism by ascendant foreign policy realism and empiricism. The change in 
the meaning, methods, and purpose of natural philosophy inaugurated by 
Machiavelli and Hobbes found in legal positivism a suitably state-centric and 
empirically-grounded interpretation of authority in international politics.  
In their understanding of the relationship between science, history, 
morality, and politics, Kant and moderns before and after him have been seen as 
inhabiting opposite sides of a range dividing not just the normative tradition 
under discussion, but the entirety of Western thought. The two sides of this 
divide have been characterized variously as, ‘is’–‘ought’, ‘fact–value’, 
‘theoretical’–‘practical’, ‘idealist–‘realist’, ‘structuralist’–‘agentic’, and 
‘naturalist’–‘positivist’.16 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Confusing the issue is that fact that moral realism connotes the opposite of both 
foreign policy realism and philosophic naturalism (which, after the decline of 
natural law, implied the same ethical perspective as logical positivism: that all 
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Kant is best known as the principal expositor of duty-based ethics, 
deontology. While it has as its cornerstone respect and promotion of individual 
autonomy, deontology is primarily distinguished by its non-consequentialist 
understanding of morality. Ethical non-consequentialism describes the 
prohibition of any intentional harm including treating people as means for 
ostensibly noble ends (such as the promotion of freedom or life saving). In 
‘private’, or interpersonal, morality, this prohibition is absolute. However, the 
absolute prohibition of harm is difficult to reconcile with the situational, 
pragmatic ethics that characterize the bad and worse options of political and 
military necessity.  
The prima facie incompatibility of politics and morality did not keep Kant 
from attempting with his practical philosophy a synthesis between the realms of 
freedom and necessity that represented humans’ rational and instinctual natures 
(Guyer 2006). For Kant, reason was not only a principle that internally governs 
human action and intention (morally, through rules or maxims for action), but 
one that externally manifests itself in laws promoting the open or free conditions 
of its realization (think ‘reasonableness’). Though interested in intention, Kant’s 
practical philosophy is not therefore unmindful of consequence; the meaning of 
his cosmopolitanism is rather that one particular ‘greater good’ — the conditions 
necessary for the realization of rational human freedom — is the milieu in which 
all political deliberation occurs. This cosmopolitan end cannot be used as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
objects of knowledge are objects of sensory experience, and therefore have a 
material reality).  
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justification to harm, but does constitute an imperfect duty to sacrifice, which 
may result in harm depending on the nature of the opposition. 
As Kant’s quiet admiration of the aims of the French Revolution 
demonstrated, the overarching goal of universal human development could 
compel individuals in political community to undertake some risk in its 
realization when gross injustice imposed barriers to reform. Beneficence toward 
other persons — and not just the presumptive beneficiaries of a given action — 
remained a constant constraint (Nardin & Mapel 1993). By framing benefits in 
terms of humanity and national community, rather than national or individual 
interest, deontological ethics delimits, but does not ignore, the kind of cost-
benefit analysis that typifies its competing ethical construct, utilitarianism. 
Like Einstein’s lifelong effort to merge quantum and field theory, Kant’s 
worked to merge the ‘micro’ moral–philosophical universe with the ‘macro’ 
legal–political in a coherent philosophy of history and international right. He 
devoted much of his philosophy to clarifying antinomies, and is appreciated for 
his contributions to epistemology and the demarcation of rationalism/moral 
realism from empiricism/ethical naturalism in his Critiques. An edited volume of 
Kant’s Political Writings were late to appear in the English-speaking world of 
academia (1970) and even before such time, were subject to the kind of 
misinterpretation such a collection might predictably invite. Taken as a whole, 
however, Kant’s political philosophy represents the most important contribution 
to “international [moral] theory” (Wight & Bull 1992). 
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With his anticipation of the League of Nations and a principled, pacific 
federation in the style of its successor, the United Nations, Kant has historically 
represented the emergent liberal/idealist element that led to the latter’s postwar 
establishment. In terms of the evolution of international law, Kant continued the 
Teutonic trend away from natural law justifications but his rational grounding of 
positive law at both the national and international level served the same purpose 
that natural law had for the Spanish School, Aquinas, and the Ancients: the 
protection and expansion of law-governed individual autonomy. With Grotius, 
he shared faith in human reason and in the positive role of international society 
in securing progress, but differed in championing morality and justice over 
national prerogative. So while Grotius, Pufendorf, and Wolff espoused Hobbes’ 
paleo-liberal premise of nations as sovereign individuals whose defense was 
paramount, Kant’s vision of international society was less atomistic, and less 
eristic, believing as he did in the development of a pacifistic federation of 
republican states. 
Contrary to popular and scholarly conception however, Kant’s goal of the 
diminution of warfare did not make him a pacifist (Teson 1992, Williams, H. 
1983). The position is not in essence different from Aquinas’ DDE; war is terrible 
and the acts therein neither moral nor just in-themselves, even when there are 
justifiable. The regulation of warfare, including punishment for grave ethical 
violations, has a definite place in bringing into reality the peaceful federation of 
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republics he envisioned.17 There may not come a day when law is unnecessary, 
but law moves humanity closer to that possibility. In the style of constructivism, 
this historically delimited synthesis of morality and politics combines realism’s 
premise regarding state autonomy with natural law’s emphasis on duty to 
generate the duty to use power for good. 
It is vital to note that while this possibility may in certain dire 
circumstances permit the violation of national sovereignty, it does not justify the 
use any means in so doing. Only interventions that intend and aim (literally) to 
respect sovereign ends-in-themselves — including but not limited to the 
presumed direct beneficiaries of any use of force — are morally permissible. And 
only the morally permissible is justifiable, even when its outcomes cannot 
properly be called just. This is the risk.  
For Kant, as for many liberals, states’ role in global justice has meant not 
only upholding peace and right, but actively expanding freedom, or the ‘empire 
of ends’, where states frequently fail in the former (Orend 2000, Guyer 2005). The 
twentieth century saw a reprise of this Wilsonian ethos in liberal 
internationalism, featuring the same selectivity in intervention and poor 
execution where it did (Doyle 1986, 2011; Stephanson 1996; Nolan 2004). The hell 
in which many ‘hotspots’ of the globe find themselves may be paved with good 
liberal intentions, but it is pockmarked with mixed motives and places where 
intentions were not good enough to intervene at all. As an inspiration of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Though as in civil society, the primary motive force was internal critique, 
preservative of even a minimally just order. See Kant’s “An Answer to the 
Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” 
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current human rights regime, some see Kant as complicit in the thin veil that 
‘humanitarian imperialism’ provides for covert and overt forms of offensive 
realism deployed to gain geopolitical advantage (Bricmont 2006; Kinzer 2010). 
This discrepancy between the word and deed of actors claiming international 
right has renewed moral skepticism among intellectuals, and spawned a popular 
retreat to more modest versions of prudential realism (Walzer 2006). 
Depending on one’s view of constructivism, Kant can be construed as 
either the problem or solution to the devolution of modern politics to the politics 
of hermeneutics (Rosen, S. 1987). On the first view, Kant is at best guilty of 
naively providing fodder for materialist looters and liberal Whig historians; at 
worst, he is guilty of the kind of historicism usually attributed to Nietzsche: the 
valorization of individual freedom such that the meaning of political philosophy 
and history is determined by its appropriation for personal or political ends 
(Nietzsche 2010). If conservative critics like Stanley Rosen are correct, Kantian 
cosmopolitanism is simply the modern (which is to say, “secular”) appropriation 
of Augustine’s original just war theorizing — a bid for a humanitarian, versus 
ecclesiastical, imperium. By framing the animating problem of political power as 
other-defense or the ‘punishment of wrongdoing’, crusades against force and 
fraud in international relations can serve as a foil for the pursuit of self-
interest/national aggrandizement. 
Far from a Kantian sentiment, this is instead precisely the instrumental 
use of religious ideology that Machiavelli offers as advice to princes. In a famous 
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passage discussing the optimal form of government, the distance of appearance 
from reality, and the necessity of ‘selective badness’, he writes: 
 
[S]ince my intent is to write something useful to whoever 
understands it, it has appeared to me more fitting to go directly to 
the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it. And 
many have imagined republics and principalities that have never 
been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from how one 
lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for 
what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation 
(1998: 61). 
 
This short passage from a short chapter in a short book captures in nuce the long 
reversal in the modern meaning of ‘justification’ effected in the 300 years after its 
publication (Trosky, Malley-Morrison & Cantrell 2014). In this sophistic twist, the 
security of the state, rather than the dictates of morality or justice, becomes the 
rubric against which all action — and the good itself — is measured; deception 
becomes virtue (Manent 2012). Machiavelli’s candor regarding his intention 
conveys the difference, and something of the distance, between consequentialist 
ethics based on what he presents as an impartial, empirical assay of history, on 
the one hand, and the deontological ethics for which Kant is known, on the other. 
Kant claims universality, but not impartiality, based on unchanging aspects of 
human nature — the internal normativity of “our deepest selves” (Orend 2000, 
Bagnoli 2013). This, too, is ‘empirical’ but is the object of a different, 
philosophical–historical inquiry. 
How one answers the metaethical questions of whether such a universal 
nature exists, its fixity, and whether it is accessible to reason, determines not only 
what one makes of Kant, but also where the inquirer falls in the hiatus irrationalis 
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between moral absolutism and pure consequentialism, or pacifism and realism. 
Liberalism answers affirmatively regarding rational autonomy, but Kant’s value 
as antidote to the nihilism or relativism augured by endless interpretative 
conflicts consists in more than reinforcing the battlements of classical humanism 
(Rosen, S. 1987, Jackson 2000). The historical significance of Kant’s thought also 
lies in its development of the possibility latent in Rousseau: that moral concepts 
themselves introduce hermeneutic limits, modification of which is naturally 
subject to collaborative, normative processes — a sort of discourse ethics 
(Habermas 2001b). 
 
Caesar non est supra Grammaticos 
The fact that cynical princes cannot unilaterally change the meaning of 
words corresponding to deeply-held popular values means that political power 
is, in an important sense, already limited. Rulers can lie and mislead but they 
cannot contort language to accommodate manifestly contradictory deeds 
(Manent 2012). Part of the purpose of the just war tradition as it has been 
presented here is to consolidate the principles the public can use to identify such 
discrepancies and deviations — an end to which Kant’s moral rigor undoubtedly 
contributed. 
 Recognition of the need for constant vigilance by the domestic and 
international community over the proclamations of political power is less 
indicative of naïve idealism than a kind of precautionary realism. Kant’s 
philosophy of international right has therefore been read as recommending 
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policies as varied as strict noninterventionism, on the one hand, and 
implementation of a world state on the other (Gallie 1979, Waltz 1979, Delahunty 
& Yoo 2010). The most famous passage used to place Kant outside the just war 
tradition appears in his Perpetual Peace and is resonant with both realist and 
pacifist skepticism: 
Although it is largely concealed by governmental constraints in 
law-governed civil society, the depravity of human nature is 
displayed without disguise in the unrestricted relations which 
obtain between the various nations. It is therefore to be wondered 
at that the word right has not been completely banished from 
military politics as superfluous pedantry, and that no state has been 
bold enough to declare itself publicly in favour of doing so. For 
Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel and the rest (sorry comforters as 
they are) are still dutifully quoted in justification of military 
aggression, although their philosophically or diplomatically 
formulated codes do not and cannot have the slightest legal force, 
since states as such are not subject to a common external constraint. 
Yet there is no instance of a state ever having been moved to desist 
from its purpose by arguments supported by the testimonies of 
such notable men (1991: 103).18 
  
Despite his awareness of the dangerous power of persuasion, and a bevy of 
quotes in the Kantian corpus expressing his general disdain of war, Kant’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Too few citing this passage continue the exegesis to the following passage 
which strikes a hopeful note regarding public education and the development of 
judgment and deliberation in a free society: 
This homage which every state pays (in words at least) to the 
concept of right proves that man possesses a greater moral capacity, still 
dormant at present, to overcome eventually the evil principle within him 
(for he cannot deny that it exists), and to hope that others will do 
likewise. Otherwise the word right would never be used by states 
which intend to make war on one another, unless in a derisory 
sense (1991: 103; emphasis added). 
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practical philosophy permits neither inaction, nor immoral action — a moral 
dilemma in the truest sense. We cannot lower ourselves to the rule of cheats and 
cynics, nor can we in good conscience turn a blind eye. Such ‘practical idealism’ 
rules out the pictures of Kant as Teson’s “extreme pacifist”, Rosen’s postmodern 
ironist, or Waltz and Doyle’s reckless idealist.  
I follow Thomas Mertens and Brian Orend among others in interpreting 
Kant’s philosophy of international right as being firmly in the just war tradition, 
albeit with his and his own ‘reformist’ elements. The first point of clarification is 
Kant’s position on whether and when sovereignty constitutes jus ad bellum 
legitimate authority. While he shared his predecessors opinion that states were 
best conceived as magna personae without “external constraint”, Kant dissents in 
emphasizing the normative gravity of states’ internal constraints. Though 
international society is technically anarchic, the architectonic19 principle of 
individual autonomy — rational self-legislation or law-governed freedom — 
pervades even these relations. States are therefore not only magna personae, but 
also personae moralis.  
It is, quite literally, the constitution of states — the rule of law within their 
borders — that gives them sovereign status in their relations with each other. 
Conceived in varied tongues and cultural contexts, these laws and constitutions 
draw legitimacy from their care for, and consent of, those they respectively 
govern (Rawls 2001). The right to legislate, including the authority to declare 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Though it appears throughout Kant scholarship, I owe my particular 
understanding and use of the concept ‘architectonic principle’ to my first and 
fondest teacher of Kant (and Aristotle, to whom it applies equally), Ladd 
Sessions. 
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war, is therefore not transferred to the state in a onetime hypothetical contract 
but maintained through ongoing consultation and election of popular 
representatives. As was true for Aquinas, legitimate sovereign authority is linked 
to the purpose of the law, which is not only peace, but the kind of order in which 
individual autonomy can be exercised (publically, if not always privately, to use 
Kant’s terms). Because this includes citing potential misrepresentations by 
government officials, Kant agrees with both Vitoria that heads of state cannot 
unilaterally make war but must consult with advisors and the populace, and with 
Vattel that sovereigns then must declare war as a form of further public 
justification to each other — one with legal ramifications. 
Alongside this domestic norm of transparency or ‘publicity’, Kant 
identifies a correlative individual duty of public critique. Its best known 
formulation appears in his “Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” 
There, he argues that given even a modicum of citizen autonomy, dedication to 
dissent plus obedience to the law can be counted upon to reform Enlightened 
despotisms into republican governments. “For enlightenment of this kind” he 
writes, “all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in question is the most 
innocuous form of all — freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all 
matters” (1991: 55). In this context, the categorical moral imperative to always tell 
the truth is not only negative (‘do not lie’) but positive: a responsibility to speak 
out against injustice or dishonesty even when it does not affect one directly. 
There is, in other words, a duty to speak truth to power. Advocating social 
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movements over civil war, Kant believed injustice was conquerable wherever 
there is freedom of expression.  
This is the most elementary solution to the apparent contradiction 
between the restrictive absolutism of Kant’s moral philosophy and the 
progressivism of his political philosophy (Rosen, A. 1993).20 While it is not part of 
Kant’s theory of the just war, his concept of ‘publicity’ formally represents the 
Kantian constructivist reinterpretation of the moral basis of international ethics. 
Rather than a naturalistic concern with the origin or letter of the law, he 
emphasizes an inclusive, discourse-based negotiation of normativity and 
legitimacy (Onuf 1989, Dryzek 2006, Clark, I. 2007, O’Flynn 2010, Bagnoli 2013). 
As Orend points out, the criterion of publicity also responds to the popular 
misconception about just war of which Kant was painfully aware in the 
preceding quote: “it is so liable to abuse as to be nothing more than a cloak with 
which to hide, or even justify, the commission of great evils by no less dubious 
institutions than the modern nation-state” (2000: 8).  
To this accusation, Orend gives an incisive reply: 
 
Kantian just war theory is emphatically public and universal with 
regard to its permissions and prohibitions. States are not simply 
entitled to assert they have just war theory on their side and expect 
to have such claims accepted at face value; rather, all such 
assertions are open to critical scrutiny in light of accessible 
evidence and a common order of moral reasoning and discourse. Just 
war theory cloaks nothing; to the contrary its main purpose is to 
facilitate a more insightful and targeted reflection upon the justice 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Compare with Kant’s Doctrine of Right: “Act externally in such a way that the 
free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to 
universal law” (230). 
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of the resort to war, conduct within it and its process of termination 
(9–10; emphasis added). 
 
 
Orend’s quote speaks to why Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Vattel are “sorry 
comforters”, in Kant’s terms. Though they also upheld state sovereignty, their 
domestic analogy is incomplete in its understanding of the relationship between 
authority and legitimacy. Laws are not legitimate simply because they are 
‘posited’ or enforced by authority. This is no different than using a fallacious 
appeal to authority to uphold convention; it offers no compelling account the 
status quo or political change beyond power.  
Legitimate states are not unlimitedly free in their ability to legislate, but 
rationally so. Sovereign status is contingent on states’ acting consistently with 
sovereign responsibility.21 The question is not simply one of criminality versus 
obedience, taken from the perspective of the law; this is external. For states as for 
individuals, the value of autonomy as an end-in-itself comes not from some 
original ‘lawless’ freedom or an ‘automated’ order but from a will governed 
through internal self-imposed constraints.  
As Locke pointed out, such constraints are effective even in the absence of 
external coercion, yet force exists for those who have not realized autonomy in 
this way, their will still enslaved to some external object (as in the case of theft 
from greed or addiction). In the domestic case as in the international, violations 
of these constraints under certain conditions constitute just cause for the use of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In ethical terms, one would call their sovereign status ‘agent-relative’ as 
opposed to ‘agent-neutral’ – a distinction discussed further in the following two 
chapters. 
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force. The most obvious constitutional duty implied by this relationship between 
state and individual right is, in Orend’s terms, “the defence, protection, and 
vindication of the fundamental rights of political communities and their citizens” 
(2000: 51). 
This duty, per Kant, extends to preemption of imminent threats (1991: 
167), and is universizable as a maxim for action, conforming to the categorical 
imperative (Orend 2000: 52). Though the international system is one of ‘self-
help’, the right to repel and respond to aggression extends to aiding allies (other-
defense) and halting a government’s unjust use of force against its own people 
(humanitarian intervention). Just cause therefore mirrors the domestic conception 
of justice, which Orend describes as “the authorization to use coercion in defence 
of anyone’s, indeed everyone’s, free rational agency” (2000: 21). 
It is unsurprising that Kant the deontologist returns to the category of 
right intention in his theory of the just war given the latitude implied by his 
blanket charge to ‘hinder hindrances to freedom’. As we have seen, this jus ad 
bellum principle introduced by Augustine ebbed after Aquinas. Despite the 
name, in its previous iterations had been largely negative —exhortations not to 
use just cause as an excuse to wantonly punish or extract what one was not 
owed. This tautological relationship to just cause, proportionality, and jus in bello 
made right intention to be among the first elements outmoded with positivism. 
Kant continued the comeback that Pufendorf’s had initiated with his emphasis 
on the particular object of right intention: just peace  
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In keeping with his deontological position that the greatest good is a good 
will, Kantian right intention precluded strategic truces (making peace with the 
intention of returning to war) as well as the use of deception, espionage, 
assassination, or incitation (1991: 96–97). As Michael Walzer observes, however, 
“There is no such thing as a pure will in political life. Intervention cannot be 
made to depend upon the moral purity of its agents” (2006: xiii). While Kant’s 
aspirational article of perpetual peace seems unrealistic in the contemporary 
climate of C.I.A. and N.S.A. cyber, spy, and eavesdropping operations, his 
central concern is not in crafting perfect states but in proscribing all forms of 
perfidy (literally, ‘bad faith’).  
Revelations from leaks and whistleblowers portray bald-faced deception 
and ‘breathtaking hypocrisy’ of statespersons and their spokespeople. This not 
only undermine the basis of diplomacy between allies and opponents, and is 
‘destructive of confidence’ (1991: 168), but as Kant recognized are also 
destructive of internal state legitimacy. Keeping covert activities from the public 
prevents authentic participation in consultation, deliberation, and legislation 
(Kinzer 2006). Even when intervention is legally permissible by conforming with 
the first three jus ad bellum principles (legitimate authority in declaring war with 
just cause), right intention is crucial to determining its moral permissibility as 
necessary (a last resort). Determining necessity is a moral obligation to those on 
the receiving end of risky interventions, but also to a home populace providing 
the blood and treasure to undertake such operations. 
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Orend adds to the core Kantian jus ad bellum principles an expanded 
version of the conventional object of right intention, just peace. “This suggestive 
yet imprecise criterion seems to serve two functions,” says Orend,                               
 
The first is to underline the fact that a state may resort to warfare 
only for the purpose of vindicating and upholding the universal 
system of law and order…The second, and arguably more 
important, function is to force a state resorting to armed force to 
consider in advance whether it can do so while adhering to norms 
of jus in bello and even to those of jus post bellum (2000: 55). 
 
Just peace serves the same function in Kant’s just war theory as the utilitarian 
categories of proportionality and chance of success. If the cause is just, authority 
legitimate, and intention correct, with the consent of the publics affected, elite or 
military aversion to loss or defeat would be insufficient grounds to forgo the 
duty to enforce international right.22 
Jus post bellum tempers this obligation in the case of humanitarian 
intervention by adding a ‘braking’ principle not unlike Colin Powell’s “Pottery 
Barn Rule” or John Stuart Mill’s philosophy on intervention: if the liberated 
people cannot be reasonably expected to establish the rule of law without 
occupation, the victory is better won civilly, with intervention advisable in only 
the direst of circumstance (1987).23 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This is part of the rationale for civilian control of the military in the person of 
the elected chief executive as commander-in-chief. See Elliot Cohen (2003) 
Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. 
23 For the particular principles of jus post bellum, see the listing at the beginning of 
last chapter, page 14. 
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The other side of the divide 
 Unfortunately, Kantian innovations such as jus post bellum, a pacifistic 
federation, an international court of justice, and a more humanitarian 
international law laid dormant in the realist climate of modern, ideological 
warfare which characterized the period stretching from the French Revolution to 
the Second World War. Kant’s philosophy of international right was too late, too 
slim, or too slimly understood to fill the breach opened by precipitous decline of 
natural law and divine command. 
The nineteenth century preference for pragmatism was driven in part by 
discoveries in biological science, and by the raised stakes of great power politics. 
The levy of one soldier per household during periods of conflict that had held in 
the 150 Scandinavian, German, and Baltic hansa comprising the decentralized 
commercial confederation known as the Hanseatic League gave each an interest 
in maintaining the peace. If Kant’s economic cosmopolitanism could not keep up 
with the great gains offered by the Great Game between a smaller number of 
imperial powers, it was not to be expected that moral–political cosmopolitanism 
would either. 
Even after the revolutionary urgency had passed, the centralizing imperial 
ethos of the day led to the rise of the standing armies that Kant’s Perpetual Peace, 
and George Washington’s farewell address, had warned against. The French levée 
en masse, in which every able-bodied male was subject to draft, spread in 
response to the Napoleonic conquests, becoming the norm on the continent. The 
swelling armies kept the machines of textiles and armaments manufacturers 
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whirring (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). Though prerogative remained with 
sovereigns and statesmen, wars were increasingly nationalistic affairs. The lives 
of military officers were romanticized in the new medium of the novel, and the 
glory of nations was exalted in music (Morton 1980). These developments, 
advances in mass communication and transport, plus greater lethality of 
weapons technology, together set the stage for the total wars of the twentieth 
century. 
 If the historical developments leading up to the First World War cast 
doubt on the descriptive and prescriptive validity of Kant’s rational and moral 
state, the crimes of the Second World War threatened to undermine collective 
faith in humans as rational and moral agents. Violence on and off the battlefield 
meant guilt for crimes against humanity was perhaps not limited to callous 
military and political leaders, but those who would tolerate or participate in 
systematic ethnic and religious violence. The perpetration of inhumanities and 
sheer scale of destruction challenged the explanatory power of social science. 
Rather than thinking the unthinkable — that evil existed in the world, freely 
chosen and with command of the weapon of rationality — it became easier to 
indict the active psychopathology of a minority in power, the blind obedience of 
functionaries, and the dangerous docility of the passive majority, with all their 
antidemocratic implications (Curtis 2002). What would Kant have said? 
Hannah Arendt, who fifty years ago gave an influential series of lectures 
on Kant’s political philosophy at New York’s New School, cites a deficit not in 
rationality but in thinking, which translates to a deficit in freedom (thinking for 
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oneself versus calculative pursuit of someone else’s end). The private courage to 
question which gave Kant his revolutionary streak had been forfeited to his 
public imperative, obedience. In her book, Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt 
recounts holocaust engineer Adolf Eichmann’s startling appeal to a pseudo 
Kantian conception of duty to positive law in his Nuremburg defense. Of course, 
national socialist imperatives were entirely idiosyncratic (‘hypothetical’ in Kant’s 
language) rather than categorical or universal — the very opposite of humane. 
On these terms, what seemed unthinkable for Kant — to disobey, perhaps 
violently, the law of a democratically constituted government — was in fact 
necessary to avoid complicity in great evil. In no place was the gulf between 
personal, human moral obligations and reason of state more stark than in the 
Third Reich, yet a strict reading of legal positivism provides no ground for an 
‘outside’ appeal to justice that would justify civil disobedience. Is a misreading of 
Kant somehow complicit in this development? 
Kant almost seems to have had a case such as this in mind in his “Answer 
to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” when he wrote, 
Now in some affairs which affect the interests of the 
commonwealth, we require a certain mechanism whereby some 
members of the commonwealth must behave purely passively, so 
that they may, by an artificial common agreement, be employed by 
the government for public ends (or at least deterred from vitiating 
them). It is, of course, impermissible to argue in such cases; obedience is 
imperative (55–56; emphasis added). 
 
Even in that rare instance where there seems to be not only right, but duty to 
revolt, Kant’s trust seems to be in the pen rather than the sword. He continues, 
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But in so far as this or that individual who acts as part of the 
machine also considers himself as a member of a complete 
commonwealth or even of cosmopolitan society, and thence as a 
man of learning who may through his writings address a public in 
the truest sense of the word, he may indeed argue without harming 
the affairs in which he is employed for some of the time in a passive 
capacity. Thus it would be very harmful if an officer receiving an 
order from his superiors were to quibble openly, while on duty, 
about the appropriateness or usefulness of the order in question. 
He must simply obey. But he cannot reasonably be banned from 
making observations as a man of learning on the errors in the 
military service, and from submitting these to his public for 
judgment…Thus, a public can only achieve enlightenment slowly. 
A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism and to 
rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce 
true reform in the way of thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the 
ones they replaced, will serve as a leash to control the great 
unthinking mass (1991: 55–56). 
 
This caution was prescient in light of the coming Terror, and prudential on 
Kant’s part as he tested the boundaries of his patron’s Frederick’s enlightenment.  
While he never goes as far to exoterically endorse violence in resisting or 
deposing a dictator, his (in)famous exhortation in Perpetual Peace is “fiat iustitia, 
pereat mundus” is usually translated as “let justice reign, even if all the world 
must perish” seems to say otherwise. The exhortation “may sound somewhat 
inflated,” Kant goes on to admit, “but it is nonetheless true. It is a sound 
principle of right…But it must not be misunderstood, or taken, for example, as a 
permit to apply one’s own rights, but should be seen as an obligation of those in 
power not to deny or detract from the rights of anyone out of disfavor or 
sympathy for others” (Reiss 1991: 123).  
As Eichmann’s example demonstrates, the inviolability of private duty, 
the superiority of legal reform, and the trust in public reason have their limits. 
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Since the very purpose of states is to protect individual autonomy, 
international/individual right supervenes, at the extreme, in the form of armed 
resistance/armed intervention. To permit otherwise would be, as he says in 
another context, “an absurdity which amounts to making absurdities 
permanent” (1991: 57). 
Prescriptively, Arendt agrees with Kant that the avoidance of such 
scenarios lies in the individual avoidance of absurdity, in the form of affronts to 
reason and freedom. Kant is not alone among liberals in postulating that slavery 
is not only immoral or immature, but an impossibility. Consigning oneself to 
unthinking servitude, even if it were politically possible, would abrogate the 
individual autonomy and dignity that are the bases of any legitimate political 
order. To have one’s self, one’s actions determined by another precludes the very 
possibility of morality and of any meaningful conception of legal responsibility.  
It is this slavish obedience to orders of which Eichmann is guilty (Butler 
2011). But even this designation handed down at Nuremburg would not make 
sense without the kind of international order in which individual agency is taken 
seriously, not to be eclipsed by overawing power or any sanctimoniousness of 
statehood. An implementation of Kant’s theory of the just war would help 
identify cases such as this in which internal travesties of justice proceeded 
without resistance and aggression spreads towards neighbors. As indicated, the 
real utility of deontological ethics is not in judging post facto, but in furnishing 
sufficient moral clarity and legal authority to mount swift and decisive 
intervention where most deeply needed.  
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Notwithstanding postwar steps toward a reconciliation of theory and 
practice/ethics and politics in international humanitarian law and institutions, 
discrepancies between supposedly rational actors’ knowledge of law/moral 
principle and their actions persist. On all sides of the Second World War as well 
as in subsequent conflicts there seems no shortage of evidence that Kant’s 
account of international right has, like just war, been coopted to unintended 
ends. In peace and conflict studies, particularly social psychological peace 
research, recognition of the gulf between stated political principle and 
rationalistic violations of these principles has led to a reaction not unlike Kant’s 
to the ‘sorry comfort’ of Grotian rationalism and Vattelian positivism: moral 
argument in cynical hands lends itself to the moralization of violence and 
facilitates the perpetration of inhumanities.  
In the coming chapter, I turn to political theory and ethics to help explain 
this discrepancy. I continue the dialogic history of international ethics, 
interweaving it with a textured account the development of its social scientific 
study. I look at the special challenge that political evil poses to social scientific 
explanation and the continuing role of the humanities and of just war in coming 
to grips with it.
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Chapter Three: 
Rationality and agency in social psychology and international politics 
 
If someone wants to see and experience the world as it ‘really’ is, he can do 
so only by understanding it as something that is shared by many people, 
lies between them, separates them and links them, showing itself 
differently to each and comprehensible only to the extent that many people 
can talk about it, over against one another. Only in the freedom of our 
speaking with one another does the world, as that about which we speak, 
emerge in its objectivity and visibility from all sides. 
 
-Hannah Arendt, “The Promise of Politics”  
 
All knowledge that is about human society, and not about the natural 
world, is historical knowledge, and therefore rests upon judgment and 
interpretation. This is not to say that facts or data are nonexistent, but 
that facts get their importance from what is made of them in 
interpretation. 
 
-Edward Said, Orientalism 
 
In the last chapter, I recounted the late Enlightenment shift in science and 
international law towards the positivist and legalist modes of interpretation 
which came to characterize post-Hegelian pragmatic and analytical philosophy 
as well as post-eighteenth century jurisprudence. I argued that the erosion of 
natural law moorings of just war theory had the practical consequence of 
trivializing jus ad bellum distinctions of moral and legal permissibility in the law 
of war, limiting its jurisdiction to empirically verifiable jus in bello infractions. I 
compared this the obligations and permissions entailed in the practical 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I followed Brian Orend in arguing that Kant’s 
contribution to the theory of the just war offers a coherent and disarmingly 
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modern account of the conditions delimiting morally and legally permissible 
uses of force. 
This chapter picks up on the opposite side of the modern ‘hermeneutical 
divide’ over the meaning and application of a universal principle of justice like 
Kant’s. At its extremes are two types of moralism: 1) those who uphold Kant as 
staunchly noninterventionist and are antiwar, and 2) those who deride his 
Enlightenment naiveté and/or ethnocentric privileging of rationality as abetting 
the excesses of colonialism, arrogance of modernization theory, and liberal 
international export of democracy. I discuss the meeting and mingling of these 
two moralisms in the development of contemporary social science, particularly 
social psychology. 
The discussion is situated in the context of a broader intellectual history 
than that of just war: the transition from late-Enlightenment rationalism to the 
flowering of nineteenth century naturalism/empiricism and twentieth century 
logical positivism. In social psychology, the Western romance of humanistic faith 
and scientific skepticism is reflected in these two epistemologies: naturalistic 
evolutionary psychology, which I call ‘biogenic’, and a ‘sociogenic’ strain arising 
out of positivism and continuing into behaviorist and cognitive psychology. As 
the names imply, the former posits natural/genetic/instinctual limits to (the 
motives behind) moral action, whereas the latter sees human behavior as an 
epiphenomenon of familial/social/cultural factors that are more plastic and 
therefore manipulable. Noting the similarity of these poles to realism and 
liberalism, respectively, it will not be a surprise that Kantian constructivism’s 
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unique account of moral development and the centrality of intention is 
somewhere between these two, combining the universality of the biogenic 
position with sociogenic optimism. 
These dueling interpretations have starkly divergent political 
implications, including for the viability of contemporary just war theory. Both 
the biogenic and sociogenic sides of the ‘onto-epistemic’ divide, naturalism and 
positivism, entail a theory of ethical irrealism. Also known as metaethical 
noncognitivism, these positions restate Hume’s Law separating ‘is’ propositions 
from ‘ought’ to assert that moral claims about the world are relative as they are 
not subject to factual verification. The authority of normative theories like just 
war, by contrast, has traditionally been predicated upon moral realism — that its 
prohibitions and prescriptions are non-relative and applicable across space and 
time, culture and history. The school of thought capturing this status is 
commonly called ethical cognitivism.  
Applying noncognitivism to international ethics means interpreting just 
war principles in terms of positive (‘merely’ posited) international law whereby 
their authority and particular prescriptions are a matter of evolving consensus. 
This contingency gives rise to social scientific skepticism that all law is 
underpinned by considerations of power, rather than rational, principled 
persuasion. I illustrate the descriptive–prescriptive disjunction between 
metaethical cognitivism and noncognitivism first in terms of approaches to 
politics, then different academic disciplines, and finally in the development of 
social psychology. To highlight the impact of this ambivalence on normative 
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questions like those of just war, I look at different disciplines’ framing of the 
problem of evil and competing social scientific accounts of altruism, intention, 
and moral judgment. Specifically, I highlight internecine conflicts that developed 
in social psychology over the relative importance of biological and sociocultural 
factors in each area (proactive and inhibitory moral action).  
 
Politics as Hermeneutics 
One way to frame the widely divergent interpretations of Kant, liberalism, 
and the Enlightenment era in which they were birthed is as a contest between 
what political philosopher Michael Oakeshott called in his book of the same 
name “the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism” (1996). In Oakeshott’s 
terms, Enlightenment faith is faith in the goodness or completeness of human 
rationality and its ability to solve political problems when sufficiently 
empowered (recall the first chapter’s depiction of idealism or liberal 
internationalism). The politics of skepticism combine a post-Babel temperance 
regarding technocracy and transnationalism with a Miltonian admiration for 
humans’ nature to question. This tension in modernity is irresolvable yet can be 
productive so long as the two impulses are allowed to balance each other. 
However, unthinking hybrids of the two, Oakeshott warned, produce intellectual 
blind spots and incoherent policy.24 
Kant’s thought comprehends modern faith and skepticism. The massive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Doubt, too could become an idol, just as a rationalist critique of rationalism 
could devolve into its own ideology (to which Oakeshott accused Friedrich 
Hayek of succumbing [1991: 26]). 
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potential latent in the free use of human reason provides justification for its 
expansion, domestically and internationally, but the necessity for this project to 
conform to the dictates of morality constrains permissible means to this end, and 
therefore the pace at which it proceeds as well. The problem of reconciling ‘the 
right’ with ‘the good’ persists in the relationship of the individual project of 
moral development (which most outside of Kant refer to as ‘private’), to wider 
‘public’ or political projects. 
The need or desire for security promised by the political project engenders 
what Michel Foucault calls “The blackmail of the Enlightenment” (1984): the 
apparent zero-sum choice between humanistic liberty and scientistic rationality. 
The contest pits human capacité and freedom of thought, speech, and critique, 
against modern forms of ‘governmentality’ that diminish individual and 
collective agency for some communal, but questionably universal, good. The 
non-uniform growth in capacity generates substantive inequality, the negotiation 
of which distracts from proper democratic oversight. Crucially, this includes 
deliberation over heretofore-unimagined technological, scientific, biomedical 
capabilities that Oakeshott would agree with Foucault are hardly an unqualified 
good. For Foucault and fellow travelers, taming or tempering this growth 
presents the primary moral and political challenge, meaning critique must 
accompany the expansion of knowledge as the indispensible (post)modern 
human activity. 
Kant’s answer to the question What is Enlightenment? in the Berlin 
Monthly newspaper serial supports the view that skepticism on matters political, 
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scientific, and religious is essential to moral progress, but maintains hope that 
this movement is not just away from despotism but towards something 
meaningfully better (better than the liberal individualism which Foucault 
criticizes as a new collectively self-imposed despotism). For Oakeshott, 
skepticism is laudable for animating individual freedom of conscience and 
humans’ understanding of the physical world but, he opines, is most salutary as 
a braking mechanism on those twin engines of progress, when humans’ self-
understanding lags behind faith in human capabilities. 
The relationship of faith and skepticism in this political philosophical 
context is therefore more complex than the epistemological binary of arational 
religious faith, on one hand, and reason or rationalism on the other. Their 
axiomatic premises also imply end points on a linear continuum of certainty, but 
as practical political philosophies, the coexistence of faith and skepticism has 
manifested as a dialogue about the respective limits of individual and collective 
capacities in liberal democracy. Western intellectual history demonstrates the 
coevolution of these counterpoints: Machiavellian skepticism had a hopeful 
courageous obverse (Manent 2012). Baconian faith in the scientific method had 
its Hobbesean ballast when it came to political progress. Cartesian skepticism 
and Leibniz’ faith did for philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics what 
credence in Newtonian laws accomplished for physics. Hume’s insistence on 
empiricism was leavened by Rousseau’s insistence on freedom, by Hegel’s 
‘spirit’, and so on. 
By the dawn of the twentieth century, this tension had become acute. The 
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materialist theories of Darwin and Marx had ground down ‘inuitionist’ appeals 
to metaphysical explanation in the study of philosophy and society. Philosopher 
Bernard Williams diagnoses the problem as “historicist weariness and 
alienation” that “has recurred in European thought since historical self-
consciousness struck deep roots in the early nineteenth century: a problem of 
reflection and commitment, or of an external view of one’s beliefs as opposed to 
an internal involvement” (2000: 488–490). The malaise in fin-de-siècle Europe 
that Frederic Morton recounts in A Nervous Splendor (1980) culminated in the 
creation of an intellectual movement insistent on the soundness of that “external 
view of one’s beliefs”, the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle.  
The original ‘ontic’ contest between Enlightenment skepticism and faith 
was over the perfection or the positive perfectability of reason — what humans 
are. The late-modern crisis to which the members of the Vienna circle were 
responding involves negative certainty — what humans can reliably claim to 
know and in what areas knowledge is impossible.25 Logical positivism and its 
outgrowths (physicalism, logical empiricism, behaviorism) insisted on an 
epistemology of verificationism. Verificationism, predicated on the 
correspondence theory of truth, dictates that to be meaningful or have ‘truth-
value’, statements must have observable referents. Ideally, per empiricism, these 
are replicable and observable through experiment. This insistence, paradoxically, 
relies on a certain faith in the reliability of sense data, as well as the (continuing) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Vienna Circle philosopher of science Karl Popper’s (2002) epistemic distinction 
between (certain) falsification and (tentative) corroboration is illustrative in this 
regard. 
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existence of those things that are. The non-demonstrable negation of things that 
appear not to be, or at least have not yet been, also relies on faith, or at least on a 
metaphysical presupposition. As friend of the Circle, the logician A. N. 
Whitehead reminds, “No science can be more secure than the unconscious 
metaphysics which tacitly it presupposes” (in Wendt 1999, epigram). 
Karl Popper aimed to amend this hubris with his fallibilist alternative to 
verificationism, though, as I will argue, extending this timidity to ethics had 
nearly the same (unintended) consequence as Vitorian invincible ignorance’s 
trivialization of just war theory. Pace utilitarians led by J.S. Mill and libertarians 
led by Friedrich Hayek, it is not certain that the same self-regulating marketplace 
of ideas they trust to move humanity toward truth can be relied upon to move 
the ‘open society’ toward justice (Popper 1971, Scarry 2001). Critique can be seen 
as ‘built-into’ science, including political science, but this essential skepticism is, 
paradoxically, predicated on faith. The humanities’ essential faith is embodied 
the artist and poet’s divine capacity for creation, tempered by tragic knowledge 
of its limits, with fellow humanities subject, history, being exhibit ‘A’. 
 
A secular theodicy 
In the manner of the materialist Diderot and the Encyclopedists, the 
historical impulse of positivism is essentially reductionist, representing an 
attempt to bring unruly Dionysian philosophy under the sway of Apollonian 
scientific order. This onto-epistemic shift to materialism is mirrored in metaethics 
in the move from messy moral realism to the neat irrealism of noncognitivism. It 
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can be said without hyperbole that moral reductionism has implications more 
significant for human life than relativity or heliocentrism.  
Its decisive significance is in reference to a question on the opposite end of 
perfectability that is at once ontological and moral. The question is that of 
theodicy: the problem of the existence of evil, and its corollary, what if anything, 
its existence requires of government and citizens? The problem of evil, which 
political theorist Hannah Arendt called “the fundamental question of postwar 
intellectual life” interrogates academic disciplines as to their value for life. (2004: 
134). Arendt can be seen as answering the same question Rousseau had two 
hundred years earlier in his first discourse on ‘the Moral Effects of the Sciences 
and the Arts’: Of what real value are the trappings of civilization and 
technological progress if they do not address this most basic question of moral 
development? Embedded in this critique is the heresy that these august academic 
realms of inquiry might actually be abetting evil and ignorance, if by no other 
means than through a false sense of security that they belong to another time 
whose dominion crumbled when university towers were erected and literacy 
became general.  
It is appropriate to begin with the disciplines’ respective formulation of 
the problem. On the side of the Arts, the empathic power of the imagination 
prompts an interrogation into what each of us is capable. Stories, fictional and 
otherwise, provide a language to come to terms with, if not understand, the 
ineffable good and ill of the human experience. This might begin with 
unexpected sympathy for a literary character, and end with befriending former 
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enemies and strangers. Insofar as they ‘humanize’ others, the humanities are 
profoundly linked to the democratic ethos of egalitarian individualism and a 
reminder of liberal progress toward the unifying belief in human decency (Rorty 
1989: 73, 93; Scarry 2001). 
The humanities are also of hermeneutic importance, as they instruct how 
to understand the character and motivations of heroes, tragic and otherwise, in 
history as in drama, and how to avoid their mistakes and replicate their triumphs. 
As the late Maya Angelou was fond of saying, “Every human grouping — 
whether it's just two people, a family, people in the neighborhood, people in a 
city, a nation, a tribe, a species — people live in direct relation to the heroes and 
the she-roes they have" (Redford et al. 2006). This activity of self and social 
critique is of more than philosophic interest; it disrupts complacency and 
rebukes prejudice, leading to better informed and less polarizing discourse in 
domestic, foreign, and academic policymaking, which, if sufficiently widespread, 
improves the quality of democratic governance (Dryzek 2006, Walzer 2006). 
If the humanities draw their identity from the human experience of 
privation and relationship to the unknowable, the sciences limit their sphere of 
inquiry to the knowable: material causes and effects. In medicine and politics 
alike, this includes both the remediation of human suffering and the promotion 
of commodious living. As is illustrated in the Enlightenment tension between 
faith in reason and skepticism about morality, however, the category of the 
absolute — especially the idea of absolute good and absolute evil — defies the 
scientific will-to-completeness. If knowledge alone can neither get us to good nor 
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deliver us from evil, it is easier to explain these concepts away as noncognitive, 
indicative of subjects’ feelings hope or fear. Such subjective aspects of the human 
experience are, on this view, not properly objects of knowledge since they are not 
universals, but seem to rely on subjects/agents for their meaning (Wittgenstein 
1972, Wendt 1999). 
Vienna Circle philosopher of language Ludwig Wittgenstein would be 
quick to point out that disagreement over what qualifies as ‘evil’ could be 
reduced to miscommunication — a difference in definition of a ‘thing’ that has 
no referent. Skeptics of both religious and secular stripes might agree that the 
word ‘evil’ is a name for that condition under which a sort of Faustian faith in 
human capacity becomes vicious, prideful, or willfully ignorant of human 
limitations. Though temporarily united in the praise of humility, a world of 
difference divides these two kinds of skepticism. In the same sense that 
Enlightenment rationalism embraces the Socratic motto “to know the good is to 
do the good”, ‘ignorance’ for the positivist materialist is exhaustive of ‘evil’.  
There is a sort of certainty, in other words, among moral skeptics that evil 
is but so in effect — that is, in the figurative sense of breeding mischief, leading to 
miscalculation or unintended consequences. The better word might be ‘bad’, 
since ‘evil’ in this sense refers less to a condition than a consequence, and 
consequentialist ethics, (which most materialist and noncognitivist accounts are), 
define ‘right’ acts as those producing the most good, or best consequences. There 
is therefore a hope common to the early utilitarian philosophers which borders 
on a faith in scientistic circles that ‘evil’ can be ameliorated, if not eradicated 
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(Wilson 2004, Churchland 2011, Pinker 2011). I will refer to this onto-epistemic 
position as ‘F’, for that faith in the post-‘E’ state that would follow evil’s 
eradication. 
The contrasting metaethical position is that moral judgments of good and 
evil describe a quality or condition of agents’ will or intent that is verifiable. I 
shall call this condition ‘D’ for ‘deontic’, defined in Oxford as “of or relating to 
duty or obligation as ethical concepts” and rooted in the Greek dei, “it is right”. 
In its most general form, the duty to which the name of this position refers is 
twofold: 
1. prevent evil and  
1b. avoid it oneself 
2. promote and support the good or right but 
2b. only when able to do so without compromising 1b. 
D’s designations “good” and “evil” permit judgments of the rightness of acts, but 
unlike F, these are agent-relative and non-consequentialist in character. This does 
not mean that they are unmindful of consequences — quite the opposite. Caveats 
1b and 2b add to noble intentions 1 and 2 mindfulness of certain consequences 
that would nullify any good intention, rendering the agent and their actions 
blameworthy rather than praiseworthy. 
D’s agent-relativity means that moral judgments have more to do with 
preserving the (one could say “absolute”) inviolability of individual rights and 
the protection of entitlements, upon pain of liability to legal prosecution or, in 
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the context of just war, morally permissible harm. Though some warring parties 
legally forfeit some rights and/or entitlements, D’s practical contrast with F is 
precisely this: priority of the ethical over the legal–political realms. In condition 
D, just legal and institutional frameworks are founded upon and continue to 
accommodate moral judgments and principles (such as original equality in 
Rawls 1999, 2001). Conversely, F’s ethical judgments accommodate (agent-
neutral) political–legal and market–institutional evaluation of general (majority) 
desirability or advantage (Nagel 1978: 39). Good and bad, or harm, are judged on 
aggregate, with certain of the most grave harms expressly prohibited but 
enormous latitude in reaching societal optimum F. 
Though intention and outcome are separable (as when an act of ill-will 
agent results in an unintended good), agents are, on view D, still culpable when 
malice can be shown (Scanlon 2008: 40, 52, 59). Consequentialism is indifferent 
on this count. Conversely, D’s nonconsequentialism dictates that acting on the 
intention to address the problem of evil, even when seemingly unconquerable, or 
to the intention do good, even if the result is negligible or unnoticed, are valuable 
in themselves. Just as the intentions of a good will are a wellspring of moral 
action, a truly malicious person will continue to do harm until apprehended or 
that condition is addressed. The same imperfection that permits condition D 
implies that moral status (attitude and act in relation to that imperfection) may 
be verifiable but is ultimately subject to imperfect knowledge, and therefore 
uncertain. This alone, Kant would agree, implies that the conscious choice to do 
ill is a recurrent, if not permanent feature of human autonomy, or free agency, 
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precluding any Pelagian politics of faith. 
I introduce these heuristics —the politics of faith and skepticism and the 
theodicies F and D — to illustrate some of what is as stake in the hermeneutic 
divide introduced in past chapters between ethical cognitivism and 
noncognitivism, which can be summarized as follows: 
 
1) cognitivism – a variety of moral realism which contends that 
moral statements are expressive of beliefs about the world that 
are ‘truth-apt’, and therefore carry with them moral obligations 
or duties. 
 
2) noncognitivism – moral judgments express approval and 
disapproval indicative of preferences/desires, attitudes, or 
emotions, which unlike facts or beliefs, have no truth conditions. 
 
 
As intimated in this chapter’s introduction, moral realism became less tenable 
once separated from natural law. Ontic realism is however not the sole basis for 
natural law claims. Kantian ethics, for example, are constructivist but also realist; 
its normative pronouncements are cognitivist in the crucial sense that they are 
objectivist (universal) and nonrelative.26  
The significance of this third possibility has not been entertained, as far as 
I can tell, in international ethics, despite being quite apt in describing the 
principles behind just war tradition. In Kant’s afterglow, the transition to legal 
positivism and foreign policy realism mirrored a transition in the natural 
sciences from naturalism to empiricism. The hard materialism of each augured 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This is in contrast to the use of the term ‘constructivism’ in social science or 
international relations. This difference has important implications for the 
contemporary application of Kant’s just war theory in those fields and their 
cognates that are outside the scope of this project. 
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the development of logical positivism — the metaethical and epistemological 
position best corresponding to materialist ontology. Here, too, the relationship 
between faith and skepticism is complex. The same premise behind F — that 
human reason plus sensory capacity confers empirical intelligibility and 
descriptive certainty regarding physical reality — renders meaningless 
untestable propositions, such as the existence of evil or the demands of 
international right. As evident in the following sections, this has been the 
working assumption behind the development of contemporary international 
relations and social science. 
A century before this waltz of epistemology and ethics that partnered 
logical and legal positivism, there was the contredanse in German idealism that 
passed Kantian rationalism through the romantics to the arational realism of 
G.W.F. Hegel. At least since Hobbes’, realism had assimilated the rationalist 
position that states exist for individuals (itself on borrow from Aquinas’ natural 
law). This ennobling idea put limits on what states could require of citizens in 
terms of life, liberty, and property in the name of nationalism. Hegel turned this 
idea on its head, with the state idealized as the wellspring of moral value worth 
defending at all costs. He took aim at Kant in this passage from the Philosophy of 
Right: 
 
War has the higher significance that by its agency…the ethical 
health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the 
stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds 
preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a 
prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be the product 
of prolonged, let alone ‘perpetual’ peace (1991: 361). 
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Beyond self-defense and the salutary function of solidarity within the national 
community, Hegel went so far as to claim that a just war was one fought by a 
‘higher’ civilization against a lower one.  
Anticipating the Social Darwinism that would emerge later that century, 
neo-Kantians on the continent were rightly skeptical of the return of the idea of 
‘destiny’, which seemed inimical to moral agency and responsibility. Yet its 
return was pervasive enough that the idea of manifest destiny took hold of 
popular imagination across the Atlantic. In his essay coining the phrase, John 
O’Sullivan advocated the annexation of Texas and California, 
 
Imbecile and distracted, Mexico never can exert any real 
governmental authority over such a country. The impotence of the 
one [Texas] and the distance of the other [California] must make 
the relations one of virtual independence, unless by stunting the 
province of all natural growth, and forbidding that immigration 
which can alone develop its capabilities and fulfill the purposes of 
its creation…The Anglo-Saxon foot is already on its borders. 
Already the advance guard of the irresistible army of Anglo-Saxon 
emigration has begun to pour down upon it (1845: 8). 
 
Forty years on, as the prairie and frontier filled and native people and animals 
dwindled, Josiah Strong used the same martial metaphors to breathlessly extol 
this expansionist ethos. Fusing religious sermonizing with the latest in natural 
science he writes in Our Country, 
 
Mr. Darwin is not only disposed to see, in the superior vigor of our 
people, an illustration of this favorite theory of natural selection, 
but even intimates that the world’s history thus far has been simply 
preparatory for our future, and tributary to it…Then this race of 
unequaled energy, with the majesty of numbers and the might of 
wealth behind it — the representative, let us hope, of the largest 
liberty, the purest Christianity, the highest civilization — having 
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developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress its 
institutions upon mankind, will spread over the earth (1885). 
 
Bellamy refers to the shameless patriotic moralism of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries as a “caricature” of realist views, but agrees it is illustrative 
of the same moral egoism that is, undeniably, at the heart of realism. The 
primacy of the national interest is common to both imperialist-colonialist and 
balance of power thinking: 
 
Raison d’état shifted normative discussion about war in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The central constraints on 
war-fighting in this period were domestic moral and political 
concerns, prudence and utility. This helped limit some types of war 
by militating against aggression aimed at restoring or preserving 
justice, but it encouraged states to engage in combat whenever they 
believed it in their interests [and] necessity provided a permanent 
justification for acts that were otherwise forbidden (2006: 90–91). 
 
Indicative of the eclipse of legal and moral considerations by strategic thinking, 
military men like Bismarck and Clausewitz, rather than jurists or philosophers, 
are the most quoted voices of the era on matters of war. They too convey a 
picture of war as an activity limited only by political goals. 
It was not as if the altruistic spirit of morality disappeared entirely during 
the belle époque; it was rather that its urgency and solemnity were transferred, 
per Hegel, to the service, preservation, and celebration of the nation. Pioneering 
psychologist and philosopher William James captured the spirit of the age when 
he acknowledged in his famous Stanford commencement speech the need for a 
“Moral Equivalent of War”. Published on the eve of World War One, James’ 
opening line is painful in its irony, “Only when forced upon one is war now 
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thought permissible” (Steeves & Ristine 1913: 520). He goes on to observe, “there 
is something highly paradoxical in the modern man’s relation to war”, referring 
to the comingling of the ‘rational’ social utility of aggression and the irrational 
biological drives of the kind Sigmund Freud and American behaviorists such as 
Clark Hull would describe. As the speech’s title intimates, James hoped that a 
collective decision to replace the martial virtues with some national service 
activity could fulfill its several psychosocial functions: providing solidarity as 
well as sublimating what the “militant authors” like Strong thought was a 
“biological necessity”: 
 
Without any exception known to me, militarist authors take a 
highly mystical view of their subject, and regard war as a biological 
or sociological necessity, uncontrolled by ordinary psychological 
checks or motives. When the time of development is ripe the war 
must come, reason or no reason, for the justifications pleaded are 
invariably fictions. War is, in short, a permanent human obligation 
(Steeves & Ristine 1913: 524). 
 
 
James however concedes the point that Strong had made a generation earlier 
regarding the interaction of genetic and cultural inheritance: “Our ancestors have 
bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years of peace 
won’t breed it out of us” (Steeves & Ristine 1913: 522). 
Whether biological or cultural, the fateful meeting of the coldly rational 
tools of mechanized warfare and human irrationality haunted James as it haunts 
us today in the rendezvous of nuclear weapons and religious extremism. It seems 
the responsibility of rational humanity to prevent it, but from Hegel to Hempel 
scientific and philosophic ambivalence is built into that very phrase, ‘rational 
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humanity’. The humane is desirable, but it is not as obvious as it was for Kant 
that this, ‘our deepest self’, is also rational. As G. K. Chesterton, who lived 
through the senseless carnage of the Great War, observed, “A madman has not 
lost his reason; he has lost everything but” (1934: 11).  
An unintended consequence of the neo-Hobbesean emphasis on humans’ 
natural or biological aggression is the marginalization of our natural compassion 
that Rousseau observed to be just as elemental to the human psyche (Rousseau 
1987). It is this faculty, Chesterton intimated, that is lost in modern materialist 
‘madness’. In response to this crisis, he and his literary inheritors C.S. Lewis and 
J.R. Tolkien, sought to re-enchant the world through human imagination and 
otherworldly faith, despite starting from the ‘orthodox’ Christian position that 
evil exists in the world. A critique of Chesterton, which could as easily apply to 
Oakeshott, reads  
 
Each has the outlook of the mediaevalist spirit — the spirit which 
finds crusades and miracles more natural than peace meetings and 
the discoveries of science, which gives Heaven and Hell a place on 
the map…[yet] If Mr. Chesterton gets up on his box to prophesy 
against the times, he seems to do so out of a passionate and 
unreasoning affection for his fellows” (Lynd 1919: 26–27). 
 
Chesterton was large enough, in intellect as in stature, to house criticism for both 
the politics of skepticism and faith. He preempted Oakeshott in observing, “The 
whole modern world has divided itself into Conservatives and Progressives. The 
business of Progressives is to go on making mistakes. The business of the 
Conservatives is to prevent the mistakes from being corrected” (1924).  
In these thinkers, religious and political skepticism come together in a 
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diagnosis of condition D, the human predisposition to evil, but also a prognosis 
that privileges human decency, reason, and agency. Biogenic fatalism (here, 
fallenness) of conservatives is not permitted to quash progressives from 
proffering sociogenic solutions. The humanistic yin to the rationalists’ yang 
allows a civil and constructive relationship of politics of faith and skepticism.  
This chary optimism, which is in international relations rather unhelpfully 
referred to as “Christian realism”, contrasts with James’ reluctant pessimism 
regarding individual humans’ reorientation toward peace after a several-
thousand-year socialization into war (Field 2010). The challenge, as James 
articulated it, is not just sociogenic — a matter of changing cultures of violence 
and creating space for civil discourse; it is a matter of changing individual 
psyches. This meeting of biogenic and sociogenic factors, today called the 
epigenetic or ‘biopscyhosocial’ matrix, is part of what makes the reduction of 
violence (Wilson 2004, Harris 2004). The fact that individual citizens are the 
memetic and genetic host to the social pathology of intergroup aggression 
constitutes a bootstrap dilemma, at least in democracies, whereby the political 
organism needs to be smarter than the sum of its parts. How to enthrone, or 
incorporate a ruling entity of gentler nature, longer vision, and greater social 
intelligence than the irascible electorate? This, Plato’s problem, was also James’ 
problem, and remains ours. 
James was a pragmatist whose functionalism was the first reactive 
movement within the discipline of psychology. Forerunner to evolutionary 
psychology, both it and functionalism are biogenic in that they approach the 
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study of mind and consciousness with reference to the environmental challenges 
they were developed to meet. These approaches, inspired by Darwin’s natural 
selection, were in response to the introspective methods of Freudian 
psychoanalysis and of the structuralist school, propounded by Wilhelm Wundt. 
Wundt authored the first textbook in the field of psychology and headed its first 
lab, passing the structuralist torch to his student in the U.S., Edward Titchener.  
James’ text, Principles of Psychology also competed with the writings of 
members of the behaviorist school, John Watson and Ivan Pavlov, who along 
with B.F. Skinner are acknowledged its founders (O’Donnell 1985). Replying to 
Freud and the structuralists, Watson claimed in his 1913 ‘Behaviorist Manifesto’ 
that a subject’s own account of her own feelings and motivation are unreliable 
(1913: 158–177). As had been demonstrated in lab animals, prediction and control 
of behavior could be accomplished without consideration of the concept ‘mind’, 
let alone its unconscious element. The behaviorist rebuke of structuralism, 
functionalism, and psychoanalysis rejected introspection not only as an 
experimental methodology, but as a meaningful account of human motivation 
and volition, placing authority on those subjects outside the ‘agent’.  
The behaviorist revolution rippled through disciplines across the social 
sciences, with two related unintended consequences common to each. First, the 
normative concept ‘rationality’ went from a shared individual capacity or faculty 
to a term describing conformity to an objective measure that was not only 
‘outside’, but opposed to the ‘subjective’. Second, the other half of human instinct 
— the humane capacity for compassion that Rousseau and Chesterton, Wundt 
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and Titchener27 recognized — came to be associated with the subjective and was 
for this reason marginalized by the more rational instinct concerned with self-
preservation. Rather than rational humanity, the drive theory of motivation 
painted a picture of human beings as embodiments of rational self-interest. What 
would have been an oxymoron one century earlier became social science 
orthodoxy before the subfield of evolutionary psychology came along to 
corroborate. 
 
A discipline born in war 
In the decades before the First World War, European and American urban 
centers experienced an exponential population boom. Rapid political, economic, 
and demographic changes meant wider contact for some citizens, particularly 
workers and younger age groups, and unprecedented isolation for others, 
including women, elderly, and orphaned, leading to levels of mania and neurosis 
previous unseen. Evidence of cities’ explosive potential collected in the 
increasingly frequent uncoordinated (non-ritualistic) gathering of large crowds. 
From the year of revolution (1848), to the bloody draft riots during the American 
Civil War, to the repeated riots on the streets of Vienna that led frenzied crowds 
to tear apart policing soldiers’ horses28, to the capacity for irrational 
destructiveness, inspired fear in monarchs and interest in social scientists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 It was Titchener who coined the term ‘empathy’ from the German (Stueber 
2014)  
28 Foucault considered the punishment of drawing and quartering as a symptom 
of social madness, as the Bacchic ritual of tearing limb from limb, sparagmos was 
for the Greeks. 
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(Morton 1980). Masses of people took to the streets of Paris for events as varied 
as The Rite of Spring, the Dreyfus affair, and Woodrow Wilson’s visit for the 
Versailles Peace Treaty, the reception of which was nothing short of messianic.  
Each event represented to ‘rational’ social science the dangerous herd 
mind of democracy that had to be kept in check (Curtis 2002). Pioneers in the 
emergent field of group psychology such as Gustave Le Bon, Gabriel Tarde, and 
George Simmel were concerned with controlling the volatility of the mob’s 
sublimated aggression. The revelation that struck Freud’s nephew, Edward 
Bernays, in accompanying Woodrow Wilson to Versailles was that the same 
tactic of media propaganda that he and the Council on Foreign Relations had 
deployed in war could and should be used to preserve peace (Bernays & Miller 
2004). Through the new field of public relations, Bernays convinced several 
presidents after Wilson and countless in private industry of the power and 
potential of steering the opinions and tastes of the crowd. What Machiavelli had 
urged in the lurch of the invention of the printing press, Bernays avers four 
hundred years on: “[t]he conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized 
habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. 
Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible 
government which is the true ruling power of our country” (Bernays & Miller 
2004).29 
The academy was not yet complicit in this anti-democratic strategy to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 On the recommendation of Titchener, the behaviorist Watson also had a highly 
successful run as an ad man applying experimental techniques of symbol and 
stimuli for behavior prediction and control (Wozniak 1993: xx). 
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transfer authority from the people to institutions. Rather than controlling 
subconscious desires — the intrapsychic forces of instinct, or ‘id’ as Bernays’ 
popularization prescribed — the newly appeared textbook Handbook of Social 
Psychology (Murchison 1935) highlighted subtler, less coordinated influences of 
external factors on human action, including majority opinion. The technology of 
the public opinion poll, however rudimentary, created adequate self-reflection 
that democracy and social movement were resurgent in the New Deal Era, 
building on the victory womens’ suffrage decade previous (Zinn 1990, 2006; 
Curtis 2002).  
Applying the ‘interactionist’ perspective that these advances reflected, 
émigrés from Kurt Lewin to Muzafer Sherif to Solomon Asch experimentally 
confirmed Alexis De Tocqueville’s observation a century earlier that self- and 
collective perceptions of majority opinion can enforce conformity or build 
consensus. Socialization pressures could even cause individuals to act and speak 
against their better (‘rational’) judgment (Sherif 1935, 1936; Asch 1940, 1948). Less 
frequently emphasized is the remarkable finding that modeling of correct 
dissenting judgment in these settings had an even larger effect in the other 
direction. While it took many people, and/or repetition to get a subject to echo 
what is popularly perceived or perceived as popular (though wrong), the 
presence of just one dissenter was more often than not capable of breaking this 
spell. As corroborated in dozens more recent experiments, persuasion is as much 
science as art: answers that comport with majority opinion (or folk knowledge) 
when controlling for other factors, do not affect courage in individual judgment 
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as heavily as an answer known to be correct but the subject, when confirmed by 
another.30 
Rapid changes in mass communication and the competition between first 
wave democracy and communism incentivized the U.S. government to fund 
experimentally-driven research in social psychology before, during, and after the 
Second World War. Following on his work at the state and national level in 
sensitivity training and group dynamics, Lewin was tapped to run a program 
assimilating war refugees. Lewin, Freud, and a raft of Jewish intellectuals had 
fled Nazi Germany after National Socialism’s implementation of social 
psychological manipulation of the primal power of crowds, in a manner 
anticipated by Le Bon and Bernays. Dorwin Cartwright, in his article, 
“Contemporary Social Psychology in Historical Perspective” goes as far as to say 
that Hitler is the person having the greatest single impact upon the field in the 
scholarly reaction to his discomfiting success tapping the group unconscious and 
sapping citizen autonomy and engagement (1979). As Alex Haslam and Steve 
Reicher suggest “the shadow of the holocaust lies over the last half century of 
social psychology” (2007: 1). Rather than irrationality as the driving explanatory 
factor, as in psychoanalysis, Haslam and Reicher agree with LeBon that group 
violence is characterized by a ‘fusion of identity’ — a flood of humanity, or 
inhumanity, in which the usual controls of agency are drowned in delicious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 I propose that moral engagement — engaged moral judgment — is nothing 
other than the ability to replicate this finding in the absence of that dissenting 
individual. It is, in other words, the courage to be that (first) dissenting 
individual. I explore this thesis next chapter in the context of the moral 
disengagement framework that evolved out of Albert Bandura’s work on role-
modeling, social cognition, and moral judgment. 
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anonymity or by the overawing power controlling it. 
These several attempts by modern social psychologists to explain 
individual participation in group violence are aimed at understanding a 
dilemma that is quite old, and by no means proprietary to the social sciences: 
Why is it that normal, well-socialized individuals who ‘know the good’, do not 
do that good, as in condition F above, or actively work against it, as in condition 
D)? This is even more of a puzzle when applied to one’s own ostensible good — 
how could a fundamentally rationally self-interested creature not work to this 
end? Whence the divorce of speech, or thought, from action which we saw in 
Chapter One as the basis of civilization’s law (Manent 2012, Wright 2001)? 
Given social science’s claims about rationality, this kind of discrepancy 
between will and self-interest is literally unthinkable. Surely, bad behavior must 
have to do with the absence of thought, not the presence of intention. Deviance, 
operationalized as self- or other harming behavior, must be a product of the 
innermost thing, and irrational, per Freud and evolutionary psychology, or the 
outermost thing and terribly rational, per Chesterton and Foucault. These 
explanations connect to the dichotomy presented at the beginning of this chapter:  
I. Naturalistic–Biogenic (NB) – neurological, biological, or ‘personality’ 
factors provide the dependent variables of deception, dullardry, 
destitution, or the ‘death-instinct’. 
 
II. Positivistic–Sociogenic (PS) – familial, peer, institutional, or civic 
failure in socialization results in sociopathic behavior. 
 
After World War Two, the state presented as the culprit most responsible for 
deviance; poor conditioning, poor socialization, and permitting the intrusion of 
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psychoanalysts and propagandists like Bernays into modern mythmaking had  
(Cassirer 1965). Better the fault of law and institutions, which were fungible, than 
of human nature or instinct, which were less so. 
Introspective adventurers from Aristotle to The Apostle Paul, and Saint 
Augustine to Nietzsche have commented on the mysterious disjuncture of 
intention from action formerly known as ‘incontinence’ as something more 
existential than a lack of self-control or overweening outside control. As 
Wittgenstein quotes Augustine’s description of the problem, “ I will, but my 
body does not obey me” (1973: 161). In the 1950s and 60s, pioneering work by 
Lewin’s student Leon Festinger reframed the dilemma in terms of the now 
familiar phenomena of cognitive dissonance (1957). This explanation for ignoring 
what one fears to be right but is at adds with what one already believes is more a 
matter of ego or vanity than lust or id. Cognitive dissonance is a ‘rational’ 
strategy for self-preservation without a rational explanation for why that self is 
worth preserving and is destructive to dissent necessary to ask that question, 
which Lewin, Asch, and Sheriff observed.  
Latter-day Handbook of Social Psychology editor Elliot Aronson conducted 
similar research on the self-justification of choice to avoid negative emotions like 
remorse or envy (1963). However, because this kind of self-reinforcement 
involves denigrating alternative opinions/perspectives, it is possible that those 
espousing those alternatives are subject to denigration as well — what Nietzsche 
called ressentiment. Aronson and colleagues later researched the strategy of 
“inducing hypocrisy” as a way to motivate individuals to adjust their behavior to 
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a norm, rather than avoiding dissonance by adjusting to continued 
noncompliance (Fried & Aronson 1995). 
If the rubric by which value is measured in these ‘innermost’ cases is how 
we are viewed — and derivatively, how we view ourselves — the rubric for the 
‘outermost’ is what the ‘they’ think generally. The difference is that between the 
psychological and the sociological. If the popularization of social psychological 
theory followed its embrace by the state, the opposite happened in the arena of 
public opinion polling, its popularization precipitating its incorporation into the 
practice of politics, and only then its academic study as a sub-field. Robert Lane 
developed the first program in political psychology at Yale, where Clark Hull 
had relocated after time at Michigan and Wisconsin. The subfields of political 
behavior and public opinion and policymaking also rose in popularity with heft 
from behavioralist experimental and quantitative methodologies filling the pages 
of journals with names like the Experimental Study of Politics (Dahl 1956, Hermann 
& Hermann 1967, Riker 1967). The political scientific expression of the 
philosophical belief that humans had the ability to change themselves with good 
data obfuscated the original discrepancy between information and action; 
knowing the good did reliably translate to doing it. Where psychoanalysis had 
delved too deeply, and behaviorism not deeply enough, the experimental social 
psychology was most susceptible to Farr’s critique of the “errors and biases” of a 
positivist philosophy of science and historiography with its “obsession with 
identifying the precise origins of a particular field of study…when [it] ceases to be 
metaphysics and becomes science” (1991: 371; emphasis in original).  
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Yet Wundt, the founder of experimental psychology, was himself anti-
positivist and skeptical that psychology was wholly a natural science, comprising 
as it did “thinking and other higher cognitive processes” (1991: 372).  Moral 
reasoning and speech acts were the province of social psychology, but not 
behaviorism or other forms of noncognitivism, since these acts do have clear 
social and personal meanings even when not always minded in practice. 
Personality psychologist Gordon Allport’s research indicated that unconscious 
historical and biological variables were less explanatory of motivation than 
subjects’ current situation and their conscious perception of it, which were 
harder to capture in experimental settings. “Noteworthy scientific gains result 
from this ‘hard-nosed’ approach” he wrote in his contribution to the Handbook of 
Social Psychology, continuing, “There is however, one serious disadvantage: neat 
and elegant experiments often lack generalizing power…some current 
investigations seem to end up in elegantly polished triviality — snippets of 
empiricism, but nothing more” (1968: 68). 
Allport pointed to the early positivist Auguste Comte as founding father 
of social psychology, but admitted in the revised Handbook that its development 
had been delayed “for nearly a century until the positivistic tools of experiment, 
statistics, survey methods, and like instruments were most adequately 
developed” (1954: 4). “While the roots of social psychology lie in the intellectual 
soil of the Western tradition” he wrote, “empiricism and positivism did not enter 
social psychology to any appreciable extent until the decade of the 1920s. The 
ideals of objectivity and precision then rapidly assumed a dominant position.” 
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This led Allport to refer to social psychology’s flowering as “characteristically an 
American phenomenon” (1954: 48, 3–4). Though the reference to Comte was 
removed in the fourth revision of the Handbook (1985), “The positivistic 
framework of the whole account, however, is left unchanged” (Farr 1991: 377).31 
The same year that the landmark Civil Rights Act was being debated and 
Arendt published her Report on the Banality of Evil  (1963), Allport’s student, 
Stanley Milgram conducted what is perhaps the most famous psychology 
experiment of all time, published later as the “Behavioral Study of Obedience” 
but known simply as the “Milgram Experiment”. Milgram viewed his work as 
corroborating and generalizing Arendt’s assessment of Eichmann and Nazi 
functionaries — that they had adopted what he infelicitously called an “agentic 
state” in which an individual sacrifices his moral agency by “com[ing] to view 
himself as the instrument for carrying out another person's wishes,” and as a 
result, “no longer sees himself as responsible for his actions” (Milgram 1974: xii). 
Arendt, however, worried that such sociogenic accounts of evil bracketed moral 
agency and obscured “the capacity of individuals both to surprise themselves 
with the novelty of their own actions, and to moderate the consequences of those 
actions by freely binding themselves to a collective enterprise” (quoted in 
Bowring 2011: 59). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Farr’s critique of “Two Rival Forms of Positivism” mirrors the present one, 
though he is less concerned with the by-then demised behavioral expression as 
with the methodological tension in social psychology between natural and social 
science, and the ‘identic’ rift between psychology and sociology in their 
American and European expressions. 
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Even though behaviorism gave way to the ‘cognitive revolution’ around 
the time of Milgrim’s writing, the latter preserved former’s agnosticism 
regarding internal motives. For example, in the context of a more recent atrocity, 
psychologist Philip Zimbardo, while testifying as an expert witness for the 
defense of Abu Ghraib ringleader Ivan Frederick, accounted for the latter’s 
crimes using an “agentic” explanation similar to that of his former classmate, 
Milgram: the subjugation of prisoners to physical, psychological, and sexual 
abuse, he said, was structural — the product of “bad barrels,” not bad apples, as 
the government had claimed (2007). Zimbardo’s controversial Stanford Prison 
Experiment expanded on Milgram’s finding that expectations of roles and 
negative role modeling overpower the personal standards that typically inhibit 
dehumanizing behavior (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo 1973). 
As I proposed earlier32, the grail in the study of agency and the real value 
of social science for life is not to explain away individual responsibility for 
violence via structural factors, but to explain the motivational difference that 
exists in good apples — the courageous whistleblowers and dissenters who had a 
catalytic effect in the mentioned studies of groupthink. In the next chapter, I train 
a critical lens on one of the driving forces of the cognitive revolution and 
‘agentic’ social psychology, the founder of social cognitive theory (SCT) Albert 
Bandura. Bandura’s work on role-modeling, social learning, and the formation of 
moral judgment has been hugely influential, most lately in the area of moral 
disengagement. Regrettably, he has written less on moral engagement and its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See footnote 30. 
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sources, leaving his prescriptive advice at only the desirability of “pro-social” 
norms.   
Echoing an underemphasized aspect of the Milgram experiment, 
Bandura’s secondary finding in a 1975 paper with Underwood and Fromson 
highlights humans’ positive capacity for empathy, the prerequisite for moral 
engagement. He observes the powerful role that “humanization”, 
“personalization”, or knowledge of (potential) victims and groups plays in 
activating the relevant controls and diminishing or circumventing aggression by 
resisting disinhibitive stimuli such as the order from an authority figure. The 
utility of social learning lies in a particular type of socialization: humane, 
pluralistic, and/or altruistic values. These values, which Bandura calls “pro-
social”, are amenable to universal moral justifications for action — that is, those 
whose authority is derived from the kind of creature humans are, or faculties 
they possess (viz. rationality or sentience). In is, in short, more biogenic than 
sociogenic, but at a minimum involves some combination of these. Conformity to 
pro-social practices might constitute a fitness advantage, but only under certain 
environmental conditions — in the case of international relations, a society of 
states or global human rights regime with mechanisms to punish defection 
and/or reward compliance. More importantly, for these normative structures to 
come about at all, these actions must have had an intrinsic value to motivate. It is 
this paradox that I claim Bandura’s sociogenic paradigm has difficulty 
explaining. 
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As was evident in the previous chapter on the decline of just war, force is 
not monopolized in international affairs and the mechanisms for enforcement of 
international law are in most cases decentralized, per IR constructivism (Clark, I. 
2007), functioning through a combination of formal agreements and informal 
consensus (Jackson 2000). Whether one calls it functionalism, legal positivism, or 
a ‘behaviorism of states’, this arrangement is admirably pragmatic but goes no 
further in securing the authority and legitimacy of the system and its actors, or 
the moral engagement of citizens. What of agency and intention in the domestic 
analogy? Even in Bandura’s sociogenic humanitarian utilitarian account, his 
“humane standards” and pro-social norms must have as their referent those acts 
that preserve and promote international right and international society, which 
itself exists for the preservation and development of individual agents, not 
societies or states. These are the values of the just war tradition, and their most 
coherent defense is, I argue in the following chapters, Kantian and deontological.
	  	  
147 
Chapter Four: 
 
Albert Bandura and the unraveling of sociogenic morality 
 
 
We are training not isolated men but a living group of men, — nay, a 
group within a group. And the final product of our training must be 
neither a psychologist nor a brickmason, but a man. And to make men, we 
must have ideals — broad, pure, and inspiring ends of living 
  
-W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk 
 
Last chapter, I traced the development of two onto-epistemic traditions in 
social psychology that grew out of the positivist revolution, evolutionary 
psychology and behaviorism. Each has a distinct hermeneutical approach to the 
problems of individual and collective agency that pioneering philosopher and 
political psychologist William James raised, and therefore differing prescriptions 
regarding the problem of evil and the possibility of altruism.  
I characterized the Naturalistic–Biogenic’ (NB) approach of evolutionary 
psychology (and later, neuroscience) as departing from Freud in taking the side 
of the politics of faith. On this view, something like human nature exists, albeit as 
a law-governed epiphenomenon of social and cultural selection pressures on a 
range of biochemical/genetic expressions of instinct (Wilson 2004). Insofar as 
those environmental pressures can be consciously manipulated, or at least 
‘canalized’ and directed, human aggressiveness can be reduced and nature, 
improved. At some point, there is the possibility, if not promise, that biopolitical 
reigns can be relaxed as humans settle into a cruelty-free world.33 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The writings of eminent sociobiologist E.O. Wilson and Pulitzer prize-winning 
author of On Human Nature and Consilience are perhaps most emblematic in this 
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The Positivistic–Sociogenic (PS) strain characteristic of behaviorism, social 
learning theory, and later, social cognitive theory, is more purely positivist in its 
emphasis on experimental verificationism. It is also generally hopeful of 
progress, but takes the side of the politics of skepticism in recognizing that 
‘evolution’ and ‘progress’ are not synonymous. Since there is no essential human 
nature, or even ‘self’ to which they accrue, the gains of either are reversible 
within a lifetime. The reflexive relationship between the individual and their 
normative environment of laws, customs, and practices means that each is only 
as ‘good’ as the other. Change depends on consciousness of this process, which 
fluctuates across time and space. Human development, on this view, is neither 
permanent, nor linearly pegged to technology. Because selection pressure is on 
more ‘top-down’ memetic factors, than ‘bottom-up’ genetic ones, there is nothing 
as persistent as in NB’s naturalistic ontology.  
Descriptively, the distinguishing feature of PS is the degree to which each 
person begins life as a blank slate and to which both behavior and the value 
judgments placed on that behavior are socially conditioned and plastic.34 
Prescriptively, the PS view of social psychology is therefore more a matter of 
uncovering, isolating, or recovering healthy practices than of engineering brave 
new citizen-subjects, as sociobiology and evolutionary/psychology intimate 
(Wilson 2004). If individuals can be made more rational, they can control 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
regard. See the writings of the transhumanists like Nick Bostrom for probabilities 
and prognoses of technological utopia. 
34 And, as ethical noncognitivists would point out, [judgments are] in this sense 
arbitrary, indicated by inverted commas on moral concepts like ‘good’, 
throughout. 
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themselves; the difference is over how individuals are ‘made’ more rational, and, 
as we shall see, whether rationality actually translates to better behavior. It is a 
separate, historical and political theoretical question, however, whether better 
behavior reliably translates to better social outcomes. As the historians Howard 
Zinn and Laurel Thatcher Ulrich remind, well-behaved people seldom make 
history (Zinn 2002, 2006). 
As I described, PS definitions of rationality and its concern with certainty 
underwrite positivism’s default prescriptive position of inaction or 
nonintervention with regression toward a stable or certain mean — the 
consequence deemed best for the most. As in international legal positivism, the 
prohibition in place to guarantee this kind of utilitarian social or political ‘order’ 
means that compliance is necessary and sufficient for peace. As in the domestic 
case of majoritarian democracy, however, if the authority of the ‘liberal’ 
international order is predicated on consensus, stability is not a good for 
minority opinion (Dahl 1956), meaning the perspective from which these could 
effectively question such orders in conditions of stasis is limited to revolutionary 
options ‘outside’ reform (Jackson 2000). If sufficiently plural or inclusive, 
‘outside’ dissent is asymptotically small as those aspiring to nationhood are 
fewer. Good laws, or practices, in other words, find social equilibrium, 
domestically and internationally.  
Social science has historically lent support to this vision of an international 
system predicated on rational states run by rational actors accountable to rational 
publics and all of whom who are believed to be, under the right conditions, 
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amenable to argument, or at least appeasement (Clark, A. 2010). The real threat, 
on this view, is defection on any level from the legitimacy framework established 
by Grotian rationalism or Vattelian legal positivism, domestically or 
internationally, which beneficiaries are primed to see as dangerous irrationalism35 
(Clark, I. 2007). The presumption of disruption by ‘bad actors’ forecloses the 
possibility of an authentic justification for disruption by taking for granted the 
justice of the status quo. This same prescriptive nonviolence or obedience 
corresponds to the first variety of moralism drawn from the ‘conservative’ 
interpretation of Kant.  
Whether confirmed through belief or experience, condition D draws a line 
directly from description to prescription with the opposite ethical conclusion: the 
necessity of action. ‘Irrational’ is insufficient to describe some threats to order, 
sanity, and humanity, to which the response of cool rationality is insufficient. A 
plea to an active shooter, or Gandhi’s two ‘cease and desist’ letters to Hitler 
would be exemplary of this exceptional circumstance. This was as true for 
Augustine as it was for Kant, despite, or perhaps because each conceived the 
essence of evil as a deficit of good. It is a paradox of this faith in free will and the 
strength of goodness that although the deficiency of evil is fundamental, its 
defeat is only guaranteed if the good shoulder the responsibility each to act. 
More important than any of the differences between BN and PS is this 
similarity: the absence — the impossibility of this kind of resolve, or self-efficacy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Recall that to avoid regress and recriminations of the kind associated with holy 
war, where the accusation of ‘evil’ is itself used as a weapon of mass destruction, 
the post-theodicy position F posited that the adjective ‘evil’ as applied to agents 
ought to be eliminated, substituting something like ‘irrational’. 
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belief, to use Bandura’s term — in both NB’s politics of faith and PS’s moral 
skepticism. Instead of intervening to halt the viral spread of some deadly 
ideological meme, nations are better served, on both views, inoculating their 
home population. The implication of the medical analogy is that power and 
authority in both views lies with experts, not with the passive and manipulable 
populace, who are incapable of inoculating themselves. Liberal openness and 
reasoned debate are perhaps the most adaptive practices, though PS’s onto-
epistemic position cannot entirely account for them as expressly moral positions. 
Positivism deals poorly with paradox, particularly, that of which Madison was 
so presciently aware: the society most permitting of individual self-fashioning is 
perhaps also that most at risk of infection and abuse (Hamilton, Madison, & Jay 
2003: 10). In short, PS’s moral skepticism shares with NB’s faith a propensity to 
paternalism that remains salient despite the best efforts of Albert Bandura’s pro-
social political psychology.  
 
Up from behaviorism 
For sixty years, Albert Bandura has researched and written on issues in 
the psychology of authority, aggression, and agency. Canadian by birth, he 
studied at the University of British Columbia before grad studies in the enclave 
of behaviorist psychology that had taken root at the University of Iowa. Iowa’s 
psychology department was chaired by Kenneth Spence, a collaborator of 
behaviorist, Clark Hull, known for quantifying the experimental modification of 
behavior of the kind that Pavlov, Watson, and Edward Thorndike were 
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pioneering. Combining the subfields of ethology and psychometrics, Spence 
added nuance to Hull’s drive theory and Thorndike’s ‘law of effect’ by mapping 
incentive and inhibition gradients for specifically human motivations. Elements 
of this neo-behaviorist approach to learning can be seen in Bandura’s work, as 
well as the interactionist approach of Kurt Lewin.  
Though Bandura arrived long after Lewin’s tenures at Iowa and Stanford, 
ideas he left behind, such as sensitivity training, group dynamics, and steps of 
institutional change was in many ways responsible for the humane research 
agenda that persisted in these institutions from which Bandura benefitted. This is 
illustrated in Bandura’s career-long focus on aggression reduction and conflict 
resolution. Neuropsychologist Arthur Benton had a more direct impact as 
Bandura’s advisor. A recently returned Navy medic, Benton’s friendship, 
mentorship, and employment helped Bandura make his way, personally and 
professionally.  
Bandura made his way to Stanford and with department chair Robert 
Sears and Sears’ graduate student Richard Walters began work on the role of 
observational learning in antisocial aggression. Contrary to Hullian conditioning 
and Freudian fear of punishment, Bandura et al’s research found that parental 
role modeling of aggression through punishment was more formative of 
children’s own aggressive behavior than verbal prohibitions or promises of 
punishment or reward (1959). A flurry of publications through the 1960s, 
beginning with the famous Bobo Doll experiments that Bandura conducted with 
Dorrie and Sheila Ross, confirmed the importance of observational learning in 
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aggression, controverting Freudian claims about their primal (‘biogenic’) origin 
and the supposed benefits of its purgation (1961, 1962, 1963a, 1963b, 1963c, 1963d, 
1964).  
Beginning in 1965, Bandura began testing the claim that observational 
learning though role modeling could also have a positive effect on behavior. Its 
premise was that the human capacity for “vicarious learning” or symbolic 
modeling which allows individuals to bypass trial and error learning and benefit 
from accumulated sociocultural knowledge might also apply to ethical behavior. 
The linguist Noam Chomsky was arguing around the same time that structural 
features of cognition and language permitted thought and speech that are rule-
governed, but novel or improvisational, and did not need to be modeled to find 
their way into actors’ repertoires. Whether the behavior was communicative or 
moral, Bandura was skeptical of biogenic or rationalistic explanations of 
“universal, though not inborn, latent preference” as belonging to discredited 
structuralist or intuitionist frameworks (1991: 46).  
Humans undoubtedly generate patterns of behavior that go beyond 
mimicry, but Bandura’s hunch was that normative human ethology was socially 
bounded: individuals infer the moral rules underlying modeled styles of 
behavior. Working outside of the paradigm of both evolutionary psychology and 
behaviorism, Bandura did not conceive of this faculty as purely strategic; it was 
predicated neither on external reward and punishment, nor on drive. Instead, he 
believed cultivating new competencies that are socially advantageous was 
dependent on identic factors. The same modeling influences responsible for 
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identity-formation affect individual motivation by raising personal expectations. 
In accordance with learned value systems, this behavior can be aspirational; one 
need not have encountered a perfectly well behaved individual to undertake 
action s/he imagines to be befitting of such a type.  
In this middle period, Bandura sought to demonstrate that, contrary to 
personality psychology or behaviorism, emotional proclivities and drives can be 
modified via self-reflection and self-regulative mechanisms of motivation. He 
began to distance himself from the social learning paradigm that had informed 
research since his first publication in 1953. It is still visible in 1977’s “Self-efficacy: 
Toward a unifying theory of behavior” and “Analysis of Self-Efficacy Theory of 
Behavioral Change” with Nancy Adams. The latter comingles the lexicon and 
concepts of drive theory and social learning theory but cites cognitive self-
reflection as decisive in motivation, particularly in overcoming fear: 
 
This cognitive mediating mechanism of change places greater 
emphasis on the informative than on the automatic energizing 
function of physiological arousal. Most arousal is activated by 
thought, and cognitive appraisal of arousal states to a large extent 
determines the level and direction of motivational inducements to 
action (1977b: 290). 
 
Five years later, the article titled “The self and mechanisms of agency” signaled 
the turn toward a more agent-centered account of motivation and judgment 
(1982). Though the germ of Bandura’s conception of agency appeared in his early 
writing in the social learning paradigm, he does not begin to use Milgram’s 
descriptor ‘agentic’ until the development of social cognitive theory (SCT) (1986, 
1989).  
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These proto-agentic publications were interspersed with Bandura’s 
development of a comprehensive psychological theory culminating in his 
ambitious book, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory 
in 1986. SCT was developed to overcome the passive unidirectionality implied by 
a social learning theory. He described this evolution in his 1989 explication of 
“Social Cognitive Theory”: 
 
Human behavior has often been explained in terms of one-sided 
determinism. In such modes of unidirectional causation, behavior 
is depicted as being shaped and controlled either by environmental 
influences or by internal dispositions. Social cognitive theory favors 
a model of causation involving triadic reciprocal determinism. In 
this model of reciprocal causation, behavior, cognition and other 
personal factors, and environmental influences all operate as 
interacting determinants that influence each other 
bidirectionally…Expectations, beliefs, self-perceptions, goals and 
intentions give shape and direction to behavior (2). 
 
Though social cognitive theory was pioneering in its exploration of the 
interaction of personal or identic factors’ with environmental factors, it is 
important to note even in this dialectical relationship of self-creation, agency is 
never a primordial fact, as idealized in liberal individualism. Selfhood is still a 
social artifact. In what follows, I try to draw out the ethical and political 
implications of Bandura’s sociogenic conception (PS) in which moral judgment 
and political possibility (progress) remain bounded by a social grammar of 
convention. Even under Bandura’s new cognitive paradigm, I argue, there 
persists a metatheoretical disjuncture between the two major phases of Bandura’s 
research on agency that it made possible: active self-efficacy beliefs and the 
essentially passive process he called “moral disengagement”. 
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Rules of Engagement 
Two influential publications appeared the same year as Social Foundations 
of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory that bolstered Bandura’s 
sociogenic premise. The first was the Seville Statement on Violence by an 
international group of scientists concluded that there was no scientific or 
biological basis for ‘naturally’ aggressive human nature, which had been the 
pervasive bias at least since Hobbes’. "Just as 'wars begin in the minds of men”, 
the authors intone, “peace also begins in our minds. The same species who [sic] 
invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of 
us" (UNESCO 2012). This same year, political scientist and scholar of 
international relations, Michael Doyle published a tremendously influential 
paper undermining the premise of democratic peace theory: that democracies are 
the most pacifistic political system because they generally do not fight each 
other. In a comprehensive review of international conflicts since the French 
Revolution, Doyle found that in the 200 years since Kant made his claims about 
the republican tendency toward pacifism and economic cosmopolitanism, liberal 
democracies were instead demonstrated to be the most likely regime type to 
initiate hostilities, albeit with nations they perceived to be illiberal (1986).36  
In the heady period from 1989–1991 marking the end of the cold war and 
beginning of the first Gulf War (among other interventions), a flurry of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Of course, this could as easily be seen as a confirmation of Kant’s just war 
theory proposed last chapter, but, as discussed, this was not the prevailing 
reading of Kant at the time. 
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publications elaborating and consolidating Bandura’s social cognitive theory 
appeared, several of which addressed themselves to the problems of group 
aggression and state violence. “These psychosocial mechanisms of moral 
disengagement have been examined most extensively in political and military 
violence” as Bandura argued in his “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in 
Terrorism”, but 
 
This limited focus tends to convey the impression that selective 
disengagement of moral self-sanctions occurs only under 
extraordinary circumstances. Quite the contrary. Such mechanisms 
operate in everyday situations in which decent people routinely 
perform activities that further their interests but have injurious 
human effects (1991: 162). 
 
Bandura published copiously on the sources of lapses in civilian moral judgment 
in “Human Agency in Social Cognitive Theory”, “Selective Activation and 
Disengagement of Moral Control”, and “Social Cognitive Theory of Moral 
Thought and Action”. Given their importance to the negotiation of this transition 
in ethical outlook, I will treat aspects of each in what follows. 
Bandura first identified the processes behind moral disengagement at the 
tail end of his work on childhood aggression in a 1975 study with Underwood 
and Fromson, “Disinhibition of Aggression through Diffusion of Responsibility 
and Dehumanization of Victims”. While still working under the social learning 
model (Bandura 1973), his findings in these experiments added nuance to 
colleague Phil Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment regarding the phenomena 
of ‘othering’, the inertia of group violence, and authoritarian personality types 
(Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo 1973). In form and finding, they resembled the 
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Milgram experiment: participants were asked to administer a shock to actors 
when they failed in a specified task, with an authority absorbing responsibility 
for any harm sustained (demonstrating the diffusion mechanism in the title). In a 
second group, participants who were described in dehumanizing terms were 
punished more readily and severely. The study confirmed its hypothesis that 
individuals subject to diffusive influences demonstrated increased punitiveness, 
and aggression escalated with repetition and dehumanization of subjects (1975: 
266). 
These disinhibiting influences comprise two of the eight mechanisms in 
the process of “neutralization of self-punishment” (254) that Bandura would 
redub, “moral disengagement”. It is also in the Disinhibition paper that first 
author Bandura lays out the basic problematic of self-censorship and self-
reinforcement that came to define social cognitive theory:  
 
After people acquire standards of conduct through modeling and 
selective reinforcement, they partly regulate their own actions by 
self-created consequences. They do things that give them self-
satisfaction and a sense of self-worth. Internalization of standards, 
however, does not create an invariable control mechanism within 
the person. Because activation of self-reinforcement is under 
discriminative control, variations in moral conduct often occur with 
the same internalized moral codes (254). 
 
Moral codes, in other words, do not self-enforce but require the agent’s 
regulatory mechanism to be activated. 
After standards of conduct are acquired through modeling and selective 
reinforcement, self-regulation is mediated by a cognitive process of anticipatorily 
morally justifying courses of action against those standards. First in children, 
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then in adult subjects, Bandura observed a gap between moral competence (rote 
knowledge of moral principle) and performance of moral acts (1975: 254). This 
discrepancy between knowledge and action is predictable enough, per Hull’s 
drive theory and Spence’s neo-behaviorism, as to be unremarkable. When 
incentives are strong enough, and/or the perceived probability of detection low 
enough, desire overrides prohibition. 
This same imputation of cost-benefit analysis to criminality was discussed 
seven years prior in Nobel prize-winning economist Gary Becker’s paper “Crime 
and Punishment: An Economic Approach” (1968). It claimed that criminal 
behavior was in this economic sense of cost and benefits, ‘rational’ Though 
controversial at the time, this had become the standard way of seeing ‘defection’ 
in game theory and the cornerstone of rational choice theory. However, this 
enthusiasm has also invited scrutiny of the premises and revealed some 
pathologies of rational choice as a methodology that intimate its insufficiency as 
a theory of human action (Allison 1971, Allison & Halperin 1972, Green & 
Shapiro 1996). The principal problem with ‘thick’ rational choice is its 
assumption that actors are omniscient, self-regarding, materialistic decision-
makers. This featureless, one-dimensional caricature of the human agent is the 
default model in much of economic theory (with its deficiencies being explained 
away with the imperfect information clause and caveats regarding 
‘externalities’). This is in contrast to the more moderate ‘thin’ rational choice of 
decision or game theory, modeled by Savage and Ostrom, and for which 
Schelling and Aumann shared the 2005 Nobel Prize. Unfortunately, both 
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approaches rest on a narrow, atavistic definition of instrumental rationality and 
self-interest that also pervades political science discourse. As ethicist Terry 
Nardin argues in his essay “Law, Morality, and the Relations of States”, “No 
matter how efficient a coordination strategy is from the perspective of game 
theory, and no matter how efficiently the observance of international moral 
precepts secures the maximal satisfaction of the aggregate interests of nation-
states, such considerations cannot be morally decisive” (Nardin & Mapel 1993: 
153). 
As a social and political problem, this diagnosis is quite old, appearing, 
among other places, in the famous Ring of Gyges example in Book II of Plato’s 
Republic. In that allegory, a peasant comes into possession of a ring that makes 
him invisible and able to sin, thieve, and kill with impunity and through regicide 
become king. Socrates’ interlocutors argue that in the same situation, most men 
(the modern would add, ‘rational’ men) would engage in the same self-
aggrandizing behavior were it guaranteed to be undetected and/or unpunished. 
Socrates spends the rest of the dialogue refuting the claim that human ethics 
must be governed by considerations of competition and consequence (in other 
words, if the benefits were to outweigh any costs). His argument anticipates 
Kant’s claim that justice, or moral good, is its own reward regardless of 
consequences (Reiss 1991: 123). 
Bandura sees this kind of devotion as untenable a foil for interest (recall 
situation F). He echoes the cynicism of Socrates’ interlocutors’ regarding human 
motivation: “Indeed, when information about different types of consequences are 
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added even to hypothetical moral dilemmas used to verify the stage theory, as 
the severity of personal consequences increases, people favor self-interest over 
principled reasoning” (1991: 49). Rather than praising the ‘hard right’, Bandura’s 
prescription in light of this invincible combination of selfishness and self-
delusion is to make it harder to do wrong: “Given the many psychological 
devices for disengagement of moral control…societies cannot rely solely on the 
individuals, however honorable their standards, to provide safeguards against 
inhumanities. To function humanely” he continues,” societies must establish 
effective social safeguards against moral disengagement practices” (1990: 27).  
Bandura has no truck with non-consequentialism in ethics, which he sees, 
(wrongly, I will argue), as emblematic of the disengagement mechanisms he calls 
“moral justification”37 (1990: 187, 1991: 45–103). PS is characteristically critical of 
devotion to elusive ideals of right or justice, which are unverifiable and prone to 
abuse as justifications of violence. The ethical alternative to ‘moral’ justification 
of right is knowledge of good — a belief with a referent (the measurable well-
being of individuals) more amenable to ‘authentic’ rationality, which must be 
universal. The battle throughout the Banduran corpus is between idiosyncratic 
(literally, “one’s own mix” of) ‘moral’ justifications that rationalize transgressive 
behavior, and conventional, reasonable, and humane norms transmitted through 
socialization whose safeguarding of a peaceable order is their own justification. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37Because I depart from Bandura in my unironic use of the phrase “moral 
justification” as a name for the process facilitating moral engagement, not 
disengagement, I hereafter refer to Bandura’s disengagement mechanism as 
“‘moral’ justification’” with inverted commas indicating the spuriousness of 
justifications with dubious moral aims that he intended to convey. 
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I identify three major problems with this characterization of moral 
justification, both as an explanation of individual motivation and social–political 
change, each to be discussed at length in this chapter. First, Bandura’s makes out 
the worst ‘moral’ justifications to be deontological in form, as they make a duty 
out of punishment or aggression. However, Bandura is also expressly critical of 
the alternative to non-consequentialist, deontological-type moral reasoning 
because of the harmful tradeoffs justified under consequentialist utilitarian 
ethical systems. Having to choose between these two ‘evils’, he embraces exactly 
the group-level, order-centric, agent-neutral rationales typical of utilitarianism 
without using this word, or mentioning its liabilities. 
Second, even if Bandura avoids contradiction by adding a ‘do no harm’ 
clause to his form of utilitarianism, this essentially conservative, law-abiding, 
noninterventionist political ethos has a stifling effect on the kinds of direct 
action and disobedience that he elsewhere praises as necessary to achieving a 
more humane world. Although Bandura espouses a variety of humanitarian 
utilitarianism, he takes a states’-eye view of ethics — both in terms of their 
content and transmission — which marginalizes that cornerstone of moral 
value and responsibility, individual choice. The truly humanizing and humane 
elements of morality are agent-relative, in contrast to utilitarian agent-neutrality. 
In political philosophical terms, Bandura chooses the safety of enforced 
equality over the riskier value of freedom, which has illiberal implications he 
fails to broach.  
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Bandura indicts one full half of moral reasoning because of the risk 
involved in severing intention from outcome, conflating deontological and 
pseudo-deontological justifications, but does not himself distinguish between 
this kind of ‘moral’ justification and the kind that pervades utilitarian or 
consequentialist ethics. Risk of abuse is implicit in entrusting any entity with 
sacrificing the good of one or few for many or more; Bandura’s compromise 
seems to be to draw a red line between two kinds of harm a minority can suffer: 
loss of preference and loss of rights (violence). A second, lesser kind of ‘moral’ 
justification then is that which blurs this line between permissible and 
impermissible uses of others for the good of the whole. The third problem with 
Bandura’s framework is that he at no point discusses relationship between the 
two kinds of inauthentic or spurious ‘moral’ justifications, which I argue could 
be used to explain all eight disengagement mechanisms he puts forward, as 
well as to explain the moral disengagement and engagement in a more 
parsimonious and accurate manner. 
Though only two of Bandura’s eight disengagement mechanisms were 
discussed in the 1975 study, they are representative of the two kinds of 
justification identified above: consequentialist and pseudo-deontological. To 
understand the difference between the two justification types, it is helpful to 
sketch Bandura’s self-regulatory mechanism and the aspects that are being 
‘hacked’ in each case. 
 
 
	  	  
164 
Ethical code + Right intention = Moral Act 
Suppose that moral codes have the general form:  ‘p’ is a person, with ‘q’ 
qualities, to whom any free and rational agent r owes ‘o’ rights, together making 
ethical situation ‘s’. Moral judgment, or what Bandura calls “discrimination”, is 
the faculty that allows one to recognize: 
 
1) oneself as r 
 
2) the equation p + q = s 
 
3) the applicability of syllogism, ‘If s, then o’ with caveat (3b) -o = -r  
(neglecting one’s duty à dissonance, remorse, self-sanction) 
 
 
“Activation”, as Bandura conceives it, is recognition of each of the factors that 
together make s the kind of (moral) situation requiring a particular response, 
whether action or inaction. Cognitive consonance, or the integrity of identity (a 
sense of “self-satisfaction” or “ self-worth” in Bandura’s terms) is the motive 
force of this equation since it is this sense of integrity that ensures the prescribed 
behavior proceeds irrespective of contrary desires, drives, interests, or outside 
inducements. This, for Bandura, is the baseline, “normal” situation of 
socialization. 
There is a vast literature in moral philosophy supporting the claim that 
obedience to moral codes is a necessary but not sufficient condition to call an 
action “moral” (Rachels & Rachels 2006). This, despite the fact that Bandura uses 
that word “moral” to describe aspects of this regulatory process, not limited to its 
standards and codes. How could behavior that conforms to an authentically 
moral standard not itself be moral? As discussed earlier in the context of Kantian 
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deontology, he standard answer has to do with the moral and legal category of 
motive or intent (Rachels & Rachels 2006, Scanlon 2008). A moral act might 
generally be defined as one that foregoes one’s self-interest or personal 
advantage for another’s in the interest of fairness or out of a feeling of empathy 
(Beitz 1999). In either case it is an expression of respect (Bagnoli 2013). 
In our schematic moral code, one might formalize the function of 
empathic, engaged, humanizing codes with the equality p = r that connects one’s 
agency to another’s. A short way to represent self-sanction is the syllogism 
preventing dehumanization: 
  
If –p, then –r 
 
in which negating another’s personhood would lead to the negation of one’s 
moral self, and the same dissonance, self-sanction, or remorse as when one fails 
in a duty.  
Bandura frequently calls for “humane standards” but does not discuss the 
empathic motive of interpersonal identification. Behavior in the normal or 
conventional situation is therefore better referred to as “ethical” since it is 
predicated on prior role modeling and normative practices of reward and 
punishment, rather than by moral theory, principle, or relationships, including 
biological/familial. It has, in other words, extrinsic rather than intrinsic value 
and is therefore an external, versus internal motive principle. It is not worthless 
but it id wroth less. Ethics dictates the right thing to do in a specific situation and 
is in every sense mediate even when internalized. Morality is immediate in that its 
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principle of action is good will or intention towards the entire class of r agents 
regardless of condition (rational or irrational; innocent or blameworthy) or 
consequence (the good feeling or well-being upon which the former ethics is 
predicated).38 The distinction makes room for that class of acts discussed in the 
context of the Doctrine of Double Effect that are lamentably common in war: 
those that are morally permissible, legal, even ethical, but not, strictly speaking, 
moral. They are not good, but necessary. Yet even in these cases — indeed, 
especially in these cases — intention or motive is central in drawing such 
distinctions (Scanlon 2008). 
A more relational vision of ethics on the NB model seeks to expand the 
natural recognition of identity and interdependence within the family unit to 
society or even species, whereby the good of the group becomes a component of 
self-conception and self-interest. While this would in theory open the door to 
more widespread altruism and sacrifice, there seems to be limits on this natural 
capacity, as observed in the distance from national and regional cooperation to 
cosmopolitan internationalism. These wider versions of morality are theoretically 
compatible with the sociogenic narrative typical of the baseline situation 
Bandura describes supra, but as is the case in IR constructivism awareness of the 
contingency of their origin is problematic. Tacit acknowledgement of a socially 
engineered and socially-driven process of internalization detracts from a full 
sense of agency; the left hand cannot know what the right hand is doing (Bateson 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Compare with Plato’s Ring of Gyges example. 
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2004). In practice, such awareness is likely to limit ethical action to obligatory 
compliance to social norms motivated by the avoidance of external punishment. 
In contrast to this ethical situation, the immediacy of the moral situation 
has the potential to produce superogative acts, such as heroism or sacrifice, the 
motive of which goes beyond law or duty, reward or punishment. Though such 
actions are praised and role-modeled in news and fictional narrative, it is 
important to reiterate the claim from the first chapter that this kind of laudatory 
storytelling is a decentralized uncoordinated normative feature of societies. In fact, 
part of the hold of these stories on the psyche of their audience is precisely that 
their provenance is not entirely known and somewhat mythic. There are norms 
reinforcing humility for superogative act, military and civilian, underscoring that 
neither recognition nor actual reciprocity (“any of those guys would have done the 
same for me”) are motivating factors for the heroic act. 
Compare this principle of hypothetical reciprocity with the motive of 
expected reciprocity: the giving-to-get of so-called “rule utilitarianism”. Like the 
motive of maintaining psychic integrity or political stasis in Bandura’s scheme, 
each is indirectly self-interested and thus something less than purely moral. To 
be deemed moral, it is not that an act needs to be sacrificial or altruistic. An 
intermediate position might prescribe ordering one’s interests to accommodate 
those of others without the foreseeable benefit of reciprocity. Thus, behaviors are 
moral to the extent that they are inspired by recognition of others’ inherent 
worth and wellbeing, with any short- or long-term cost or benefit being 
incidental to the act (Bagnoli 2013). This obligation has been conceived positively 
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in liberal political theory as a matter of equal individual desert, right, or 
entitlement. Such a view privileges theoretical equality but has been criticized as 
too artificially atomistic to describe humans’ lived experience of obligation and 
care, which is concentrated in natural dependence relationships, with parent, 
sibling, and cousin, for example (Gilligan 1993, Noddings 1984, Harman 2011).39 
 
Expansion and contraction of disengagement mechanisms 
Returning to the terms of our proposed formula, moral disengagement 
works by deactivating the discriminatory capacity that enables r to recognize:  
 
1. him/herself as a rational agent, who is responsible for his/her actions by 
virtue of his/her freedom 
 
2. p’s equal freedom, rationality, responsibility, and the q quality of 
innocence (his/her not having willfully violated the same) 
 
3. the convergence of these statuses, self and other, in moral situation s 
demanding duty o, which connects action in accordance with the moral 
code back to r‘s self-conception. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 It is not coincidental that the same civilization credited with democracy and the 
city is also credited with expanding the features of these natural relationships to 
social relationships of friendship and education in the enlargement of the self 
that Aristotle describes:  
 
The excellent person is related to his friend in the same way as he is 
related to himself, since, a friend is another self; and therefore, just 
as his own being is choiceworthy for him, the friend's being is 
choice-worthy for him in the same or a similar way. We agreed that 
someone’s being is choiceworthy because he perceives that he is 
good, and this sort of perception is pleasant in itself. He must, then, 
perceive his friend’s being [together with his own], and he will do 
this if they live together and share rational discourse (logos) and 
thought (quoted in Irwin “Self-Love and Altruism”, 1989: 391-392). 
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Already evident in Bandura’s 1975 study is a feature that would become 
salient in Bandura’s later work: the doubly dangerous effect of dehumanization. 
Denying the personhood of another (-p) not only deactivates the self-censorship 
of existing moral codes (that would apply to humanized subjects), but activates 
self-reward centers by reframing them as the appropriate object of aggression and 
deserving of punishment. Rather than masking or altering an existing moral code, 
dehumanization seems to work through the substitution of an alternative ‘moral’ 
code o’ (o prime) under which escalated punitiveness is not only permissible, but 
praiseworthy. Bandura notes the crucial contrast with Milgram’s findings on the 
transfer of agency: “In studies of obedient aggression people are commanded to 
behave punitively. Here, participants escalated their punitiveness on their own” 
(268). 
Bandura eventually elaborated these two distinct diffusive and 
dehumanizing mechanisms to eight to better explain disengagement. Figure One 
depicts the eight mechanisms of moral engagement and the four points in 
cognition at which they are operative. While I do not debate the existence or even 
exhaustiveness of these eight, I contend that they are still perhaps better 
understood as two species of the first “‘moral’ justification” mechanism. In the 
same manner that each of the eight just war criteria relies on a root just cause — 
itself predicated on the moral principle of autonomy or personhood — each of 
the disengagement mechanisms follow from a ‘moral’ justification of this 
principle’s violation (by p) or forfeiture (by the agent). 
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Figure One: Bandura, A. (1991). Sociocognitive theory of moral thought and 
action in Kurtines & Gewirtz (Eds.) Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development 
 
To explain, it is helpful to summarize the four subgroups comprising 
different strategies of justification, the purpose of each of which is to avoid self-
condemnation by making an otherwise unacceptable act, acceptable (Bandura, 
Barbarnaelli, Capara & Pastorelli 1996): 
 
I. Reconstrue the conduct (1. ‘moral’ justification, 2. euphemistic 
labeling, 3. advantageous comparison) 
 
II. Obscure personal causal agency (4. diffusion, and 5. displacement 
of responsibility) 
 
III. Misrepresent or disregard the injurious consequences (6.) 
 
IV. Vilify recipients (7. dehumanizing or 8. blaming victims). 
 
 
Each of these modes of cognitive restructuring corresponds to one aspect of the 
minimalist “do no harm” ethic that Bandura espouses. 
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“Cognitive restructuring”, perhaps sounds grander than it need. Instead, I 
submit, each of the four groups can be thought of as emphasizing a different 
word of the four-word claim, “I’m–not–harming–them”. It is this kind of claim 
that allows prospective actions to slide past censorship mechanisms of 
internalized codes with one’s self-worth intact. The most straight-ahead 
cognitive–linguistic strategy to bypass inhibitive triggers is the negation, “not”, 
corresponding to Roman numeral I. above. ”Being economical with the truth”, 
for example, is a euphemistic way of saying to oneself, “I’m not lying.” The 
commonplaces, “People do it all the time”, and “It’s not like I’m killing anybody” 
are examples of advantageous comparisons, which provide deniability or doubt 
that the behavior in question is in fact deviant. 
The items in the second set (II.) downplay the responsibility of the first 
person “I” by permitting the participant to believe there is no violation of the 
moral principle that individuals ought not harm each other. This is accomplished 
by reframing s as a political rather than a moral situation. The implicit utilitarian 
corollary is the ‘moral’ justification that political institutions or authorities cannot 
avoid harming some in the pursuit of good for most. Whether on the majority or 
minority side of this proposition, individual agency is melted down into that of 
the crowd, institution, or nation (diffusion), vanishing under the moral weight of 
authority and necessity (displacement). These mechanisms, and the 
minimization of costs (III.) are each expressly utilitarian justifications since they 
relativize ‘harm’ and the agent’s relationship to it. Through creative moral 
calculus, one can fulfill the agent-universal maxim that the costs of an action 
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ought not outweigh the benefits. This is accomplished by reframing harm as a 
net good, as expressed in commonplaces such as “It’s not that bad”, or “They’ll 
be better for it in the long run.”  
Of course, these rationalizations violate an agent’s autonomous right to 
make most such determinations for him- or herself, which leads to the final 
category (IV): rights are forfeited if the agent is no longer considered as an agent. 
If only humans, or innocent persons (q), are entitled to such rights, one justifies 
skirting the “them” in the phrase “I’m–not–harming–them” by negating one or 
both of these. In this way, dehumanization is the last, and most overt 
disengagement mechanism. 
While the preceding ‘moral’ justifications subtly alter permissions by re-
categorizing the act and/or diminishing one’s agency so that it is a) not a 
violation (a morally neutral act), or b) less selfish, egoistic, or arbitrary than it 
appears, my claim is that the outright denial of another’s agentic status is a 
qualitatively different kind of ‘moral’ justification. The interpolation of a 
spurious ‘moral’ principle like, “the wicked must be punished”, for an authentic 
maxim like, “intentionally harm no innocent” is proactive, not just disinhibitive, 
incentivizing the transgressive act as charitable, even selfless.  
By placing it first, and discussing its combination with other mechanisms, 
Bandura sets up ‘moral’ justification as the primary mechanism of moral 
disengagement. He nowhere entertains an authentic moral justification, because 
his premise is that “do no harm” is exhaustive of ethics. This invites the 
interpretation that engagement is achieved by inverting disengagement 
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mechanisms (Malley-Morrison, Oh, Wu & Zaveri 2009). Thus, dehumanization 
becomes humanization (1990: 186); blaming the victim becomes exoneration; 
diffusion and displacement of moral responsibility become infusion and 
augmentation of agency (o) (1986, 1989); euphemistic language, minimization of 
consequences, and advantageous comparison are supplanted by honesty and 
precision in prediction, et cetera. 
These processes are presumed to help resist disengagement but without a 
positive conception of moral justification and the principles upon which it 
proceeds, they are insufficient to constitute moral engagement. One indication of 
this insufficiency is the foreclosure of engagement to those for whom the use of 
force is a duty. Putting the presumption the other way round makes it more 
provocative: those guardians who are responsible for security — the necessity 
that makes possible the good, on the oldest political theoretical account — are on 
Bandura’s definition, guilty of ‘morally’ justifying, if not promoting moral 
disengagement. He uses the example of military indoctrination, by which 
civilians are transformed into soldiers through the cognitive reconstrual of the 
act of killing ‘bad guys’ as service to God and country (1991: 163).40 The 
revaluation that often occurred as a survival mechanism to avoid cognitive 
dissonance in combat contexts was well documented by this point in the post-
Vietnam era (Kelman 1973, Sanford & Comstock 1971), though the effects upon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Augustine recommended a similar reconstrual when we suggested that the 
Christian faith demanded certain kinds of killing, rather than prohibiting all killing 
as early conscientious objectors and church fathers had supposed. 
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reintegration into civilian life were not. Bandura says of this phenomenon of re-
socialization, 
 
Through moral sanction of violent means, people see themselves as 
fighting ruthless oppressors who have an unquenchable appetite 
for conquest, protecting their cherished values and way of life, 
preserving world peace, saving humanity from subjugation to an 
evil ideology, and honoring their country’s international 
commitments (1991:163).  
 
Though Bandura means these adjectives to flag spurious or ‘moral’ justifications 
for killing, the difficulty is that each has authentic moral content, is supported by 
international law, and most are, in Kant’s terms, universizable as maxims for 
action. This does not mean, as Bandura seems to assume, that they could or 
should be treated as moral absolutes and thereby used an excuse to wage 
aggressive war or intentionally imperil innocent civilians. As they appear, each 
conceivably constitutes either just cause (other-defense, self-defense, 
humanitarian intervention) or is otherwise consistent with the UN Charter 
(collective security and fulfilling treaty obligation). Though each, like any such 
warrant, is subject to abuse, the principles articulated in the rest of just war 
doctrine clearly delineate when, where, and upon whom they may permissibly 
be used as justification to kill. 
 Bandura warns in his later entry on this topic,  “Moral Disengagement In 
The Perpetration Of Inhumanities”, “Just war tenets were devised to specify 
when the use of violent force is morally justified. However, given people’s 
dexterous facility for justifying violent means all kinds of inhumanities get 
clothed in moral wrappings” (1999). Bandura’s category error conflating the 
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violence of ‘war’ with the violence of ‘terror’ leads him to confuse ‘moral’ for 
moral. Both might ‘morally’ justify their ends as a matter of military necessity; 
both might end in the death of civilians; the non-trivial difference that after the 
institutionalization of the war convention, participants in war are clearly 
identified and therefore required to attend to the rules limiting targeting and 
treatment of combatants and noncombatants alike. Terrorism is defined by 
making no such distinctions. It is true that war can devolve into terror bombing 
and other totalizing tactics, but these are precisely the morally impermissible 
scenarios that just war doctrine was painstakingly compiled to avoid through jus 
ad bellum and which it actively indicts through jus in bello. 
Another source of interdisciplinary misunderstanding is the term 
‘aggression’. Bandura follows convention in psychology in using this term to 
describe unprovoked outward violence. In international law, however, this is a 
technical term defined as the initiation of hostilities through an act of war, such 
as violation of national sovereignty, or immanent threat thereof. Lumping the 
technical category of aggression into the contested term ‘violence’ leads to the 
false assertion that violent acts are never morally permissible, as Bandura implies 
when he writes,  
 
The task of making violence morally defensible is facilitated when 
nonviolent options are judged to have been ineffective, and 
utilitarian justifications portray the suffering caused by violent 
counterattacks as greatly outweighed by the human suffering 
inflicted by the foe. 
Over the years, much reprehensible and destructive conduct has 
been perpetrated by ordinary, decent people in the name of 
religious principles, righteous ideologies, and nationalistic 
imperatives. Throughout history countless people have suffered at 
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the hands of self-righteous crusaders bent on stamping out what 
they consider evil. (1991: 164). 
 
While noting the difference in effect, Bandura does not make explicit the 
qualitative disinhibitory difference between these two major mechanisms of 
‘moral’ justification inhabiting a single moral disengagement framework. The 
first diffusive variety operates via the unconscious blocking of empathic 
controls through rationalizations, which function not by denying harm, but by 
denying responsibility for harm. These utilitarian-style justifications are agent-
neutral in form, disinhibiting by marginalizing or negating r’s own 
agency/responsibility/freedom relative to situation s, so that it does not meet 
the threshold of “moral” that would demand o duties.  
As a reminder, the general formula for moral codes proposed: ‘p’ is a 
person, with ‘q’ qualities, to whom any free and rational agent ‘r’ owes ‘o’ rights, 
together making ethical situation ‘s’. Activation of these codes requires 
recognition of each term in this cognitive circuit: 
 
1) oneself as r 
 
2) the equation p + q = s 
 
3) the applicability of syllogism, ‘If s, then o’ with caveat (3b) -o = -r  
(neglecting one’s duty à dissonance, remorse, self-sanction) 
  
 
The key feature of utilitarian rationales is that they clear the way to some good, 
real or imagined, to which o would usually be a barrier. This calculus is similar to 
the weighting exercise that happens in any (non-moral) cost-benefit analysis, but 
with the rights and interests of individuals conflated with larger units — society, 
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company, military, state, humanity — as required. This process is conscious, and 
is in that sense, rational. However, because ‘interest’ is entirely fungible, 
depending on unit of analysis and term (immediate, short, long, afterlife), its 
calculus is arbitrary and morally relativistic. 
If the first justification lowers barriers to participation in systemic violence, 
turning the self-regulatory traffic light from red to yellow, the second variety of 
‘moral’ justification turns it green by incentivizing transgression. It does so 
though the opposite justificatory mechanism: embracing agency/efficacy by 
denying harm and embracing responsibility for punitive acts. One’s sense of 
agency is enhanced by believing that s/he is the agent r’ (r prime) of right. Where 
the first set of agent-neutral mechanisms work within the utilitarian context of 
maximizing good(s), this latter is concerned less with odds or outcome than with 
a perversion of the traditionally moral rubric, righteousness of cause.  
Transgressive behavior in service of an ostensibly noble cause can pass 
through individuals’ self-censorship mechanism when p, q, and/or s are negated 
or restructured, calling for a different moral code o’ such as sacrificial duty or 
obedience to group, rather than respect for rights. Construing party p as 
responsible for some harm changes the relevant quality q of that person or group 
from ‘innocent’ to ‘blameworthy’, denying their candidacy for moral duty o. 
Inverting the image of victim to victimizer permits harming the harmer, while 
negating his or her personhood entirely (-p) through selective scientific or 
historical narrative or outright racism, for example, brackets q entirely, and 
makes hateful acts part of r prime’s identity and self-reward center. 
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The similarity of the language used in this second pseudo-deontological 
mechanism of moral disengagement to the deontological conception of morality, 
makes Bandura profoundly skeptical of concepts like ‘right’, ‘duty’, and ‘justice’ 
and its cognate, ‘justification’. Bandura’s fear is understandable; victim-blaming 
and dehumanization are not so much a “deactivation” of the self-regulatory 
behavioral system as a hijacking, or in Bandura’s phrasing, “Acting on moral or 
ideological imperatives reflects a conscious offense mechanism not an 
unconscious defense mechanism” (1990: 163). But to arrive here is a longer, less 
conscious process that requires its own sort of socialization, usually “conducted 
within a communal milieu of intense interpersonal influences insulated from 
mainstream social life.” Recruits for gangs or terror groups “become deeply 
immersed in the ideology and role performances of the group” (1991:187) with 
repeated exposure to hateful jokes, songs, stories, rituals, or media (neo-Nazi 
death metal, racist hooligan chants, or jihadi websites, for example).  
Bandura refers to each disengagement mechanism as a deactivation 
“strategy” in the research context, as if to insinuate somehow intentional on the 
part of the agent. His later work makes clear that it is rather political 
“powerholders” that deploy these strategies of disengagement to justify state 
violence abroad. These are usually the ‘yellow’ utilitarian variety, but in the rare 
‘green’ cases, government or military agents convince citizens to turn on enemies, 
as in the case of Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda, Hutu-controlled radio that 
sparked the Rwandan genocide, or Serbian cartoons dehumanizing former 
Yugoslav countrymen. Elsewhere in Bandura’s research and writing, the yellow 
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utilitarian mechanisms seem systemic and agentless, more like a disease than a 
weapon, under whose influence subjects “may not fully recognize the 
transformation they are undergoing” (“Gradualistic Moral Disengagement” 
1990: 187). These older, subtler prejudices are also politically manipulable, 
however, as illustrated in Russian media bombast over fascism in the current 
Ukraine crisis. 
The diagnostic distinction between yellow and green disengagement 
becomes hugely important in answering the political question, “What is to be 
done?”, as well as in formulating the research question, “Which groups are most 
prone to moral disengagement?” discussed next chapter. To the political 
question first: embracing agency for deleterious acts is reminiscent of the 
justificatory mechanism discussed earlier in the contexts of political evil, holy 
war, and ideological warfare. Reversing the roles of victim and aggressor 
facilitates exonerative ‘proactive’ violence that can masquerade as necessary for 
preservation or purification, but is more preventative than genuinely protective 
(1990: 167). At its most delusional, the perpetrator conceives of him- or herself as 
a nemesis — an agent (r’) of cosmic justice, divine wrath, or species preservation 
(Hoffer 2010). Though the source in these cases is sociogenic, dehumanization 
can result in the same cognitive empathy deficit as observed in (biogenic) cases 
of psycho- and sociopathology.41  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The neurological structures underpinning the kind of cognitions associated 
with sociopathy have been confirmed in recent research by analyzing PET/MRI 
scans of thousands of inmates convicted of violent crime, including hundreds of 
serial killers who exhibit abnormally low activity in the orbital cortex, the area of 
the brain believed to be responsible for ethical behavior, moral judgment, and 
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Once diagnosed, political evil, like mental illness, should be a serious 
enough condition as to require intervention for the health and safety of the 
subject and international society. However, to be legitimate, per just war theory, 
such intervention could not be undertaken without the consent from the affected 
parties, at least until that madness results in aggression or credible threat thereof 
(the case of North Korea comes to mind). Since the home populace of the 
intervening nation(s) is also affected by any intervention in their name, 
recognition of just cause on their part of requires citizen engagement. However, 
adequate political and historical knowledge is often lacking.  
As mentioned, Bandura says precious little positively about engagement 
mechanisms, besides general endorsements of humanization, agency, and 
balanced analysis. Insofar as these are used to formulate better policy, and build 
cultures of peace, they are useful in resisting moral disengagement. It is less clear 
that they are sufficient to build up the critical faculties of prudence and moral 
judgment so central to both the democratic measure of informed public consent, 
and the republican measure of sound-minded representatives capable of serving 
the common good. In combination, these expressions of citizen political and 
moral engagement are capable of distinguishing spurious from justified 
interventions and uses of force. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
impulse control, and relatively high activity in the amygdala, the seat of 
aggression and appetites (Hagerty, 2010a). This was correlated in some cases 
with twelve genes that have been associated with violence (Hagerty, 2010b) but 
the researcher noted that these genetic and neurological predispositions were 
only significant in the presence of the ‘trigger’ of childhood abuse. 
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In the clash of cultural, religious, and political systems, engagement 
processes can be surreptitiously stifled by potential beneficiaries (yellow) or 
actively reversed by ideologues (green). The calculative rational self-interest of 
the former permits a bending of ethical practices; the calculative irrationality of 
the latter facilitates their breaking, suspension, or reversal. My purpose in 
identifying these two qualitatively different disengagement mechanisms of 
‘moral’ justification is to illustrate the danger of their conflation. Bandura and 
followers’ political and moral skepticism tends to generalize from the latter 
scenario to the former. This has the effect of giving leaders too much credit for 
their hypercompetence in controlling public opinion and the policy process, and 
too little credit for their own ethical and religious beliefs. 
The converse is also true: portrayals of moral engagement in social 
psychological peace research describe a gullible public, lacking the competence 
or discernment for moral judgment. Cynics since Machiavelli have taken this 
asymmetry or inequality between elites and public to be a truism of politics. 
Whereas this sort of elitism was previously used as license for pragmatism and 
realpolitik, public gullibility and poor moral judgment in conjunction with the 
presumption of political/elite depravity (bad F, not evil D) is also used by those 
on the side of peace to condemn any suggestion of the use of force as either ill-
conceived or disingenuous. 
A secondary effect of the moral–political skepticism following from the 
conflation in justificatory types is the tendency to bracket larger questions of 
responsibility in historical and political change that might be demanded under 
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condition D as part of agency (r). So long as it does not jeopardize one’s existing 
commitments and obligations, there is an imperfect ‘private’ or personal moral 
duty to aid. Under the just war parameters articulated in the second chapter, 
there exists an imperfect duty to prevent or end aggression, so long as it is as a 
last resort and declared with right intention by the legitimate authority. Its 
recognized function in contemporary international humanitarian law and 
convention is to protect, not to punish. Though PS may be right to point out that 
the intention which divides these is not easily measurable, standards of 
proportionality that divide protection from punishment are amenable to 
verification. 
In summary, necessary ‘violence’ is not in the same category as violence or 
“aggression” as Bandura conceives it, and is consistent with the ethic and 
tradition of nonviolence to which he subscribes (2001: 15, 2002b, 227). To quote 
an expert on the subject, “Taking life may be a duty…Suppose a man runs amok 
and goes furiously about, sword in hand, and killing anyone that comes in his 
way, and no one dares capture him alive. Anyone who dispatches this lunatic 
will earn the gratitude of the community and be regarded as a benevolent man 
(Gandhi in The Hindu Newspaper [1926], quoted in Fischer 2010: 269).42 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 It is important to note that a consistent philosophy of nonviolence (ahimsa) 
requires certain conditions to be met beyond dispatching of the evildoer: 
 
1. One must act as far as possible without anger or fear. One must harbor no 
hatred of the deranged party. Even lunatics are people. 
 
2. One must not complain if one is injured in the process. Life will not 
always appear fair to our limited vision. 
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Humanitarian utilitarianism, deontology, and doubt 
For sociogenic conceptions of morality like Bandura’s, humans’ facility for 
“cognitive reconstrual”, intentional and unintentional misrepresentation of value 
and permissibility, is the greatest threat to society. This is primarily an internal 
threat — a national challenge, rather than international. I have been suggesting 
that moral disengagement is a two-tiered threat featuring qualitatively different 
varieties of justification and recommending divergent43 ethical and policy 
prescriptions. 
What specifically does moral engagement demand of us, individually and 
collectively? From a practical perspective, the problems to be addressed are: 
 
1. Utilitarian [yellow] ‘moral’ justifications, which allow agents to 
misrepresent the terms and scope of moral calculus (the relevant group 
and timeframe, respectively) in a way that privileges the short-term 
interest of self, faith, firm, tribe or country over another such and/or 
over agents’ shared longer-term environmental/species interest. 
Reformulates potentially mutually beneficial reciprocal relationships 
as zero-sum.  
 
2. Pseudo-deontological [green] ‘moral’ justifications, which misappropriate 
agent-relative moral codes to exclude, rather than include, or harm 
rather than protect. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. One must not feel that she has solved the problem once the maddened 
person is successfully stopped and innocents protected. Instead, one must 
dedicate some serious time and effort, to asking how we have created a 
world where this can happen — and how to change it (Paige, 2007). 
 
43 “Divergent” is a technical term in psychology, which Oxford defines as “using a 
variety of premises, especially unfamiliar premises, as bases for inferences, and 
avoiding common limiting assumptions in making deductions.”  
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The most obvious prescriptive antidote to narrow utilitarianism is to broaden it 
to humanitarian utilitarianism, of the kind espoused by ethicist Peter Singer 
(Appiah 2006).44 Sociogenic in the largest possible sense, the normative unit of 
analysis is ‘species’, and correct perspective, the longest predictable. This seems a 
reasonable enough position, and has assent from the biogenic crowd (Wilson 
2004). But insofar as it preserves an agent-neutral view of individual choice, it is 
incompatible with the tenets of liberal democracy and untenable as a political 
philosophy. 
As importantly, the breadth of humanitarian utilitarianism makes it 
impracticable as a personal maxim for action, with the private self completely 
subsumed into a public self. As cosmopolitan political philosopher Anthony 
Appiah argues, doing the best for the most with each action is a worthy 
aspiration, but taking into account the good of all in every decision defies any 
sensible definition of individual rational agency, and would be destructive of 
identity. Appiah persuasively lays out the cosmopolitan alternative, whose moral 
principles are no less universal but miles more attainable (2006: 158–169).45 Rather 
than giving the good (for the most) a claim similar to that of right, Appiah, like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Though Singer goes further in extending o duties to non-rational agents that are 
nonetheless sentient, which includes most animals. 
45 Appiah suggests replacing Singer’s principle: 
 
If you can prevent something bad from happening at the cost of something less 
bad, you ought to do it (2006: 160) 
 
with what I’ll call “Appiah’s principle”:  
 
If you are the person in the best position to prevent something really awful, 
and it won’t cost you much to do so, do it (2006: 163). 
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Kant, treats the political and moral as separate but balanceable features of the 
human experience. 
As for pseudo-deontological justifications, Bandura would rephrase 
“misappropriation of agent-relative moral codes” in number 2. above to read 
“appropriation”, since on his view, any authentic moral justification would be 
agent-universal (and all agent-relative formulations would be appropriations — 
in other words, there is no substantial difference between deontological and 
pseudo-deontological). The only duties are to “do no harm” and to not pursue 
goods inconsistent with the agreed/political good for the most (or at least accept 
punishment or censure if one does, per Plato’s Gyges example). From the 
absolute humanitarian perspective, irrationalist faiths and rationalist creeds 
(deontology proper) that argue otherwise might have had an historical, social 
evolutionary use but are antiquated and ethnocentric in a post-Enlightenment 
globalizing age; they are part of the problem, rather than the solution (Bandura 
1991, Wilson 2004, Harris 2004).  
Whether deontological or pseudo-deontological, Bandura believes that 
any non-consequentialist understanding of good or right that is universalist but 
agent-relative serves to obfuscate the only agreeable (humanitarian utilitarian) 
‘good’, abetting actors in their intent to deceive. However, without the 
‘essentialist’ idea or ‘foundationalist’ belief that there is such as thing as authentic 
moral principle/moral justifications (such as, “intending to deceive is wrong”), 
judgments that pretend to universality remain relative to social context, 
culturally circumscribed language games on the shifting ground of consensus. 
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The problems humanity faces are not circumscribed in this manner, but 
are international. In the same way that just war theorist Michael Walzer 
describes he and fellow anti-war protesters having borrowed the language of just 
war theory to justify their positions during its resurgence in the Vietnam era, 
Bandura’s repeated use of the word “moral” unironically (as in the moral 
standards that moral disengagement works upon) in the context of criticizing 
‘moral’ justifications of both kinds affirms the following principle: even in the 
most divisive discursive climates, behind passionate disagreement about the 
priority of principles and values, there is often tacit agreement about the ‘menu’ 
of values. 
Beyond or behind the zero-sum framing of ‘war’ or ‘not war’, 
‘interventionism’ or ‘noninterventionism’, there are substantive debates to be had 
about individual cases, the merits of which depend on the relative emphasis of 
the principles dictating national priorities. That such civil discourse is possible — 
that there is sufficient minimum agreement or recognition to permit meaningful 
conversation — is a procedural point of substantive moral significance. The 
courage to share and the tolerance to listen are pluralistic values that underpin 
the normative backdrop of civilization: reciprocity born of recognition of equality 
(Locke 1980, Habermas 2001b). As Thucydides illustrated through the example of 
Diodotus in Chapter One, civil arguments about the good are a good, if not the 
good to which human societies aspire. 
In that chapter, I referred to this essentially cooperative feature of human 
political and philosophic association as constitutive of discourse ethical 
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constructivism. The idea, reaffirmed in Arendt’s epigram last chapter, is that 
communication persists even amidst even radical difference. When compared 
with Bandura’s position (F), Arendt’s conception of the relationship between 
normative discursive political philosophy and evil (D) is illustrative of the 
disciplinary divide. Bandura’s conception of politics is quite common on the 
political left: an essentially contested space in which self-interested elites keep a 
public in thrall with different forms of irrationalism. The modern challenge of 
social and political change, then, is to wrest democratic control of the institutions 
responsible for socialization and slowly reform them to be more humane. It is not 
enough to fight disengagement; reform requires engagement. 
By Arendt’s lights, the essentially contested space is the self. In modernity, 
the challenge is not to be a rational person, but to be a thinking person. Thinking 
is in this case the prerequisite for speaking out — the activity that enables 
resistance to unthinking forms of national life that inhabit ideological extremes, 
patriotic moralism or knee-jerk isolationism. Even if a majority were to eschew 
irrationality, as Bandura describes it, ‘rational’ conflict would persist: the 
‘asymmetry’, or material inequality between public and elites, regularly 
motivates individuals to rationalize transgressive behavior to get ahead (Detert, 
Treviño & Sweitzer 2008, Horowitz 2002, Samuelson 2006, Seglin 2006). More 
importantly, then, is the struggle in individual psyches’ over the prioritization of 
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different kinds of value. Envy is no less irrational, and no less innate, than evil 
(Fukuyama 1992).46 
This tension or division in the self is unthinkable for Bandura. PS faith in 
human rationality is such that it rules out the possibility of self-deception: 
 
Because of the incompatibility of being simultaneously a deceiver 
and the one deceived, literal self-deception cannot exist (Bok 1980; 
Champlin 1977; Haight 1980). It is logically impossible to deceive 
oneself into believing something, while simultaneously knowing it 
to be false. Efforts to resolve the paradox of how one can be the 
agent and the object of deception at the same time have been met 
with little success (Bandura 1986). These attempts usually involve 
creating split selves and rendering one of them unconscious. The 
split-conceptions fail to specify how a conscious self can lie to an 
unconscious self without some awareness of what the other self-believes. 
The deceiving self has to be aware of what the deceived self believes in 
order to know what kind of deceptions to concoct (1990: 190; emphasis 
added; citations Bandura’s). 
 
 
On first read, this has an air of sensibility. But as a rebuttal of philosophic or ‘folk’ 
explanations of self-deception, it quite literally leaves something to be desired. 
The italicized portion states the case as if the self, subjectivity itself, were an 
objective phenomenon, to which a meaningful correspondence theory of truth 
applied. The problem with this notion of selfhood is that it makes not only 
deception, but any change in mind or opinion reliant on outside/extrinsic 
principles that are derivatively if not directly social. The pertinent question, then, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Rousseau differed on this point, citing asymmetry in the original contract and 
the concentration of individuals in cities as the origin of vices like envy (i.e. vice, 
but not virtue, is sociogenic). Though inequality is the original social fact for 
Rousseau, he leaves open the possibility that human compassion and individual 
autonomy could ‘catch up’ in the equality of a well-arranged (just) nation or city-
state. International inequality, and therefore international strife, however, would 
persist. 
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pertains less the thing to be believed, as the act of believing. It may be “logically 
impossible” to deceive oneself but it is not impossible, because, as the earlier 
exposition of incontinence made clear, deception is not simply a matter of 
misinformation. 
Bandura continues this passage, “Different levels of awareness are 
sometimes proposed as another possible solution. It is said that ‘deep down’ 
people really know what they believe. Reacquainting the split selves only 
reinstates the paradox” (1990: 190). On a sociogenic view there is no “deep down” 
self apart from earliest or strongest socialization. But this does not avoid the 
question for an existing human being: what principle, what faculty orders or 
prioritizes the several ‘voices’ they do hear — the elements of group socialization 
and the residua of conflicting normative accounts that echo throughout any 
modern social context.  
Whatever the most persistent or persuasive of these influences, there 
remains the question for Arendt’s thinking person: in what sense is that voice, 
that idea theirs, and not just the victory of the strongest outside influence of any 
moment? At what point can one call this voice internal and not merely 
internalized? If there is only the latter, identifying the “strongest” influence as the 
most rational or best requires an ancillary belief in the principles governing the 
marketplace of ideas in public and historical deliberation. Kant, Appiah, and 
Arendt’s accounts connect certain principles that are the object of consensus back 
to legitimate authority but each is clear that it is not consensus that gives them 
authority but vice versa. 
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Even if one suspects, as Bandura does, that there is no ‘inside’ voice — 
that ‘intuition’ or ‘conscience’ are useful fictions naming the consensus that is 
internalized via socialization — this by no means eliminates the human 
experience of doubt. Two forms of self-deception are still possible: 1) ignoring 
doubt when one has reason to suspect the received wisdom or law is incorrect, 
and 2) giving in to doubt when one suspects instead that the received wisdom 
might be correct. In the first case, doubt implies a higher authority than fallible 
positivist justice; thus, to ignore doubt is to risk tolerating injustice and 
promoting moral disengagement. In the second case, doubt gnaws away at 
legitimate consensus via the temptation of self- or group interest. 
Clearly, doubt can be an agent of either moral engagement or 
disengagement, depending on what is being doubted and on what principle. It is 
as if one needs a sort of faith or faculty to know when to exercise skepticism and 
when to exorcise skepticism. Accounting for why one wants or believes what it is 
s/he thinks they want or believe depends on a ‘third point’ — an ordering 
principle by which one can make sense of the experience of wanting or believing 
more than one thing, and then reconcile them in non-arbitrary decisions. The 
metatheoretical issue between ethical cognitivism and noncognitivism is the 
existence and (normative) significance of this third thing — a principle of reason 
or faculty of moral judgment (Heidegger 1996, Arendt 2005). 
Positing certainty or perfect information in this reconciliation process is 
also a sort of self-deception, one that instantiates, rather than resolves, the 
paradox of split selfhood. Yet Bandura seems to imply such an idealized unity in 
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his description of the opposite condition. In the concluding sentences on the 
impossibility of self-deception, he claims  
 
People, of course, often misconstrue events, they lead themselves 
astray by their biases and misbeliefs, and they act uninformedly. 
However, to be misdirected by one’s beliefs or ignorance does not 
mean one is lying to oneself…Staunch believers often choose not to 
waste their time scrutinizing opposing arguments or evidence 
because they are already convinced of their fallacy. When 
confronted with evidence that disputes their beliefs, they question 
its credibility, dismiss its relevance, or twist it to fit their views 
(1990: 190).   
 
This description divulges an implicit split just as it is denying the very possibility 
of one: that between the ‘given’ self and that which desires to not be deceived, to 
have perfect information, to possess true beliefs and a view identical with the 
relevant moral perspective. More modestly, one might wish to have their action 
governed by the relevant moral principle, though this still affirms the moral 
cognitivist view that there is a true referent, or a state of being according to this 
wish.  
If not purely the product of education or socialization, nor preexisting 
“deep down”, the remaining hope is that the dictates of this ‘higher’ or better self 
are accessible through contemplative introspection. Bandura views that which is 
not conscious as not reliable; there, there be dragons. Instead, he suggests 
resisting obvious deceivers (!) and praises skeptical scientific fallibilism that 
seeks “compellingly persuasive evidence” to refute currently held beliefs. 
Though it may be a similar desire to know that drives inquiry and introspection, 
it is not clear that moral knowledge is available to one or the other independently. 
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Philosophers from Socrates to Nietzsche and Kierkegaard to Heidegger have 
demonstrated that pursuing knowledge of normativity and its ground can lead 
one outside the safety of the norm, perhaps even outside its definition of pro-
social. 
If instead one treats certainty as normative, as noncognitivists do, 
inferring that every human thing, even the last ‘deciding’ voice, is socially 
derivative, this is still not eliminative of doubt. This is because there are at least 
two ‘rational’ responses to sociogenic theories of morality: 1) to question the 
content, if not the contingency of every maxim and moral code as tentative 
(moral skepticism or irrealism), or 2) to embrace a communitarian faith in the 
‘givenness’ of those practices belonging to one’s particular social, cultural, 
political, historical milieu as being ‘as good as’ truth. As an applied ethic, the 
relativism of the first position recommends legal positivism, and if consensus 
dictates, prosociality and pacifism. These positions are accommodative, until 
they are not, that is, until it becomes more rational from the perspective of a 
powerful actor or group of actors to emphasize the authority of that power or 
right over the authority of a majority and their tentative object of agreement.  
One example of a ‘rational’ alternative is the ‘love of one’s own’ 
characteristic of the second, communitarian response. However rational it might 
seem in its parsimony, its ‘natural’ attachment to group identity is ethically 
questionable, amounting to the justification of moral egoism writ large. While 
this option may enhance in-group cohesiveness per NB, it is inimical to out-
group (international) relations. This sort of patriotic moralism provides the same 
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‘moral’ justification/permission to bracket or question ethics’ applicability to 
international relations as foreign policy realism. The good of the nation is ‘as 
good as’ right, or justice.  
In sum, the two ethical alternatives left by Bandura’s PS premise are 
equally morally objectionable. Embedding moral sensibility, the faculty of 
judgment, and human rights in disparate socialization processes begs many of 
the same philosophic questions raised by the onto-epistemic premises of social 
science and psychology, from Durkheim to Freud: 
 
1. Questions of causal regress – If morality is a social product and 
moral arguments are persuasive due to the amount or type of 
socialization, what could it mean to have a conviction, persuade 
oneself, or change one’s mind? Can reasons for espousing or 
eschewing certain beliefs or values be objective or are they always 
socially constructed as well? 
 
2. Questions of judgment – Why do moral or legal arguments 
convince some, and similar but spurious ‘moral’ arguments, others, 
who are socialized into the same sociocultural value system? How 
do humans distinguish between rhetoric and reality, between 
language and concept? Is there a socialization process or value 
system attuned to this nuance that can break the hermeneutic 
circle? 
 
3. Questions of intention – Do leaders typically propagate ‘moral’ 
arguments cynically or might they believe them as well? Is self- or 
other-deception a sort of mental illness, and if so, is it the product 
or prerequisite of ideology? 
 
4. Questions of responsibility – How is blame apportioned between 
those who devise ‘moral’ justifications for violence, those who 
spread them, those who accept them, and those who act on them — 
that is, between Whig intellectuals, politicians, civilians, and 
soldiers and other functionaries?
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Chapter Five: 
 
Moral reasoning and just war theory in public opinion research 
 
 
But progressive values need not be vindicated by history — they need not 
be shown to be winning — in order to be kept alive. The holding of certain 
values by the historian does not require that history move toward those 
values, only that the historian try his best to move that way, whatever the 
actual flow of events. 
 
 -Howard Zinn, “The Historians”, The Politics of History 
 
The preceding chapter conducted moral philosophic exegeses of several 
underemphasized texts by the world’s most cited living psychologist 
(Haggbloom et al. 2002) and founder of social cognitive theory, Albert Bandura. 
These were undertaken to illustrate the ethical implications of Bandura’s theories 
of social learning, social cognition, and moral disengagement when applied to 
international and domestic politics. The critique extends to any approach sharing 
the onto-epistemic premises of positivism or materialism — what I have been 
referring to as PS (Positivistic–Sociogenic) and NB (Naturalistic–Biogenic).  
Some progress was made toward answering Bandura’s central question: 
How is it that people are convinced to tolerate and/or participate in mass 
violence? I distilled from his eight mechanisms of moral disengagement two 
kinds of justifications that individuals deploy in deactivating moral sanction, 
utilitarian and pseudo-deontological. My critique of these concluded that neither 
the difference between moral engagement and disengagement, nor the difference 
between the two forms of ‘moral’ justification can be reasonably reduced to the 
difference between rationality and irrationality (in ‘green’ pseudo-deontological 
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justifications), or irrationality and ignorance (in ‘yellow’ utilitarian justifications) 
as Bandura implies.  
Moral judgment to distinguish between authentic and spurious 
justifications was shown to require a third term such as a principle of individual 
autonomy, empathic belief in interdependence, Arendt’s “thinking” or Kant’s 
rational freedom. Conclusion (1) showed that positivist valorization of certainty, 
or dogmatic skepticism, neither obsolesces nor reliably replaces faith, belief, or 
duty (contra deontology), while (2) showed that faith in one’s group or society 
can mitigate doubt and facilitate smaller scale utilitarian ethics, but unduly limits 
rationality, morality, or both (contra cosmopolitanism). This exploration ended 
by raising several questions, which this chapter picks up in contrasting a neo-
Kantian cognitive structural approach to moral judgment with Bandura’s critique 
thereof. Using a similarly neo-Kantian starting part, I then present two heuristics 
to aid in social scientific judgment of individual ethical opinions. 
 
Pedagogies of peace and progress 
Before wading back into Bandura’s corpus is helpful to return to his main 
research question: Why do well-socialized people transgress social norms? 
Where many natural law thinkers relied on the concept of a noumenal conscience 
to anchor authority and regulate behavior, Bandura’s concept of self-regulation is 
closer to Freud’s super-ego. There is an important difference in that in Freud’s 
account the thing (ego) to be regulated is biogenic, not sociogenic: the self is 
naturally aggressive and prone to animalistic visceral, instinctive action or 
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reaction for the sake of self-preservation. While they agree this element of self is 
irrational, Freud’s complementary faculty is not pro-social rationalism, as it is for 
Bandura, but an even less rational id. Beyond irrational, the erotic id can be 
suicidal or worse, entwined as it is with the death instinct’s desire to obliterate 
the individuated self. Thus, while all civilized men and women exhibit a veneer 
of socialized rationality, psychoanalysis makes them all out to be a bit mad. The 
only ethical distinction to be made is between better and worse repressors; in the 
modern social political environment, obedience leads to preservation. Despite 
disparate premises about the source of aggression (NB versus PS), Bandura 
shares with Freud a sociogenic view of rationality/morality. His ethical 
distinction is similar to Freud’s: better and worse socialization, or the felicitous 
confluence of humane standards and a norm of obedience, is what leads to good 
behavior. 
Thus, in each case socialized humans carry with them internalized 
versions of ‘outside’ disciplinarians — a super-ego echoing the injunctions of 
God, parents, and/or society. In the repetition of this voice and confluence with 
reward, it comes to be identified with the ego and the behaviors and values they 
express come to be recognized as part of identity. In the transition from 
socialization to internalization, and adolescent to adult conceptions of self, this 
voice comes to be recognized as one’s own. Maintaining ‘cognitive consonance’47 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The phrase Bandura uses in the context of other theories of self-regulation is 
“discrepancy reduction system” through a “negative feedback control system”. 
His description of self-regulation in social cognitive theory adds the idea of 
“feedforward control” (as a complement of feedback) through which people not 
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of that self may no longer have the character of obedience, though it may remain 
difficult to ignore certain drives on the biogenic view, or social pressures on the 
sociogenic view, such as those advocating self-interest, or otherwise promoting 
moral disengagement. 
These accounts bear superficial similarity to Kant’s claim that maturity 
and freedom, if not enlightenment, are found through realizing autonomy, which 
he defines as self-legislation independent from outside sources of authority.48 As 
discussed, this liberty is not license; obedience to legitimate authorities respectful 
of this right is mandatory. To be legitimate, the regime should be deliberative, 
representative, and defend the rule of law. Analogously, the individual ‘rule of 
law’ prohibits pursuits of self-interest harmful of individuals or the public good. 
Integrity in resisting such pursuits is, or becomes, its own reward. For Kant as for 
Aristotle, happiness is an incidental outcome rather than a motive for fulfilling 
one’s duty, or acting in concert with the laws of one’s rational freedom. The 
distinction between this account of happiness, duty, and society differs 
fundamentally from that in NB, in which desire, drive, or instinct are operative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
only ascertain whether they are living up to their standards, but set new goals 
(1986: 49). 
48 This formulation is not unique to Kant. The opposition between self and society, 
structure and agent, resonates with thinkers from Rousseau to Emerson to 
Arendt: those agents’ claiming responsibility for their actions, and who recognize 
their ‘efficacy’, are to be contrasted with those who passively accept authority. 
Dependence (for Rousseau), reliance (for Emerson), obedience (for Thoreau) are 
all forms of self-abnegation (to use Nietzsche’s word) that perpetuate servitude, 
injustice, and, as Arendt observed, can imperil whole societies or civilizations if 
unchecked. 
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and to be civilized means to be discontent, having rationally ‘consented’ or 
contracted to substitute order and security for liberty (Freud 2010). 
In metaethical condition PS, by contrast, the proliferation of goods, social 
and material, in contemporary liberal democracy under capitalism socializes 
citizens into norms privileging the maximization of individual choice. Happiness 
is expected. This is not entirely passive internalization; Bandura would write 
later that socialization processes are reflexive. Breadth of choice is largely 
theoretical, not identical with one’s actual options as the distance between 
(procedural) equality under the law and substantive equality indicates (Miller 
2003, MacIntyre 1989). An individual’s ability to forge an identity is limited by 
material, socioeconomic constraints, and more importantly, by the degree to 
which these are genuinely reflexive. Though Bandura does not formulate it as 
such, ‘reflexivity’ is political — another word for ‘democratic responsiveness’ or 
‘accountability’. It corresponds to the degree to which citizens are individually 
and collectively able to influence the choices on offer (Miller 2003). 
Bandura’s social cognitive theory was meant to merge this idea of 
individual self-efficacy with insights from social learning theory such as the 
ability to infer, internalize, and improvise behavior along the line of the moral 
standards exhibited by role models, personally and vicariously. His chapter in 
the Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development, which lays out his “Social 
Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action” (1991), speaks of the 
importance of these codes or standards, 
 
Human morality is an issue of considerable import both 
	  	  
199 
individually and collectively. Internalization of a set of standards is 
integral to the achievement of self-directedness and a sense of 
continuity and purpose in one’s everyday life. In the absence of 
personal standards and the exercise of self-regulatory influence, 
people would behave like weathervanes, constantly shifting 
direction to conform with whatever is expedient. Many forms of 
behavior are personally advantageous but are detrimental to others 
or infringe on their rights. Without some consensual moral codes 
people would disregard each others’ rights and welfare whenever 
their desires come into social conflict (1991: 45; emphasis added). 
 
Here, Bandura derives Kantian principle from Hobbesean premise. The political 
need for order motivates the rationally self-interested choice to consent to a 
social contract, but rather than liberating individuals to “chase desire after 
desire”, it fulfills a more basic moral and psychological need to be free from the 
slavery to the passions that Hobbes and Freud describe, and embrace Kantian 
free agency and purposiveness.  
The authority and legitimacy of such a community, however, is not based 
on consent — a moral code, or any personal standard — but the rational capacity 
for each citizen to self-legislate. As Kant and Rousseau argued, the norm of 
egalitarian individualism is less an ‘internalization’ of a consensual moral code 
than an external expression of humans’ rational nature and freedom, the 
acknowledgement of which forms the original, unanimous consensus of the 
social contract. This change in emphasis makes all the difference in the normative 
significance of consensus in constructivism as well. It is, in short, the difference 
between an agent and a subject — between the compelling force of unanimity 
and the flimsiness that social science generally imputes to subjectivity. 
 Bandura repeats the following sentence in his publications like a mantra, 
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“Most of the recent psychological interest in the domain of morality has centered 
on analyses of moral thought. The conspicuous neglect of moral conduct reflects 
both the rationalistic bias of many theories of morality and the convenience of 
investigatory method…people suffer from the wrongs done to them however 
perpetrators might justify their inhumane action” (1991: 45). The fault is not 
Bandura’s for the equivocation on the word “justify”; the transformation of this 
concept and that of “rationalization” and “moralization” to mean their opposite 
is a well known phenomenon in normative discourse (Trosky, Malley-Morrison 
& Cantrell 2014). The “rationalistic bias” to which he refers is an accusation 
primarily leveled at developmental psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. Through 
several written and dialogical instruments, Kohlberg and students’ claimed to be 
able to ascertain respondent’s sophistication of moral reasoning. Bandura’s 
protest is that the quality of argument and knowledge of moral principle have 
very little to do with the cognitive mechanisms more directly responsible for 
individual and group behavior. 
 Kohlberg elaborated the stage theory of moral judgment pioneered by 
enormously influential neo-Kantian Swiss child psychologist Jean Piaget. As 
Bandura characterizes Kohlberg’s six stage sequential typology, humans’ 
maturing cognition maps onto a natural hierarchy of moral reasoning: 1) 
punishment-based obedience, 2) opportunistic self-interest, 3) approval-seeking 
conformity, 4) respect for authority, 5) contractual legalistic observance, and 6) 
principled morality based on standards of justice (Bandura 1991: 49–50).  
These stages divide into thirds with the first two ‘pre-conventional’ being 
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classed as consequentialist and self-oriented, the middle two ‘conventional’ and 
order-oriented, and the latter two ‘post-conventional’ as other- or justice 
oriented. Importantly, the immature egoism of the first two, pre-conventional 
stages is, by definition, not moral (Beitz 1999). Conventional ‘morality’ is better 
described as an ethos of obedience, since the principle of action comes from 
without. Bandura’s ‘legalistic’ phrasing of stage five applies more aptly to 
conventional morality; for Kohlberg, contractarianism (as distinct from 
contractualism) is premised not on dogmatic observance of the law but on the 
law’s recognition of the rights of others — a respect for others mediated by the 
law that has the potential to inspire proactive social acts, not just the avoidance 
of harm.  
 The misunderstanding is amplified in Bandura’s conception of stage six. 
To understand the gravity of the misunderstanding requires some background 
explanation. Bandura’s dissent centers on Piaget and Kohlberg’s “moral realism” 
(‘naturalism’ or [ethical] ‘cognitivism’ supra): the idea that some sort of non-
arbitrary moral hierarchy exists outside of social convention and can be used 
reliably to distinguish better from worse actions. This difference in onto-
epistemic premise results in a grave misinterpretation of Kohlberg’s stage theory 
when Bandura claims, “Piagetian theory (1948) favors a developmental sequence 
progressing from moral realism, in which rules are seen as unchangeable and 
conduct is judged in terms of damage done, to relativistic morality in which 
conduct is judged primarily by the performer’s intentions” (1991: 46). 
This is incorrect on several levels. First, the entire schema is premised on 
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moral realism, which is by no account identical to moral absolutism as Bandura 
claims. Bandura confuses a claim about the reality of moral principles with the 
fixity of moral rules, which is precisely the kind of distinction that the heuristic 
of a stage theory captures: a higher level of moral judgment is required to discern 
instances in which principle, such as the value of life, outweighs rules or 
convention or aligns with the original intent of a law that it initially seems to 
contradict. 
The pre-conventional and conventional stages are therefore not moral 
realist, as Bandura claims, but ‘moral’ and ethical, respectively, subject to the 
critique of the authentically moral orientation articulated in the final two stages, 
five and six. Agents acting on maxims from the first four stages lack proper 
intention as they are motivated by fear of punishment or disorder, rather than 
the genuine recognition of others’ personhood. They are consequentialist, rather 
than deontological in character, expressive of the precisely the utilitarian ‘moral’ 
justifications Bandura fears. (For example, someone who believes in the absolute 
necessity and higher value of order might provide a maxim, “it is acceptable to 
harm innocent others if it preserves order since order benefits more.”) 
There are further and graver confusions in language and concept. To 
repeat Bandura’s claim about stage theory, the sequence of moral judgment 
developed from moral realism to relativistic morality because the latter is judged 
in relation to intention. This is term-for-term the opposite of what stage theory 
claims but, as far as I can tell, has not been subject to clarification or critique. 
The confusion concerns a basic distinction between agent-relative moral 
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reasoning (which is typical of deontology), agent-neutral moral reasoning (which 
is objective), and moral relativism (which is subjective). Agent-relative moral 
reasoning posits that there are reasons not to mistreat others that are stronger 
than the general preference or claim that ‘no one should be mistreated’ (Nagel 
1988). This form of reasoning is ‘stronger’ precisely in the sense that Bandura 
means to insinuate by his earlier use of the phrase “moral absolutism”: the 
decreased permissions that the inviolability of the person entails. Moral 
relativism, by contrast, is predicated on moral irrealism. Relativists believe that 
moral reasons/justifications are merely expressive of individual (‘moral’) 
preferences, which are at odds. 
Accepting the subjectivism of individual preference, agent-neutral 
utilitarianism presents itself as the most pragmatic solution. Authority (or 
“warrant”, below) is therefore deferred to the social, political, legal, and 
economic institutions responsible for aggregating and refereeing individuals’ 
disparate preferences. A ‘good’ reason, on this view, is one that fulfills the most 
individual preferences, or maximizes utility. This might still be considered 
‘rational’ but only in the trivial sense Hillary Putnam identifies in his work Ethics 
Without Ontology, 
 
Of course there is a sense of “rational” in which any view that has a 
well thought out and intelligent defense on the basis of the shared 
assumptions of a community can be called “rational” no matter 
what those shared assumptions might be; but that sense is not the 
normatively important one. To deny that there is a sense of 
“rational” that goes beyond the sense provided by whatever jeu de 
vérité we happen to be playing at a given moment in history — or 
to say, as Richard Rorty once did, that “I view warrant as a 
sociological matter, to be ascertained by observing the reception of 
	  	  
204 
S’s statement by her peers” — is simply to capitulate to a form of 
cultural relativism” (5). 
 
On the preceding, it is clearly Bandura that would be defined as a relativist, not 
Kohlberg or his sixth stage individual. “Post-conventional” in no way means 
post-modern, but its Kantian opposite. 
Bandura’s preference for pragmatism is evident in his claim that “Higher-
stage reasoning cannot be functionally superior because stages provide the 
rationale for supporting either side of a moral issue but they do not prescribe 
particular solutions…Immorality can thus be served as well, or better, by 
sophisticated reasoning as by simpler reasoning” (1991: 47). Again, the confusion 
of a formal ethical criterion (moral principles that enable judgment) for a 
particular ethical prescription (moral rule) highlights the inaptness of the critique.  
Catholic casuistry, the Talmudic tradition, or the just war tradition — in 
each case of legal formalism, a system of rules (moral principles, in the analogy) 
enable a judge to reasonably determine any case without reference to either an 
identical precedent or other ‘external’ norms. The fact that rules or principles can 
be used to support more than one legal or moral interpretation makes neither the 
rules nor conclusion relativistic, nor the system perverse. Indeed, this was 
Kohlberg et al.’s point in claiming that the reasoning is more revealing of moral 
judgment than the particular resolution of moral dilemmas (Colby, Kohlberg, 
Gibbs, Lieberman, Fischer & Saltzstein 1983). Situational ethics’ dependence on 
context implies that to truly understand a moral principle means to understand 
its exceptions (Scanlon 2008). 
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Bandura’s findings suggest “that in many instances tests of maturity in 
moral reasoning may be measuring personal preferences more than level of 
competence” (1991: 46; Mischel & Mischel 1976). As an example, Bandura asks 
“By what logical reasoning is a morality rooted in law and order (stage 4) 
morally superior to one relying on social regard and concern for others (stage 
3)?” (1991: 47; parentheses in original). In reality, stage three, which Bandura 
already described as “approval-seeking conformity”, conveys in that phrasing 
the danger with which Arendt was concerned. The “respect for authority” of 
stage four (again, Bandura’s phrasing, not Kohlberg’s) open the possibility that 
the authority is justified and law observed out of recognition of right or respect 
for rule of law, rather than simple consensus or coercion. Bandura’s 
characterization of stage three’s “concern for others” is more descriptive of stage 
six, further undermining his critique. 
Notwithstanding the weakness of Bandura’s critique, his prolificacy in 
publication combined with Kohlberg’s multiple-front interdisciplinary wars49 and 
premature death combined to allow Bandura to outlast Kohlberg in life and 
debate. Starting in 2001, corroboration from Jonathan Haidt’s influential research 
and writing on “social intuitionism” further swayed the argument to Bandura’s 
side. However, recent work corroborating the link between moral judgment and 
response in emergency situations seems to falsify Bandura’s central claim about 
the chasm between moral knowledge and behavior. As unfashionable as 
anything resembling structuralism remains, research by Kohlberg’s inheritor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 His debates with feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan and philosopher Owen 
Flanagan, for example, and separate work in the philosophy of education. 
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James Rest, among others, notes that “stages qua schemas can function implicitly 
or preconsciously” (Rest, Narvez, Bebeau & Thoma 1999: 137; Pizarro & Bloom 
2003; Saltzstein & Kasachkoff 2005; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel & Schaal 
1999). Thus, an article in Psychological Review answering negatively the question, 
“Should Kohlberg’s Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality be Replaced 
With a More Pragmatic Approach?” argues persuasively that dismissing the 
cognitive developmental approach “is at best premature and provokes some 
serious concerns”, particularly the false accusation that mature moral reasoning 
is expressive of preference, not competence (Krebs & Denton 2005, Gibbs 2006: 
666).50 
It is the persistence of the differences sparked by humanist and scientific 
enlightenments that led Putnam in Ethics without Ontology to call for a third 
enlightenment — a pragmatist enlightenment. In this enlightenment, ‘rejection of 
every form of fundamentalism and apriorism are essential to proper 
understanding of what a learning process is” (13). Putnam concedes Bandura’s 
skepticism, quoting the philosopher and scientist Charles Sanders Peirce that 
“The Method of What is Agreeable to Reason is as bad a way of fixing belief as 
the Method of Authority.” However, he adds, for learning to be learning and not 
simply the replacement with one belief by another, some notion of authentically 
rational justification is indispensible. 
 To summarize, Bandura’s representations of a pre-conventional absolute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Kohlberg had already defended “The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest 
Stage of Moral Judgment” in The Journal of Philosophy (1973), but it is not cited in 
otherwise thorough bibliographies, speaking to the effects of the 
interdisciplinary divide around issues in moral judgment (Puka 1982). 
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moral realism, and a post-conventional relativistic ethics, heedless of 
consequence, are flawed in both form and substance. Bandura’s concern with 
consequence, while well-intentioned, ignores the basic problematic that divides 
the two major schools of ethical thought, deontology and utilitarianism. With his 
averred interest in moral agency and individual rights, Bandura should be 
aligned with the former Kantian school of ethics; however, methodological 
differences with his cognitive developmental interlocutors, and his not 
uncommon worry that moral principles defending humanitarianism are subject 
to abuse led him to abjure the basis of agency, individual freedom. The ethical 
maxim drawn out of Bandura’s own theory is uncomfortably bound by legal 
positivism: always obey the law, which naively supposes that the law always 
abides by his primary maxim, “do no harm”. 
  
Judging Judgment 
The ease with which the virtue of obedience can be transformed into 
something more vicious was the phenomenon to which Arendt, Milgram, and 
originally, Bandura, were responding. A decade before the September 11th 
attacks, Bandura was already writing on the effect of terror as public 
intimidation. A fearful populace’s fixation on security can lead them, he argued, 
to tolerate, if not participate in, aggression towards past or probable aggressors. 
“Utilitarian justifications can readily win the support of a frightened public for 
violent counterterrorist measures. A frightened and angered populous [sic] does 
not spend much time agonizing over the morality of lethal modes of self-defense. 
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Should any concern arise over the taking of innocent lives, it can be assuaged by 
stripping the victims of their innocence” (1990:166).  
‘The terrorists win’, in other words, not in the customary manner of 
destruction of military targets, but by the corrosive effects “a widespread sense 
of personal vulnerability” has on citizens’ empathic sentiments/moral 
engagement, on societal openness/liberality, and potentially, by emboldening 
the aggressive and isolationist extremes of the nation’s foreign policy. As the so-
called war on terror has illustrated, this climate leads to the kinds of conditions 
and tactics Kant sought to proscribe in Perpetual Peace: deception, espionage, 
assassinations, and use of mercenaries. Rather than democratic control of power, 
Bandura describes “powerholders’” control of democracy. This claim is not 
without evidence but the indictment raises serious questions about the value of 
disengagement-prone democracy. It is abetted by the kind of mass media 
coverage on which terrorist violence thrives, and by disproportional 
counterterrorist reactions the shock and awe of which journalists tout as much as 
they critique (Der Derian 2001). Bandura’s degradation of belief in the moral 
authority of democracy makes an unwitting case for more orderly, predictable, 
and censorious varieties of authoritarianism, which are undeniably more ‘pro-
social’ but manifestly less free. 
In his few mentions of international relations, Bandura’s writings express 
a sanguine sort of economic cosmopolitanism. He describes a social equilibrium 
that, despite being disturbed by globalization, would recalibrate naturally were it 
not for the influence of corrupt governments, militaries, and disenfranchised 
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non-state actors (1999, 2001, 2002b). If all actors could be convinced to follow the 
rule of nonaggression (which Bandura and peace psychologists conflate with 
nonintervention), debating the merits of different justifications for counter-
intervention would be unnecessary; the cycle would be broken (Clark, A. 2011).  
This view corresponds with Richard Rorty’s that “[p]roviding 
philosophical justifications for human rights is far less important than — perhaps 
even useless in comparison with — developing in people an emotional 
disposition in favor of respecting human rights” by “manipulating their 
sentiments” (quoted in Orend 2002). From Bandura’s perspective, the major 
obstacle to this reasonable “no-harm” paradigm taking root is the manipulation 
of sentiments by elites who, pandering to the home populace’s fears and 
prejudices, assail other actors’ goodness, rationality, or sanity to justify wars of 
national aggrandizement (Bandura 1996, Lakoff 2002). “Moral disengagement” 
describes both the technique and the outcome of appealing to this less rational 
side. 
However, one measure of authentic democracy is the political system’s 
ability to recognize dissent and respond to critique. These could be judicial or 
legislative or extra-judicial and legislative remedies, such as accommodating 
nonviolent protest or devolving authority to communities in the latter case. 
Champions of nonviolence are held up elsewhere in the Banduran corpus (1999), 
but social learning theory lacks an account of the kind of society that a) best 
equips individuals with this judgment (how to use freedom without 
undermining freedom), and b) the kind of society or political regime against 
	  	  
210 
which nonviolent tactics will be effective, and c) what the humane alternative to 
‘pro-social’ looks like in such a situation. 
Bandura and Kant reject individuals and groups using this ends–means 
proposition for revolutionary apologetics, but the discomfiting conclusion from 
Bandura’s relativistic premises regarding morality is that a state using the same 
utilitarian rationale is unassailable. Forcing social change through “militant 
action aimed at changing inhumane social conditions” is a ‘moral’ justification 
insofar as it is coercive, harmful to existing order (1990: 165). Right, and redress 
of the violation of rights are limited by the ‘good’ of the socializing unit (or its 
conceptions thereof). To have instead an inviolable principle of individual life, 
liberty, dignity would seem to require ‘extra-social’ authority, whether from 
natural law/moral realist ontology, divine command/sacred text, or 
transnational/cosmopolitan institutions (Nardin & Mapel 1993). 
Though non-violence seems an acceptably neutral, normative position, it 
is apolitical, meaning, per relativism, that neither side in a conflict can have right 
on their side, only competing preferences. “In conflicts of power, one person’s 
violence is another person’s selfless benevolence” Bandura pronounces, even 
when aimed at halting “criminal terrorist activity” (1990: 166). Relativism 
forecloses the possibility of an authentically moral justification or genuinely 
noble or worthy cause. This position is simply untenable for someone who 
retains an interest in improving ethical decision-making and promoting positive 
social change. The self-referential character of the sociogenic account prevents 
appeal to international human rights norms such as the Responsibility to Protect. 
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If ‘value’ is limited in this way to ideas preservative of order, rather than a moral 
fact pertaining to individuals (as in cognitivism), ethics become instrumental, 
relative to and orientated by society’s valued ends.  
The difficulty in Bandura’s substitution of the term ‘pro-social’ for ‘moral’ 
is abundantly clear by this point: for progress to be possible, moral principle is 
indispensible in discerning acts that are ‘pro-social’, perhaps even a legal, but 
ethically problematic. Abandoning those in need ‘on principle’ sets a poor 
example on every level, including interpersonal, and is not conducive to the 
health of domestic or international society. Beginning with the premise that there 
is no rational justification for violence yields rather predictable results when 
studying ethics and the use of force. While identifying misrepresentations and 
understanding how populations are duped by pseudo-moral justifications is 
important, the more pressing prescriptive matter seems to be education. Rather 
than training people to be critical of any statesperson making an argument for 
the necessity of the use of force, a more productive mission would be to educate 
populations into the extant moral and legal standards governing such use.  
The beliefs in the backdrop of pro- and noninterventionist positions — 
humans’ selfish or corruptible nature or their extraordinary compassion and 
bravery — are informal aspects of political socialization that speak louder than 
formally promulgated moral codes of nonviolence or democratic sovereignty. 
Young adults’ adoption of more cynical worldviews is an attractive strategy to 
distance themselves from the perceived naiveté of childhood — one which 
secondary and post-secondary educators regularly confront. One of the claims of 
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the present project is that the best safeguard against cynicism and moral and 
social disengagement is to embrace the precariousness of trusting oneself and 
one’s fellows that Bandura rejects as dangerous. Rather than more legislation or 
less latitude in individual judgment, an education attentive to the human 
capacity and right to self-govern is consistent with Kantian deontology, 
Kohlbergian moral judgment, and Banduran self-efficacy. An important first step 
is to understand what global citizens already believe about international right 
and human rights, including that to war and peace. 
The Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression 
and Peace (GIPGAP) is one of several groups involved in social psychological 
peace research (SPPR) in this area. Many SPPR researchers find it expedient to 
structure surveys, coding manuals, and educational materials measuring and 
modifying attitudes toward state violence and individual rights around 
Bandura’s eight mechanisms of moral disengagement (Cohrs & Moschner 2002; 
Cohrs 2003, 2004; McAlister 2001, 2006; Halversheid & Witte 2008). Several 
researchers in the subfield of peace psychology have applied Bandura’s 
disengagement paradigm to political speech, media reports, and public discourse 
on the use of military force (McAlister 2000, Cohrs, Moschner, Maes & Kielmann 
2005, McAlister, Bandura & Owen 2006, Gibson 2011). 
Some studies analyze how the framing of international conflict sets the 
tone and terms of debate (Lakoff 2004, Spielvogel 2005, Burks 2010); others gauge 
public opinion directly, correlating respondents’ agreement with survey items 
that invoke the eight disengagement mechanisms with scores on a scale 
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measuring attitudes of relative militarism and pacifism (Jackson & Sparr 2005, 
Cohrs & Nelson 2007). None, however, have acknowledged the potential 
counter-bias of what I call “methodological” or “prescriptive pacifism” that 
arises from framing issues in international relations through the lens of ‘moral’ 
justification, which confirms the construct validity of the disengagement 
framework without confronting arguments for authentically just uses of force. 
The moral disengagement framework has been used profitably in analyzing 
survey data on views relating to governmental violence, especially in societies 
with frequent and/or recent experience of such phenomena (Trosky & Campbell 
2013, Trosky & Castanheira 2008). But the attempt to codify mirroring 
mechanisms of moral engagement, in keeping with the prescriptive dimension of 
peace psychology, has proved more challenging (Malley-Morrison, Oh, Wu & 
Zaveri 2009, Jackson & Sparr 2005). 
Part of the challenge is that “pacifism” has a range of referents, from 
absolute prohibition of the resort to arms, to strictly national defense (Fiala 2004), 
to a post- or transnational arrangement to prevent future conflict (Habermas 
2001a, Field 2010). It is this middle sense of pacifism that Bandura and the PS 
position construe international law as upholding — one primarily concerned 
with preserving national territorial integrity by preventing the violation of 
national sovereignty (Clark, A. 2010). PS is best identified in this sense by legal 
positivism, defined as “the theory that laws are to be understood as social rules, 
valid because they are enacted by authority or derive logically from existing 
decisions, and that ideal or moral considerations (e.g. that a rule is unjust) should 
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not limit the scope or operation of the law” (New Oxford American Dictionary 
2010). In this case, the relevant authority or “existing decision” to which legal 
positivism refers is the body of jurisprudence, beginning with the Treaty of 
Westphalia, establishing and reinforcing national sovereignty as the cornerstone 
of international law and politics (Raz 1983). As noted in Chapter Two, this is the 
same basis for international politics as recognized by foreign policy realism. 
These approaches to international law leave enforcement of human rights 
entirely to states, which are conceived much like the idealized, self-sufficient 
individuals of contractarian theory (Rawls 1999). “The most obvious weakness of 
this justification,” one critic of legal positivism notes, is “if codification into law is 
what justifies human rights, then in those places where such rights are not 
codified, it follows that they are not justified…[T]his, erroneously, takes human 
rights out of the hands of those who hold them and places them into the preserve 
of powerful institutions” (Orend 2002). Recent construals of human rights, such 
as the 1993 Vienna Declaration and 2007 special treaties amending the 
International Covenant for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, indicate that 
substantive equality demands a “vulnerable subject” interpretation (Fineman 
2008) that includes group rights (Freeman 1995). 
The positivist approach tends to define human rights and equality under 
the law in negative terms, discouraging “activist” government intervention to 
protect or provide restorative justice (Nickel 2006, 2010). To use Martin Wight’s 
word, international legal positivism eschews the “revolutionary” approach of 
Marxist-Leninist theory and progressive liberal internationalism that seek to 
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reshape the global order, for a more laissez-faire, “rationalist” belief in the 
diplomatic and economic sublimation of conflict in the society of states (Wight 
1992, Waltz 1979). The foregoing account of Kantian constructivism places his 
theory of international right somewhere between rationalist principles of defense 
of national sovereignty and noninterventionism, and more active 
interventionism. 
Since 2005, GIPGAP has been mapping global public opinion on these 
issues of individual and state rights to peace and duty to intervene in over 40 
countries. The main instrument GIPGAP used in this effort is the Personal and 
Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) (Malley-
Morrison, Daskalopoulos & You 2006). Responses were coded using a moral 
disengagement/engagement coding manual developed by the author and other 
members of the Group on International Perspectives of Governmental 
Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP). The manual was researcher-developed using a 
grounded theory approach that this project culls thematic categories from these 
diverse perspectives (Glaser & Strauss 1967) and “deductive qualitative analysis” 
(Gilgun 2004) based on work by Bandura (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & 
Pastorelli 1996, Bandura 1999).  
In addition to the predictable challenge posed by translation, questions of 
interpretation of qualitative responses are inescapable. GIPGAP’s method of 
resolving differences in interpretation was dialogic and deliberative, but in some 
cases, the elusiveness of consensus led to experimentation with alternative 
coding frameworks. Alternative frameworks to Bandura’s experimented with 
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other conceptions of moral disengagement and more so, different 
operationalizations of moral engagement. For my part, the hardest translation of 
all was not linguistic but conceptual: How to turn Kant’s commitment to 
nonviolent resistance and critique in domestic politics into a suitably progressive 
and humane international analogue? 
 My framework for operationalizing moral judgment, originally developed 
with Lauren Groves, is called the Moral Reasoning Model (MRM). The MRM 
departs from the conceptual grounding of Bandura’s sociocognitive theory, 
taking inspiration from Kohlberg’s developmental stage theory of moral 
judgment. It was developed to addresses the lacunae identified in this and the 
previous chapter. It does so by drawing parallels between individuals’ capacity 
for post-conventional moral reasoning (for example, extra-legal justifications that 
are nonetheless governed by principled considerations of justice), and the 
capacity for casuistic flexibility in the just war tradition that is principled but 
context-sensitive. It also draws analogies between the foreign policy outlooks 
canvassed above and the logic of Kohlberg’s pre-conventional and conventional 
stages. This “Adult Attachment Scale of International Ethical Orientations” was 
used as a survey item administered to Boston University PS 325 class in 
Experimental Psychology aimed at gauging levels of moral engagement. 
  The MRM is used to aid coders in ranking survey responses to normative 
questions (not limited to international conflict) on an eight-point, three-region 
scale indicative of relative moral engagement. These are qualitative responses to 
binary survey items soliciting rationales for or against certain uses of force in 
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pursuit of rights and fulfillment of duties. The instrument’s flow chart parses 
responses into their component rationales, ascertaining the degree to which the 
respondent attends to the moral and legal permissibility and desirability of the 
act, practice, or policy in question. Responses are located on or between the 
MRM’s eight justification types, ranging from lower to higher based on the kind 
and quality of moral reasoning employed, roughly corresponding to Kohlberg’s 
stage distinctions. 
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Figure Two: The Moral Reasoning Model 
 
 Figure Two graphically illustrates the qualitative response coding process. 
To support multiple levels of analysis, responses are categorized along four 
dimensions: 
1) By the disposition of the reasoning (Agree, Disagree, No Position) 
2) By worldview (Practical or Ideological ~ Utilitarian or Deontological) 
3) By perspective (Individual or Institutional) 
4) By emergent patterns in thematic categories (e.g. recent conflicts) 
 
The categorization process was designed to result in a profile that is a function of 
each response dimension and tracks one of the eight named types. The top six of 
these roughly correspond to Kohlberg’s stages, themselves subdivided into post-
conventional (1. universalist and 2. moral contractualist), conventional (3. 
consequentialist and 4. pragmatist), and pre-conventional (5. narrow utilitarian 
and 6. moral egoist). The middle of these (4–6) track the yellow utilitarian-
consequentialist ‘moral’ justifications identified last chapter. The bottom two are 
reserved for the thankfully rare 7. zealot/compliant disengager and 8. Militant — 
both employing pseudo-deotonological ‘moral’ justifications of the kind 
discussed last chapter (identified as ‘green’ there but with ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ 
inverted51 here appearing red). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The gradient is read from top to bottom for questions dealing with claims to 
personal rights such as protest, and bottom to top for questions relating to 
institutional claims to rights such as torture. Since the schema is symmetrical 
aside from agree/disagree, one can simply flip it on it’s middle axis (where the 
statement appears) to put disagree on top for questions relating to institutional 
violence, in which case the gradient of the minor subcategories would be read 
top to bottom as more to less morally engaged. 
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Despite the paucity of material to work with in sometimes laconic 
quantitative answers, even the briefest response usually permits classification 
within one of the four major subcategories and one of the eight minor 
subcategories specified by the MRM’s logic tree (1–8). When a respondent is 
asked to account for why they believe something, it adds analytical leverage to 
the self-reported 1-7 Likert response to an “Agree/Disagree” item. Given the 
provocative topics with which the PAIRTAPS survey deals, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that ideological and individual defenses of rights form the 
extremities while practical and institutional considerations are channeled toward 
the middle. 
This symmetry reflects the contours of the universe of discourse. As 
Kohlberg documented, the most admirable and most disdainful attitudes (pre- 
and post-conventional, or deontological and pseudo-deontological) are scarce, as 
each appeals to abstract ideas or principles and are charismatic versus 
institutional, in the Weberian sense. As the name “conventional” implies, the 
great many tend toward the middle, taking recourse in more familiar, less 
contentious, pragmatic or utilitarian solutions that are seen as more realistic or 
practicable. As with any typology, the differences between the primitive 
dichotomies are more clearly demarcated than those at the extremities. As Figure 
Two illustrated, more detailed responses can be classified further into an 
undetermined number of recurrent themes that may not be susceptible to further 
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ordering without lapsing into arbitrary or subjective valuations.52 These recurring 
themes are more useful for determining the importance of national politics, 
recent events, or media influences in shaping more basic ethical and political 
dispositions. 
It is possible to treat these data as both categorical (nominal) and ordinal 
because the justifications for personal and institutional actions, though varied, 
are finite, grounding themselves ultimately in either values (ideological) or goals 
(practical). Level of engagement is gauged in relation to international right, 
defined as the preserving and expanding of individual autonomy without 
intentional violation of the same. Programmatically, this is accomplished 
domestically and internationally by attending to the rule of law and through 
inclusive governance, as opposed to pursuit of self- and national interest. 
The foregoing describes the top-level ‘ideological’ category, with 
individual position referring to mention of human rights. These responses 
ultimately appeal to the universal ideas upon which human rights regimes are 
based — the ideal autonomy and absolute equality of individuals.  In what 
follows, I will run through hypothetical examples using the PAIRTAPS item 
“The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.” 
Responses that reference founding principles of nations or religions can 
also fit into this category but will more often be categorized as ‘ideological–
institutional’, especially if these principles could conceivably come into conflict 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Half and quarter decimals between the 1–8 ratings would not be indicative of a 
statistically meaningful continuity because these are ordinal, not interval 
measurements.	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with larger (transnational or pluralist) goals. For example, if a respondent thinks 
that their government does not have the right to torture because citizens’ rights 
are protected in its founding documents, this does not exclude this principle 
being ignored in the case of foreign nationals. Conversely, a government’s legal 
duty to protect property and person does not preclude action elsewhere that 
violates those same rights of others, the salient difference being between the right 
to wage war and humanitarian intervention, and the “duty to interfere”. 
Although both actions are permissible, with caveats, under existing international 
law, only the latter can be seen as a duty of individuals as well as nations. 
The mirror-image of the ‘ideological–individual’ type at the opposite end 
of the spectrum represents a category that is rarely relevant. The completely 
morally disengaged individual holds opinions that are either idiosyncratic or 
openly ethnocentric, ‘justified’ solely by his/her having willed them or 
belonging to their cherished group. While it is difficult to imagine anyone 
besides a sadist agreeing with torture for ideological–individual reasons (especially 
considering that the question regards the right of the government), this 
classification has been useful on less polarizing questions in national security or 
intervention. Examples include respondents who agree vigorously with the 
priority of the security or expansion of their nation or religion at the expense of 
others’ freedom because of the professed superiority of its/their values.   
Occasionally, ardent nationalism or religious dogmatism is so intertwined 
with a respondent’s identity that the line between ‘ideological-institutional’ and 
‘ideological–individual’ justifications is blurred. If the respondent expresses 
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unquestioning adherence to the purported values of a certain race, class, nation 
or religion (or any combination thereof) which implicitly or explicitly denigrates 
a real or imagined other, the coder can usually exonerate the group and conclude 
that this individual misrepresents its authentic core values (e.g. American 
pluralism or Islamic charity in the above examples). The representative of the 
deviating sect is coded as ‘ideological–individual’. 
The ‘practical–individual’ category applies primarily to respondents who 
evaluate questions based on how their person, family or certain citizens might be 
affected (a view sometimes called “common-sense morality”, not to be confused 
with universal common morality). Traditionally, “love of one’s own” extended to 
the city-state — an area circumscribed by common custom in which all members 
are familiar (the analog of tribe or township today). However admirable in other 
contexts, loyalty is not a robust ethical defense for action because of the 
arbitrariness of its object. Respect for custom is a cousin of legal positivism, each 
of which define justice by what is posited by traditional authority or precedent. 
The proximity of practical–individual justifications to self-preservation — the 
most immediate form of love of one’s own — is understandable but morally 
questionable. Sometimes these considerations are offered from the perspective of 
a concerned family-member or citizen; sometimes self-interest is more naked, as 
in the case of a soldier or the family of a deployed soldier.   
Examples of practical–individual reasoning can range from improbably 
hypothetical to specifically circumstantial. For example, one who fears that 
torture would be the only method to extract information that could save 
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him/her, a loved-one, or a fellow citizen might agree to its use, while a soldier 
might disagree out of fear that the same methods might be used on her/him. In 
either case, the word “fear” is telling in its consequentialist orientation. This 
points to a paradox of popular ‘practical’ reasoning relating to terrorist threats: 
although it claims to be realistic, it is rarely probabilistic, and more often it is 
fatalistic, assuming the worst in the face of uncertainty even with a 
preponderance of evidence to the contrary (higher chance of being killed by a 
bus or falling piano). Recurring themes emphasized by media or encouraged by 
a selective reading of history are partially responsible for the propagation and 
pervasiveness of such pessimism and are telling aspects of such responses. 
To summarize: in distinguishing between practical and ideological 
reasoning, the former is primarily concerned with calculating effects — whether 
in the short or long-run, or for an individual or institution — while ideological 
justifications eschew cost-benefit analysis, being more absolute in character (e.g. 
one cannot harm one innocent even in the hopes of saving many). Nowhere is 
the former way of thinking more evident than in the ‘practical–institutional’ 
category. Since institutions themselves operate in a rational, means–ends fashion, 
this variety of reasoning is merely an extension of the bureaucratic way of 
thinking. As such, it might be argued that it is less self-interested way of thinking 
than the practical-individual type, calling into question its more moderate rating 
(4 or 5).  
 However, because the dilution of agency through the authority of 
institutions is one of the principal mechanisms by which responsibility for 
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atrocity is diffused or displaced, practical–institutional dis/agreement 
constitutes the weakest argument against governmental infringement and for 
individual rights. For example, a respondent might advocate the right to peaceful 
protest because it is acknowledged as the least dangerous form of dissent from 
the perspective of the state — a sublimation of the same impulses that drive civil 
disobedience, riot and revolution. Similarly, torture might be dismissed not 
because it is morally abhorrent but because the quality of information it yields is 
questionable.53 In both cases, institutional ends are the deciding factor, with a 
demonstrative lack of skepticism as to the desert and effects of institutional 
control. 
 
What’s so bad about the national interest? 
What about the institution of the nation? In the analogy between self-
interest and the national interest, there is an ambiguity as to what exactly 
demands protection: Is it solely the life and person of the contractor, or property 
as well? If property, would this include potential property? What if acquiring 
others’ property is perceived as securing future prosperity? The fungibility of the 
concept of security, especially as it relates to property and sovereignty, leads to 
ambiguity in the precise rights and duties of states and individuals.  
The nation-state provides the illusion of a closed system whose borders 
circumscribe duty solely to fellow citizens. Outside conflict or suffering is only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Whether torture is effective as a means of domestic intimidation is another 
issue, though it has proven a poor deterrent to those eager to die for their cause 
insofar as it increases both vendetta martyrdom and the incentives to evade 
capture. 
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problematic when it directly concerns the national interest; otherwise, prudence 
dictates nonintervention. The principle that under international anarchy no 
country should expect aid has the rather homely title of “self-help”. Given 
resource scarcity, states believe that they cannot afford to be altruistic since there 
is no guarantee that others will do the same. Instead, uncertainty motivates states 
to augment their power in anticipation of conflict, driving the arms races and 
mutual suspicion characteristic of the security dilemma, spending astronomic 
amounts nominally on “defense” (Booth & Wheeler 2007). The rationale that 
drives this collective action problem allows developed countries to countenance 
exorbitant opportunity costs in education and healthcare, as well as staggering 
domestic and global inequality — both facilitators of moral disengagement 
(Malley-Morrison, Corgan & Castanheira 2007). 
Some realists have been aware of a tension, if not an outright 
contradiction, in what Reinhold Niebuhr calls the “ethical paradox” of 
patriotism. This paradox, of which the social contract is emblematic, points to the 
fact that the collective perspective of the national interest itself rests on a 
subordination, if not sacrifice of personal interest. Realist historian E.H. Carr is 
also known for his critique of the liberal doctrine of the harmony of interests and 
acknowledges that while realism provides the soundest basis of foreign policy, it 
fails to provide sufficient motivation for an ethical national policy or for social 
cohesion in general (Forde in Nardin & Mapel 1993: 76). The two solutions to the 
problem of the dissolution of national community by an immoral foreign policy 
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are Machiavelli’s illiberally deceiving citizens, and Hobbes’ liberal attempt to 
make self-interest the basis of society. Both are recipes for moral disengagement. 
Whether through realism or liberalism, elevating the state or sovereignty 
to a metaethical category is woefully misguided. Waltz’ argument that “states in 
anarchy cannot afford to be moral” is simply false; it may be true that law 
requires impartial and consistent enforcement to justify compliance and to deter 
noncompliance but ethical behavior is possible for states as it is for individuals 
with little or no cost to the national interest. As environmental crises mount, 
there are compelling reasons to include moral considerations as part of the 
national interest. Even if superogative acts are subordinated to practical and 
power considerations, amorality should be the exception, not the rule (Donelly in 
Nardin & Mapel 1993: 106).  
Although liberal thought has traditionally portrayed the tradeoff of 
individual sovereignty for state sovereignty and representation as an expression 
of calculative self-interest or simple expediency, contractarians after Hobbes 
have interpreted this transfer of sovereignty as accompanied by a sovereign duty 
not just to protect citizens, but to express their collective will. Locke and 
Rousseau both enshrined the right to revolution as a procedural safeguard in the 
event that the state was remiss in this duty. The state is not considered ‘rational’ 
because of its technocratic or bureaucratic efficiency, but is only deemed so 
pursuant on the fulfillment of its proper function — democratically expressing 
public reason through deliberation, and incorporating it into legislation so that each 
citizen can recognize her/himself as the author of its laws. This is Kant’s position, 
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which I have supported throughout as the most persuasive account for the basis 
of legitimate authority. 
The social contract is accepted as a useful fiction to justify the state’s right 
and duty to make and enforce law, but individual rights and duties precede this 
compact and persist after its dissolution. Certain codified negative prohibitions 
might disappear with state dissolution; the positive duty (“Appiah principle” 
supra) to promote good by acting in a manner that increases others’ well-being, 
where it does not disproportionately diminish one’s own, does not. The finitude 
of certain resources will always entail some degree of uncertainty, but the myth 
of Malthusian scarcity too often is used as an excuse for a majority to not 
undertake small risks that would enhance social equity for all.54 Because this 
opportunity cost of foregone generosity is more salient to the potential recipients 
than to the potential givers, this conservativeness corrodes community ethic and 
increases international resentments toward the developed world.   
Although the state has historically been responsible for providing the 
threshold of domestic security requisite to enjoying certain public and private 
goods, it is not “the indispensable condition of value” (Osgood & Tucker 1967: 
323). Rather than seeing the state’s special responsibility as an aggregator of 
interest as undermining the domestic analogy (Fromkin 1981), the collective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The attempt to exterminate the welfare state heralded an ideological regression 
to the attitude of Malthusian scarcity noted in a paper by Joel Federman’s (1999) 
The Politics of Universal Compassion, in which he observes, “To believe in scarcity 
is therefore to disbelieve in the possibility of universal need satisfaction. In turn, 
it means that universal compassion, which involves the advancement of the 
universal fulfillment of basic human needs, as in universal human economic, 
social, and political rights, is completely unrealizable.” 
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action problems of the global political system are close enough in kind to lend 
themselves to diplomatic and legal solutions through transnational institutions 
(Beitz 1999). 
 
Invasion versus Intervention 
 As demonstrated in the example form preceding section, the MRM was of 
use in isolating paths of reasoning on questions in international law and ethics 
on which there is some consensus, such as the use of torture. Its categorizations 
are less imprecise on questions pertaining to the more ambiguous PAIRTAPS 
question on invasion. Previous GIPGAP coding manuals for this item ran into 
graver difficulty, with any violation of national sovereignty being treated as 
indicative of moral disengagement, per the Banduran legal positivism entailed in 
PS. The Just Cause coding manual (JCM) was developed to bring out 
respondents’ particular rationales for war and intervention in a more nuanced 
way that aids researchers in identifying their appreciation for differences in just 
and unjust causes. It implements McMahan’s (2005) finding that the justness of a 
conflict is primarily determined by conformity to the jus ad bellum principle of 
just cause, of which there are three examples — self-defense, other-defense, and 
humanitarian intervention. 
 McMahan argues persuasively that the ancillary five jus ad bellum 
principles merely reiterate what it means for any of these causes to be just. 
Respondents who appeal to one or more of these stipulating principles replicate 
the rationale of international law and ethics, which can be construed as indicative 
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of a proportional level of resistance to the kinds of manipulation or 
misrepresentation that contribute to moral disengagement. While such 
knowledge could be indicative of greater engagement in international affairs, this 
manual does not translate political engagement as moral engagement. As 
importantly, unlike existing moral disengagement frameworks, it does not deem 
as demonstrative of disengagement responses that mention a just cause but no 
stipulators. Such judgment is reserved for those who refer to the violation of 
national sovereignty as a brute fact of international relations or an unqualified 
national right, which would be detected by the MRM. 
 Following developments in international humanitarian law, principally 
the norm supporting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the “prevention of 
large-scale violations of people’s human rights by their own government” is 
counted by the JCM as a third authentically just cause for the use of force 
(McMahan 2005, Walzer 2004, 2006). Rather than a focus on the rights of 
wronged parties, the three just causes are framed as duties: 
 
i. self-defense [SD] against immanent threat or actual attack, which  
governments pledge to their own people, 
 
ii. other-defense [OD] from international aggression by treaty obligation, 
including UN membership, and 
 
iii. humanitarian intervention [HI] responding to mass governmental 
violence against its own people when they are incapable of defending 
themselves. 
 
 
In this manual, the presence of any of these three widely acknowledged just 
causes in a response is sufficient to identify it as a just war rationale — a 
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warranted exception to the general prohibition against invasion that conforms to 
international law.  
The reasons why just cause — versus proportionality [P], right intention 
[RI], or legitimate authority [LA] — is treated as comprehensive, are several: 
 
[1] that the requirement of just cause is logically and morally prior to 
all the other requirements of a just war, [2] that this requirement 
governs all phases of war and not just the resort to war, [3] that it is 
thus impermissible to continue to fight at all in a war that lacks a 
just cause, [and 4] that just cause is a restriction on the type of aim 
that may be pursued by means of war and is not a matter of scale 
(McMahan 2005; emphasis added). 
 
The logical and moral priority of just cause defines a discrete universe of moral 
discourse bounded by the three prerequisites, each elaborated by the five 
remaining just war principles that have historically helped define and preserve 
international justice. This formulation “parallels commonsense beliefs about the 
morality of individual action” (McMahan 2005) — a feature that helps to 
categorize even the tersest responses to PAIRTAPS’ open-ended question on the 
justifiability of invasion. 
The presence of one or more of the five remaining principles which I call 
“stipulators” indicates a response that is more resistant to moral disengagement 
mechanisms than a response citing a just cause, or national right, alone. Rather 
than breaking responses into codeable units, responses featuring a cause 
alongside a stipulator are identified with the compound three-to-four character 
codes (HI.G or SD.LR, for example). 
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A just cause is necessary but not always sufficient for a morally engaged 
response. For example, self- or other-defense is often invoked prematurely due to 
fear of possible threats or a unpredictably dangerous anarchic international 
system. Humanitarian intervention is prone to similar abuse by nations that seek 
to bypass UN and International Criminal Court protocols for policing and 
punishment to pursue their own interests or a punishment they perceive as just. 
Characteristics helpful in identifying SD, OD, and HI responses are discussed 
more thoroughly under headings I, II, and III below. 
Responses including just war stipulators without mentioning any just 
cause are also insufficient and susceptible to political manipulation. Unlike the 
bare just cause rationales used to support invasion generally, stipulating criteria 
can be used either affirm or negate the right to invasion. Even if they could be 
known decisively, however, factors like nations’ motivation (coded as RI); 
independent cost/benefit analyses, “doing good,” or “helping” (coded as P); and 
projected outcomes based on history (coded as CS) are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to ascertain the justness of a particular invasion. The same is true of 
respondents’ appeals to supposedly comprehensive authorities (LA), such as 
national government, the UN, or international law, used fallaciously as trumps 
for or against invasion without a demonstrated appreciation of their proper 
jurisdiction as it relates to the interplay of national rights and duties. 
This manual includes an additional stipulator for the Responsibility to 
Protect [RP]. R2P includes the four UN-recognized categories of aggression 
whose level and type of violence are now widely agreed to warrant intervention: 
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these are genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  
Just as immanence of threat implies the just cause category of self-defense, these 
stipulators imply the just cause category of humanitarian intervention and 
should be coded as such. If a survey response mentions Responsibility to Protect 
or prevention (versus punishment) of war crimes, for example, it should always 
be coded as HI.RP and HI.CH respectively. 
These responses, like international law, usually deal with the justice of 
conflict in the abstract. When respondents provide an historical or contemporary 
example, it is either to prove the general rule against invasion (with their paucity, 
e.g. WWII & …), or to prove that that rule has important exceptions (Six Day 
War). These positions can also be demonstrated with future hypotheticals or 
counterfactuals (syllogisms in the form, “if ___ , then ___”). Respondents also 
provide counterexamples of unjust interventions for one of the same two reasons: 
1) to reinforce the salience of particular just war principles in marking exceptions 
(“as long as” format: invasion can be ok as long as it not resemble Iraq in its 
pretenses and execution, for example), or 2) to argue the impossibility of a just 
cause for war, or for moral violence.   
Qualitative responses relating to just war can therefore be broadly classed 
like quantitative responses: 
1. “Yes” just causes for invasion/the right exists (SD, OD, HI) 
 
2. “Yes, the right exists under certain circumstances/stipulations (SD.xx; 
OD.xx; HI.xx) 
 
3. “Yes” certain considerations/conventions can justify invasion (LA, RI, CS, 
LR, P) 
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The first category demonstrates only the potential for moral engagement, and 
that the first and last categories are prone to abuse when focus on stipulations or 
legal permissions supplants concern for rightness or justness of the action. The 
second category is the most demonstrative of a respondent who has weighed 
both the legal and moral implications of invasion. 
As with the MRM, the manual is divided into two meta-categories of 
agreement and disagreement, comprised of three highly affirmative responses 
(just causes) and their elaborations, and three, more straightforward negative 
responses. Ambivalent answers that refer to the elaborations or stipulating 
criteria without reference to a just cause comprise a third category.  
In summary, while it is possible for moral disengagement processes to 
pervert individual rationales for invasion whose ‘bare’ just causes fail to 
demonstrate awareness of costs or unintended consequences, the far greater 
threat comes from arguments that limit themselves to costs and benefits without 
sufficient attention to just cause. Put positively, expressions of the gravity and 
rarity of a just use of lethal force should accompany just war language in order 
for the response to be interpreted as indicative of moral engagement, rather than 
a recitation of political rhetoric. 
 
Conclusion 
Just war theory provided the tools for the assessments in the JCM and to a 
lesser extent, the MRM. Despite questions as to the ongoing relevance of just war 
theory in the twenty-first century (Rengger 2002), concerted action in the activist 
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and legal communities has moved nations closer to its jus in bello standards for 
how they fight. Greater official clarity on jus ad bellum standards, in conjunction 
with sensitivity to the basic consensus in global public opinion on the matter and 
the R2P protocol, could potentially govern when they fight as well.  
Repeated foreign policy failures on the part of the United States might 
indicate that the people have greater moral clarity and independence than their 
representatives, but their lot does not seem to be with isolationism (Kull & 
Destler 1999, Neiman 2008). It is the premise of this project that to be moral, 
engagement must be more than civic in character, producing more than 
complaint or general calls for restraint, more than picketed expressions of 
empathy and solidarity; free people ought to be empowered to not only steer 
their government back form the brink or away from folly, but toward places there 
is dire need if their nation is in the best position to help. In this view, learning 
from history might mean using forgone and botched interventions to prove not 
just war’s failure, or governments’, but citizens’ and the media as well. Standing 
by pledges to ‘never again’ succumb to the bystander effect in cases of genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity requires the courage and the 
moral vocabulary to call evil by its name. 
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APPENDIX I – PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
AGGRESION AND PEACE SURVEY 
 
             International Perspectives Project  2006r 
 
Background Information 
 
DIRECTIONS:  Please answer each question as accurately as possible by circling the correct answer or filling in the 
space provided. 
  
1a. What is your age? ________   
1b. What is your ethnic background?_____________________ 
 
2a. What is your gender?  Female      Male      
2b. What is the gender of your preferred partner?    Female      Male     Either 
                                
3a.  What country were you born in? __________________________________ 
3b. Where do you live now?______________ How long have you lived there for?_____________________ 
4a.  What country was your mother born in?____________________________  
4b. What country does your mother live in now?___________________________ 
 5a.  What country was your father born in?_____________________________    
5b. What country does your father live in now? ____________________________ 
 
 6.   What was/is your religion? (Please specify both major religious grouping (e.g., Catholic, Protestant, Jewish,  
Muslim, etc.) and denomination or sect (e.g., Methodist, Conservative Jew, Sunni Muslim): 
religion in  childhood:                            __________  denomination/sect in childhood:_____________________ 
religion now: _______________________________  denomination/sect now:   __________________________  
      
7. Please choose one of the following that best describes your social class. 
 
Lower        Working        Middle        Upper middle        Upper 
 
8a. What is the highest level of education you have completed?_______________ 
8b. Are you currently a student?  ____  If yes, grad or undergrad? ________Major: ________________ 
9. Describe your employment status: __________________________________ 
10.  What is your marital status? ______________________  
 
11. With which political party in your country do you identify most? ______________________________  
 
12a. Have you ever been in the military service? _____________________________ 
12b. If yes: which service? ______________ How long?________Are you in it now? _______    
Draft or volunteer? _____________ Have you seen combat? _______________________ 
13a. Has any member of your family ever been in the military service? If so, please specify the relationship of 
the family member(s), the service to which he/she belonged/belongs, length of time in service, draft or volunteer, 
and whether or not he/she/they saw combat: _________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14.  Have you ever participated in any conflict resolution or peace education programs in a school or 
community setting? _______________ 
If yes, please indicate when and where and describe the program __________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Have you ever been involved in any sort of protest against war and in favor of peace--e.g., by signing a 
petition, or participating in a march or vigil? __________ 
If yes, please explain _______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this personal profile.  Please respond to the attached survey as well. 
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Opinions Survey 
 
Part A. Rights Questions  
 
Rate each item below on a scale of 1 to 7 to indicate the extent to which you agree with it.  Put your rating on the line 
in front of each item, and then explain your rating below the item. Please provide as much detail as possible 
concerning the reasoning behind your judgment that sometimes individuals or governments do (or do not) have 
the right to carry out the behavior specified in the item. 
 
1= total disagreement   4=neither agree nor disagree    7=total agreement 
2=fairly strong disagreement  5=mild agreement 
3=mild disagreement   6=fairly strong agreement 
 
____1.  Sometimes the police or military have the right to use violence against their own citizens. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
____ 2. Sometimes a government has the right to execute one of its citizens. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
____3.  Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
       
____4.   Sometimes a government has the right to conscript (draft) citizens and send them to fight in a foreign war 
(that is, a war outside its own borders). 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
____5.   Sometimes a country has the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
____6. Children have the right to grow up in a world of peace. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
____7. All human beings have a basic right to peace. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
____8. Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. 
Explanation of rating: 
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____9. No one has the right to physically or psychologically torture, injure, much less kill, any other human being. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
___10. The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
___11. Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
 
 
Part B. Governmental Beliefs Survey 
 
Rate each item below on a scale of 1 to 7 to indicate the extent to which you agree with it.  Put your rating on the line 
in front of each item, and then explain your rating below the item. Please provide as much detail as possible 
concerning the reasoning behind your rating for each judgment. 
 
1= total disagreement   4=neither agree nor disagree    7=total agreement 
2=fairly strong disagreement  5=mild agreement 
3= mild disagreement   6=fairly strong agreement 
 
_____1. It is unpatriotic to disagree with your government on the decisions it makes. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
____2. It is important to support the government in time of war.  
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
____3.  The United States’ involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
____4. In all the military actions taking place around the globe today, it is possible to identify which party (nation, 
ethnic group, religion) is in the right and which is wrong. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
If your country is currently involved in armed conflict with another country, please respond to the following item 
(#5): 
 
____5. My country’s involvement in armed conflict is morally correct (morally defensible). 
Explanation of rating: 
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____ 6. If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another 
country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between 
the countries.  
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
What steps or factors are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation between the countries?: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part C. Emotional Responses Survey 
 
 Instructions: Assume that you have very direct and dramatic exposure to each of the situations below—that is, 
either you witness them directly or you see them happening live on a TV show or documentary that exposes you to the 
event in the most immediate and dramatic way. Please indicate first how you would feel in the situation and then 
what you would want to do.   
   
1. Another country is indiscriminately bombing a major city in your country, and women, children, the elderly, 
and civilian men are running around bloody and screaming. 
What you would feel?______________________________________________ 
What you would want to do?_________________________________________ 
  
2.  Your country is indiscriminately bombing a major city in another country, and women, children, the elderly, 
and civilian men are running around bloody and screaming. 
What you would feel?______________________________________________ 
What you would want to do?_________________________________________ 
 
3. A person is being put to death in the electric chair several years after being convicted of murder. 
What you would feel?______________________________________________ 
What you would want to do?_________________________________________ 
 
4. Military officials are torturing somebody suspected of having information about terrorists. 
What you would feel?______________________________________________ 
What you would want to do?_________________________________________ 
  
5. Police are beating peaceful anti-war demonstrators. 
What you would feel?______________________________________________ 
What you would want to do?_________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Part D. Definitions 
 
Please provide your personal definition and understanding of each of the following terms: 
 
1. War_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Torture______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Terrorism____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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4. Reconciliation_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.  Peace________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Rights _______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Part E. Views on Peace and Security 
 
Rate each item below on a scale of 1 to 7 to indicate the extent to which you agree with it.  Put your rating on the line 
in front of each item, and then explain your rating below the item. Please provide as much detail as possible 
concerning the reasoning behind your rating for each judgment. 
 
1= total disagreement   4=neither agree nor disagree    7=total agreement 
2=fairly strong disagreement  5=mild agreement 
3=mild disagreement   6=fairly strong agreement 
 
____1. I believe that world peace can be achieved. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
The best way to achieve world peace is:  
 
 
 
 
___2. National security is essential for individual and family security. 
Explanation of rating: 
 
 
 
The best way to achieve security for individuals and families throughout the world is:  
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APPENDIX II  - JUST WAR CODING MANUAL 
 
I. SELF-DEFENSE (SD) – The first and most common just cause for invasion, 
this category of responses either directly invokes this concept, or 
references the idea that nations’ right to protect themselves extends to 
preemption of (perceived) threats.  In the latter case, the following 
stipulators help distinguish more from less justifiable positions: 
 
1) LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY (SD.LA) – for self-defense is 
“inherent” according to United Nations Article 51, but could also 
refer to 
a) the Security Council-approved actions outlined in 
Article 42 
b) consensus among citizens  in nations invoking the 
rights named in either of these Articles to bear the 
costs of war 
 
2) RIGHT INTENTION (SD.RI) – Emphasizes protection, versus 
ulterior geopolitical/aggrandizing/ideological motives 
(“existential” concerns versus dangerously fungible economic 
concerns masked by phrases such as “vital interests” or “way of 
life” that have more to do with maintaining a unsustainable 
standard of living than survival). 
 
3) CHANCE OF SUCCESS (SD.CS) – Focus on repelling attacks and 
preempting planned attacks, versus grander goals such as nation 
building 
a) Excludes wars of honor or those demanding 
unconditional surrender 
b) Excludes actions in the name of (future) defense that 
nullify civil rights 
 
4) LAST RESORT (SD.LR) – Can refer to  
a) a response to an actual attack, or imminent threat of 
attack 
b) the exhaustion of diplomacy and/or other coercive 
measures outlined in UN Article 41 in the face of a 
threat 
 
5) PROPORTIONALITY (SD.PR) – Destruction limited to military 
necessity, thwarting immediate and immanent attacks, versus all 
medium-term military capability  
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II. OTHER-DEFENSE (OD) – This category refers, most obviously, to the 
necessity of invasion of victimized nations in order to expel an actively 
aggressing nation or group of nations. Less commonly, it can refer to 
“counter-intervention” in civil wars against antidemocratic agents and 
their supporters. Defenses of invasion that refer to vague “threats” or 
“dangers” to unspecified others or to “stability” or “security” are more 
suspect without reference to at least one of the following stipulators: 
 
1) LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY (OD.LA) – Traditionally includes 
fulfillment of treaty obligations, which now must comply with 
terms of UN membership 
 
2) RIGHT INTENTION (OD.RI) – Entry into other nations’ hostilities 
should be with the prevailing purpose of hastening a lasting peace 
 
3) CHANCE OF SUCCESS (OD.CS) – Indication of the immorality of 
endangering the security of the invading nation’s populace through 
increased vulnerability to attack or neglect of vital national services 
 
4) LAST RESORT (OD.LR) – Can refer to either the immanence of a 
threat/repelling an attack in progress, the rarity of these 
circumstances (with use of the word, “only,” for example), or the 
prerequisite of sanctions, multilateral talks, or other cooperative 
measures to prevent such circumstances 
 
5) PROPORTIONALITY (OD.PR) – Commitment of forces that is 
commensurate with the immediate needs of the imperiled people, 
lessening the risk of being misconstrued as an occupying army  
 
 
III. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (HI) – Response condones the 
violation of national sovereignty to address the systematic violent 
suppression of human rights and/or prevent atrocities by the victims’ own 
government and/or other actors. Only under such extreme conditions as 
genocide and other convulsive forms of mass violence can a state be 
thought of as forfeiting its sovereignty beyond the cessation of atrocities, 
justifying occupation for restoration of order, and restructuring. 
Interventions with the abstract goals of “peace,” “order,” or “stability,” 
stated at the outset are suspect without one or more of the following 
stipulations: 
 
 
1) LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY (HI.LA) – Is not limited to the United 
Nations but is rooted in a duty to victimized others by implied or 
express consent of the invading nation’s home populace 
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2) RIGHT INTENTION (HI.RI) – Cites duty to others and 
international justice, versus ideological or nationalistic motives 
 
3) CHANCE OF SUCCESS (HI.CS) – Multilateral interventions are 
more likely to gain legitimacy, and therefore longevity 
 
4) LAST RESORT (HI.LR) – Systemic atrocities may not afford the 
time for diplomacy or sanctions but if so, antecedents to armed 
intervention could include UN resolutions condemning the action, 
calling on rogue states to cease violating and cede power to 
opposition, and/or the introduction of peacekeepers or observers 
from regional transnational organizations 
 
5) PROPORTIONALITY (HI.PR) – More innocents must not be 
foreseeably harmed by righting the wrong that prompts invasion 
than by abstention or other measures 
 
A. Includes but is not limited to the four categories recognized under 
the United Nations’ RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (HI.RP) 
doctrine: 
 
1) GENOCIDE (HI.G) 
2) ETHNIC CLEANSING (HI.EC) 
3) WAR CRIMES (HI.WC) 
4) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (HI.CH) 
 
 
IV. Negative responses: 
 
1) REALIST MORAL SKEPTICISM (RMS) – a right does not exist 
because invasion and war are inevitable and amoral; “might makes 
right” 
 
2) INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POSITIVISM (ILP) – Respondent 
upholds national sovereignty against any right to “invasion,” 
which s/he reads as synonymous with “aggression,” ignoring or 
dismissing UN recognized exceptions in international humanitarian 
law. 
 
3) PACIFIST MORAL SKEPTICISM (PMS) – The category of moral 
violence does not exist so there can be no such justification; the 
pretense of just causes for invasion perpetuates war when 
nonviolent means are sufficient. 
 
 
Quick Reference: 
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I. Affirmative 
A. SELF-DEFENSE (SD) 
1) LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY (SD.LA)  
2) RIGHT INTENTION (SD.RI)  
3) CHANCE OF SUCCESS (SD.CS)  
4) LAST RESORT (SD.LR)  
5) PROPORTIONALITY (SD.PR) 
 
B. OTHER-DEFENSE (OD) 
1) LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY (OD.LA)  
2) RIGHT INTENTION (OD.RI) 
3) CHANCE OF SUCCESS (OD.CS)  
4) LAST RESORT (OD.LR) 
5) PROPORTIONALITY (OD.PR) 
 
C. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION/HUMAN RIGHTS (HI) 
1) LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY (HI.LA 
2) RIGHT INTENTION (HI.RI)  
3) CHANCE OF SUCCESS (HI.CS)  
4) LAST RESORT (HI.LR) 
5) PROPORTIONALITY (HI.PR) 
a) RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (HI.RP) 
1) GENOCIDE (HI.G) 
2) ETHNIC CLEANSING (HI.EC) 
3) WAR CRIMES (HI.WC) 
4) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (HI.CH) 
 
II.  Negative responses 
1) REALIST MORAL SKEPTICISM (RMS) 
2) INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POSITIVISM (ILP) 
3) PACIFIST MORAL SKEPTICISM (PMS) 
 
III. Affirmative or Negative 
1) LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY (LA)  
2) RIGHT INTENTION (RI)  
3) CHANCE OF SUCCESS (CS)  
4) LAST RESORT (LR)  
5) PROPORTIONALITY (PR) 	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Boston University College of Communication 
 
Debater, twenty-seventh annual “Great Debate”        2009 
With a panel of foreign policy experts, argued for the motion, “The war in 
Afghanistan is worth fighting” against Boston University Professors 
Andrew Bacevich and Hamid Karzai biographer, Nick Mills 
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VOLUNTEER TEACHING AND TUTORING 
 
Writing Fellow, Boston University Educational Resource Center 
Boston, MA               2009–2012 
Helped BU staff, undergraduates, graduate students, and adult learners of 
diverse backgrounds and nationalities improve their written 
communication 
 
Juror, City On A Hill Charter Public School, Roxbury, MA        2009–2010 
Evaluated presentations of final projects on national histories by rising 
seniors 
 
Session leader, Boston University new teaching fellow orientation 
Boston MA               2008 
Helped plan and facilitate an instructional seminar on pedagogy for 
incoming teaching fellows in the social sciences 
 
Resource Teacher, Monterey County Charter Schools, Monterey, CA      2003 
Mentored ADHD- and dyslexia-affected student, tutoring in all eighth 
grade subjects 
 
English tutor, Washington & Lee University Dean’s Peer Tutoring Program 
Lexington, VA             2002 
 
 
APPOINTMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ROLES 
 
Boston University 
Online Media Coordinator, Center for the Study of Europe       2013 
Vice-President, Graduate Student Organization                                           2008–2009 
Departmental Representative, Graduate Student Organization                2007–2010 
Resident Assistant                                                                                             2006–2007 
Student Advisor, Dean of Students’ ‘One BU’ Strategic Planning Committee  2006 
 
St. John’s College 
President, Graduate Institute Council                                                                2004–2005 
Executive Board Member, SJC Search & Rescue Team                                   2004–2005 
Member-at-Large, SJC Search & Rescue Team                                                2004–2005 
Representative, Graduate Institute Council                                                   2003–2004 
 
Washington & Lee University 
Tenure File Contributor                   2003, 2006, 2013 
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Asked to support the candidacy of two professors of the Department of 
Politics and one professor in the Department of Classics (all granted). Also 
asked to support the latter for the State Council of Higher Education for 
Virginia Outstanding Faculty Award. 
 
Writing Program Advisory Committee Chair         2002 
 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
 
American Political Science Association 
 Section memberships: 17. Foundations of Political Thought 
  28. Political Psychology 
  31. Foreign Policy 
 
American Psychological Association 
Peace Psychology, Division 48: Society for the Study Peace, Conflict, and 
Violence 
 
Association for Political Theory 
International Society of Political Psychology 
Midwestern Political Science Association 
Northeastern Political Science Association 
Psychologists for Social Responsibility 
